Abstract
The purity of the ‘Pure Theory’ demands the separation of law from morality. Therefore, Kelsen tries to offer the ideal form of legal statements which are distinguishable ...
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The purity of the ‘Pure Theory’ demands the separation of law from morality. Therefore, Kelsen tries to offer the ideal form of legal statements which are distinguishable from morality. In his traditional theory, with its substantial normativity, he sustains this independency by proposing the category of imputation as a conditional statement, as opposed to imperatives of morality. Here, norm addressees are authorities, not legal subjects. Nonetheless, the normativity of his positivism leads to deontic form of obligation which is univocal in both law and morality. It means that the basis of ‘ought’ in both fields is the rational necessitation which gives the basic norm – as a source of normativity of any legal system – a moral character. Kelsen was aware of the problem; hence his theory of empowerment. In the second theory, ‘ought’ has a meaning of competency to exercise power. Now, obligation is not more a first-hand concept in legal theory. Therefore, the ideal form of law is neither deontic nor imperative and norm addresses are authorities. Therefore, the form is the purest.
