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<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>University of Zanjan</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>Philosophical Meditations</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2228-5253</Issn>
				<Volume>9</Volume>
				<Issue>23</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2020</Year>
					<Month>02</Month>
					<Day>20</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>Supervenience and Moral Realism</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>Supervenience and Moral Realism</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>327</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>354</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">38460</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.30470/phm.2019.97526.1521</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Behruz</FirstName>
					<LastName>Muhammadi</LastName>
<Affiliation>University of Tehran</Affiliation>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2018</Year>
					<Month>11</Month>
					<Day>26</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>The main purpose of this article is to defend the position of moral realism, that is to defend this general approach to which moral characteristics and attributes are part of the outside world and at least some of the moral propositions are true. To this end, it is first necessary to criticize moral nonrealism arguments and to respond. One of the arguments of moral nonrealism versus moral realism has been formulated through Supervenience. John Mckie and Simon Blackburn, with the help of Supervenience, have argued in defense of moral realism and rejection of moral realism. In this paper we seek to explain, analyze and criticize this argument. So, first, we explain the nature of Supervenience and its domain to the field of ethics, then analyze Blackburn&#039;s argument through Supervenience in a critique of moral realism and finally, will criticize this argument.The result of this research is that moral realism is more acceptable than ethical falsehoods.</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">The main purpose of this article is to defend the position of moral realism, that is to defend this general approach to which moral characteristics and attributes are part of the outside world and at least some of the moral propositions are true. To this end, it is first necessary to criticize moral nonrealism arguments and to respond. One of the arguments of moral nonrealism versus moral realism has been formulated through Supervenience. John Mckie and Simon Blackburn, with the help of Supervenience, have argued in defense of moral realism and rejection of moral realism. In this paper we seek to explain, analyze and criticize this argument. So, first, we explain the nature of Supervenience and its domain to the field of ethics, then analyze Blackburn&#039;s argument through Supervenience in a critique of moral realism and finally, will criticize this argument.The result of this research is that moral realism is more acceptable than ethical falsehoods.</OtherAbstract>
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			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Supervenience</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">moral realism</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">moral nonrealism</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Blackburn</Param>
			</Object>
		</ObjectList>
<ArchiveCopySource DocType="pdf">https://phm.znu.ac.ir/article_38460_5782efc436ca617a069a0cbc86f5f371.pdf</ArchiveCopySource>
</Article>
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