عنوان مقاله [English]
Philosophers have provided many accounts in response to this question that how we know our mental states. Cassam presented Inferentialism in response to this question. In his opinion, against that we intuitively feel, we don’t have any immediate access to our mental states, but we know our mental states based on some external and internal evidences. Boyle doesn’t count this account as a good account. He believes that inferential account of self-knowledge is like that we are alienated of our mental states. Cassam doesn’t accept Boyle objection too. In this paper, we will show first, Cassam hasn’t taken Boyle intention of alienation correctly and if he takes it correctly, he finds it inevitable. Second, if Cassam by accepting this issue, restricts his claim and doesn’t introduce inferentialism as an account for all kind of self-knowledge, alienation problem will not endanger the life of inferentialism as a good account for many instance of self-knowledge.