Document Type : Original Article

Authors

• Mahdi Akhavan
• Seyyed Mahdi Keshmiri
• Hamed Merati

Abstract

This paper tries to describe, analyze and critique John Mackie’s metaethical views. Mackie’s metaethical views and his skeptical stand, along with his ideas on the philosophy of religion, are highly influenced by the English philosopher, David Hume. However, his ideas, at least on the realm of ethics, are more complex than those of Hume’s and thus more difficult to challenge.  Mackie’s ideas, regardless of their similarities to other skeptical views in Ethics, have their own complications, so much so that some of critics who work on various aspects of moral nihilism have failed to fully address it. Hence alternative arguments are needed in order to defend moral knowledge and critique Error Theory. This paper argues that first, some of Mackie’s arguments are fundamentally distorted, and second, even if they were not, they hardly result in moral nihilism.

Keywords

• Error Theory
• Moral Properties
• moral knowledge
• Moral Ontology
• Moral Epistemology