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<Journal>
				<PublisherName>University of Zanjan</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>Philosophical Meditations</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2228-5253</Issn>
				<Volume>2</Volume>
				<Issue>7.8</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2010</Year>
					<Month>11</Month>
					<Day>22</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>An Analysis of the Recognition Value and Consideration of Contingent/Necessity argument from Ibn-Sina and Mulla Sadra&#039;s Points of View</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>An Analysis of the Recognition Value and Consideration of Contingent/Necessity argument from Ibn-Sina and Mulla Sadra&#039;s Points of View</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>27</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>43</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">19535</ELocationID>
			
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2016</Year>
					<Month>04</Month>
					<Day>29</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>Contingent/&lt;strong&gt;Necessity argument &lt;/strong&gt;(sometimes briefly called contingent &lt;strong&gt;argument&lt;/strong&gt;) is one of the most important intellectual grounds to prove the existence of God. This &lt;strong&gt;argument &lt;/strong&gt;is of high significance among the Islamic philosophers and it is regarded as the way of philosophers to prove the existence of God. The main subject of this argument is the existence of possible bings and effects. This is to say that we can reach to cause except through the effects. According to the usual division of logicians, this kind of argument is called quiatic proof. On the other hand, according to philosophers, without awareness of effect we cannot recognize the cause. In this case proving the cause through the quiatic proof is useless and ineffective. Ibn-sina considers the contingent and &lt;strong&gt;Necessity &lt;/strong&gt;argument as a kind of propteric proof to reply to these challengers. Because of Ibn-sina&#039;s carefulness in this argument, Mulla sadra, considers it as a special type of certainty reason.</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">Contingent/&lt;strong&gt;Necessity argument &lt;/strong&gt;(sometimes briefly called contingent &lt;strong&gt;argument&lt;/strong&gt;) is one of the most important intellectual grounds to prove the existence of God. This &lt;strong&gt;argument &lt;/strong&gt;is of high significance among the Islamic philosophers and it is regarded as the way of philosophers to prove the existence of God. The main subject of this argument is the existence of possible bings and effects. This is to say that we can reach to cause except through the effects. According to the usual division of logicians, this kind of argument is called quiatic proof. On the other hand, according to philosophers, without awareness of effect we cannot recognize the cause. In this case proving the cause through the quiatic proof is useless and ineffective. Ibn-sina considers the contingent and &lt;strong&gt;Necessity &lt;/strong&gt;argument as a kind of propteric proof to reply to these challengers. Because of Ibn-sina&#039;s carefulness in this argument, Mulla sadra, considers it as a special type of certainty reason.</OtherAbstract>
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			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Contingent/necessary argument</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">causal argument</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">assertoric argument</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Reason</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Ibn-Sina</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Mulla sadra</Param>
			</Object>
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