Document Type : Original Article

Abstract

Kant’s discussions in Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) and Critique of Practical Reason (1788) hasled the vast majority of his readers to recognize him as a philosopher who denies the view that “anthropology and empirical study of human nature plays an important role in morality.” Therefore, dwelling upon lack of Kant’s attention to empirical facts, they criticize his moral philosophy as having formal or pure characteristics. But can it be seriously argued that Kant’s moral arguments assign no role for experience? A close examination of Kant’s works shows that, after all, his moral philosophy is not pure, since in some of his works including The Metaphysics of Morals (1797), Anthropology from Pragmatic Point of View (1798) and Lectures on Ethics (1795) he speaks of the need for empirical basis in morality and refers to it as moral anthropology. Thus, Kant’s moral anthropology demonstrates empirical strategies needed to attain freedom and good being. In this paper, introducing this obscured part of Kant’s moral philosophy, we have established that Kant’s moral philosophy is not quite formal as it also enjoys the empirical basis.

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