عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسنده [English]چکیده [English]
The problem of the standard of judging in ethical criticism of art is one of the most decisive problems in this arena, the problem that which one of the set of values is the standard of judging artworks. Now, one of the most recent attitudes is Value Pluralism, which beside of the three other main attitudes, Moralism, Aestheticism, and Autonomism, provides a deferent presentation, namely a combination of values (including ethical and aesthetic ones) is ultimately the standard of judging art. A prominent representative of Value Pluralism in ethical criticism of art is Berys Gaut. In defending his characteristic approach to ethical criticism of art, he takes Value Pluralism. However, it seems that Value Pluralism, at least according to Guat, comes to grips with the problems make it unjustifiable. The Pluralist either must accept that the ultimate decision on value of art will reduce to the taste of judger, must acknowledge that his attitude will ultimately reduce to the three other main ones, or must present a new standard to which the both aesthetic and ethical values are interchangeable. It is clear that in the first case criticism in the sense of a systematic action will be canceled, and in the second and third cases Value Pluralism will have no realizable sense.