University of Zanjan Philosophical Meditations 2228-5253 15 35 2025 08 23 The Criticism of Friendly Atheism The Criticism of Friendly Atheism 11 42 710784 10.30470/phm.2024.2006894.2424 FA Farah Ramin Associate professor, Qom University, Qom, Iran. Seyyedeh Mona Mousavi Department of Shia Studies, Faculty of Islamic Theology, University of Qom, Qom.Iran Aleme Allami Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Faculty of Islamic Theology, Qom University, Qom, Iran Journal Article 2023 07 13 William Rowe presents a new understanding of the evidential problem of evil based on his own epistemic principle, which states that "the truth of a proposition is not a necessary condition for its rational acceptance." He proposes the theory of "friendly atheism" and defends the rationality of belief in God through "epistemic friendliness." However, forty years later, he revisits this theory and only believes in “ethical friendliness”. In this study, through an analytical-critical method, we aim to evaluate the theory of friendly atheism - epistemological or moral - and its challenges. The findings show that despite the ambiguity in the meaning of rationality in the epistemic principle, "epistemic friendliness" in affirming the evidence for and against God is paradoxical and faces relativism in rationality, and the theory of incomplete determination cannot justify this dilemma. ethical friendliness is a normative approach dedicated to the behavior of atheists and seems to weaken the rationality of the theory and can be considered as a form of new atheism that requires weakening belief in God. William Rowe presents a new understanding of the evidential problem of evil based on his own epistemic principle, which states that "the truth of a proposition is not a necessary condition for its rational acceptance." He proposes the theory of "friendly atheism" and defends the rationality of belief in God through "epistemic friendliness." However, forty years later, he revisits this theory and only believes in “ethical friendliness”. In this study, through an analytical-critical method, we aim to evaluate the theory of friendly atheism - epistemological or moral - and its challenges. The findings show that despite the ambiguity in the meaning of rationality in the epistemic principle, "epistemic friendliness" in affirming the evidence for and against God is paradoxical and faces relativism in rationality, and the theory of incomplete determination cannot justify this dilemma. ethical friendliness is a normative approach dedicated to the behavior of atheists and seems to weaken the rationality of the theory and can be considered as a form of new atheism that requires weakening belief in God. https://phm.znu.ac.ir/article_710784_b8e17e747cd236dd80639cb2ca326348.pdf