عنوان مقاله [English]
The semantics, e.g. self-evidence and (in)definability, of moral concepts is one of the considered subjects on Ethics. In this article, we shall try to explore al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī's views, as a theologian (mutakallim) considering his moral viewpoints more clearly than his predecessors, on the subject and explain it accordance with the contemporary debates. Unlike Adams, the moral philosopher, although he does not distinguish between moral value and that of obligation, he believes, like Moore, that the moral values are simple and indefinable by ḥaddī definition. It should be noted that unlike Moore claiming that merely “Good” is indefinable, firstly, Ḥillī, I think, believes that both “Good” and “Evil” are like that. Secondly, he asserts a rasmī definition praise and blame desert (istiḥqāq al-madḥ wa al-dhamm). It can be understood from his views that the definability by rasmī definition and self-evidence are compatible. Besides, he takes apart moral values from that of aesthetic. His distinction is similar to that of John Lock separating Primary Qualities from Secondary Qualities.