University of Zanjan Philosophical Meditations 2228-5253 10 24 2020 08 22 Explaining the Incompatibility of Emergentism with Physicalism by an Emphasis on the Ontological Perspective; And Propose a New Emergentist Position Explaining the Incompatibility of Emergentism with Physicalism by an Emphasis on the Ontological Perspective; And Propose a New Emergentist Position 11 42 36311 10.30470/phm.2019.102292.1553 FA Massoud Toossi Saeidi PhD Candidate for Philosophy of Religion, Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies 0000-0001-8394-8507 Seyed Hassan Hosseini Department for Philosophy of Science, Faculty Member, Sharif University of Technology, Tehran, Iran Journal Article 2019 01 20 In this paper, first Physicalism is defined by the suggestion of David Lewis, and through the use of the concept of Supervenience. Afterwards, it is explained that among a variety of Emergentist's positions, a small number can be chosen to have an ontological inconsistency with Physicalism. In this regard, the Substantial Emergentism, based on the thoughts of Hasker, Lowe and Toner, and the Causal Emergentism, based on O'Connor and Wong's ideas, and their incompatibility with physicalism is explained. In the following, the relation of each of these ideas, with each other and with Physicalism and Cartesian Dualism, is analyzed. In the end, based on a metaphysical analysis, a new Emergentist's position is proposed; which its ontology is not a basically different plan from Physicalism, but at the same time inconsistent with it. It is also explained that the non-differentiation of this proposal with physicalism in terms of its ontological outline is its advantage over the emergentist's positions which are examined in this paper. In this paper, first Physicalism is defined by the suggestion of David Lewis, and through the use of the concept of Supervenience. Afterwards, it is explained that among a variety of Emergentist's positions, a small number can be chosen to have an ontological inconsistency with Physicalism. In this regard, the Substantial Emergentism, based on the thoughts of Hasker, Lowe and Toner, and the Causal Emergentism, based on O'Connor and Wong's ideas, and their incompatibility with physicalism is explained. In the following, the relation of each of these ideas, with each other and with Physicalism and Cartesian Dualism, is analyzed. In the end, based on a metaphysical analysis, a new Emergentist's position is proposed; which its ontology is not a basically different plan from Physicalism, but at the same time inconsistent with it. It is also explained that the non-differentiation of this proposal with physicalism in terms of its ontological outline is its advantage over the emergentist's positions which are examined in this paper. https://phm.znu.ac.ir/article_36311_fb5dc7f2fdd8cb3c0c885f0c269039da.pdf