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<ArticleSet>
<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>University of Zanjan</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>Philosophical Meditations</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2228-5253</Issn>
				<Volume>6</Volume>
				<Issue>17</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2016</Year>
					<Month>11</Month>
					<Day>21</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>Larry Laudan and the Pessimistic Induction</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>Larry Laudan and the Pessimistic Induction</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>103</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>134</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">24914</ELocationID>
			
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Javad</FirstName>
					<LastName>Akbari Takhtameshlou</LastName>
<Affiliation>Assistant Professor at Sharif University of Technology</Affiliation>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2017</Year>
					<Month>03</Month>
					<Day>26</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>Relying on the ‘no miracle argument’, the realists claim that the best explanation for the extraordinary success of scientific theories is that they are (approximately) true. But Larry Laudan in his 1981 paper presented an influential historical argument (known as the ‘pessimistic induction’) which challenged this claim. History of science, according to Laudan, offers many scientific theories that despite their previous success are rejected today. Then, unlike the realists’ claim, success cannot be considered as a mark of truth of the theories. In this paper first Laudan’s argument will be introduced in detail, and then the exact logical formulation of this argument will be reconstructed. Finally, we suggest a response to this argument.</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">Relying on the ‘no miracle argument’, the realists claim that the best explanation for the extraordinary success of scientific theories is that they are (approximately) true. But Larry Laudan in his 1981 paper presented an influential historical argument (known as the ‘pessimistic induction’) which challenged this claim. History of science, according to Laudan, offers many scientific theories that despite their previous success are rejected today. Then, unlike the realists’ claim, success cannot be considered as a mark of truth of the theories. In this paper first Laudan’s argument will be introduced in detail, and then the exact logical formulation of this argument will be reconstructed. Finally, we suggest a response to this argument.</OtherAbstract>
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			<Param Name="value">Larry Laudan</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Pessimistic (Meta) Induction</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Success of Theories</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">(Approximate) Truth</Param>
			</Object>
		</ObjectList>
<ArchiveCopySource DocType="pdf">https://phm.znu.ac.ir/article_24914_7c405af5d78fe60ff050b1da3143c84a.pdf</ArchiveCopySource>
</Article>
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