دانشگاه زنجانتأملات فلسفی2228-52531637(Crises of Contemporary Humanity)20260622The meaning of life from Farabi's point of viewThe meaning of life from Farabi's point of view73673725010.30470/phm.2026.737250FAMosaviSeyedeh LeilaPostdoctoral Student at the University of PretoriaThaddeusMetzResearch Professor Philosophy at the University of PretoriaJournal ArticleIn this article we study the meaning of life in the philosophy of Abu Nasr Farabi in English for the first time, in contrast to familiar works discussing his contributions to philosophy of religion, philosophical anthropology, and political philosophy. We present the findings in relation to contemporary literature in the field of the meaning of life and the divisions made by analytic philosophers. In Farabi’s philosophy, there is a fundamental connection between theism and true happiness (Sa'adat) based on the knowledge of the soul and its immortality. As a philosopher who believes in God and the immortal soul, Farabi designs a system- based on which man's worldly life becomes meaningful given the supreme goal of achieving good fortune in the afterlife and in connection with God. We characterize Farabi's approach as a supernaturalist (against naturalist) theory involving both God and a soul (against only one of these) that is based on the discovery (against error theory) of a single meaning in life (against pluralism), built upon objectivism (against subjectivism), action-guiding (against knowledge merely for its own sake), and holist (against partialism).In this article we study the meaning of life in the philosophy of Abu Nasr Farabi in English for the first time, in contrast to familiar works discussing his contributions to philosophy of religion, philosophical anthropology, and political philosophy. We present the findings in relation to contemporary literature in the field of the meaning of life and the divisions made by analytic philosophers. In Farabi’s philosophy, there is a fundamental connection between theism and true happiness (Sa'adat) based on the knowledge of the soul and its immortality. As a philosopher who believes in God and the immortal soul, Farabi designs a system- based on which man's worldly life becomes meaningful given the supreme goal of achieving good fortune in the afterlife and in connection with God. We characterize Farabi's approach as a supernaturalist (against naturalist) theory involving both God and a soul (against only one of these) that is based on the discovery (against error theory) of a single meaning in life (against pluralism), built upon objectivism (against subjectivism), action-guiding (against knowledge merely for its own sake), and holist (against partialism).https://phm.znu.ac.ir/article_737250_40c586ac6ca36a26cf3d91ca40eb9008.pdfدانشگاه زنجانتأملات فلسفی2228-52531637(Crises of Contemporary Humanity)20260622“Belief Is Impossible and Necessary.” Crisis of History and Eschatological Hope in Sergio Quinzio“Belief Is Impossible and Necessary.” Crisis of History and Eschatological Hope in Sergio Quinzio73725110.30470/phm.2026.2081912.2798FAMarioLupoliFaculty of Philosophy, Pontifical University Antonianum, Holy See0000-0002-5457-7222Journal Article20251224This article offers a philosophical reading of Sergio Quinzio’s thought as a radical interpretation of the crisis of contemporary humanity. Starting from the deferral of the Christian eschatological promise, it analyzes the erosion of the meaning of history and of the possibility of conceiving the future as a space of transformation. In Quinzio, the non-fulfillment of salvation does not constitute a theological anomaly, but rather the site in which the dramatic truth of historical experience emerges: the rupture between promise and fulfillment, between hope and despair. Through a reflection on the Cross, on the theme of failure, and on a critique of the dominant narratives of modernity, the article shows how Quinzio’s discourse situates faith as a potential bearer of an eminently critical function, preventing the present from being absolutized. Hope, deprived of any guarantee, thus takes shape as an experience of risk and as resistance to meaninglessness, making Quinzio’s thought relevant for a philosophical understanding of the anthropological and symbolic crisis of contemporaneity.This article offers a philosophical reading of Sergio Quinzio’s thought as a radical interpretation of the crisis of contemporary humanity. Starting from the deferral of the Christian eschatological promise, it analyzes the erosion of the meaning of history and of the possibility of conceiving the future as a space of transformation. In Quinzio, the non-fulfillment of salvation does not constitute a theological anomaly, but rather the site in which the dramatic truth of historical experience emerges: the rupture between promise and fulfillment, between hope and despair. Through a reflection on the Cross, on the theme of failure, and on a critique of the dominant narratives of modernity, the article shows how Quinzio’s discourse situates faith as a potential bearer of an eminently critical function, preventing the present from being absolutized. Hope, deprived of any guarantee, thus takes shape as an experience of risk and as resistance to meaninglessness, making Quinzio’s thought relevant for a philosophical understanding of the anthropological and symbolic crisis of contemporaneity.https://phm.znu.ac.ir/article_737251_8a0b76594d4360090762d58e743bcc31.pdfدانشگاه زنجانتأملات فلسفی2228-52531637(Crises of Contemporary Humanity)20260622Said Nursi’s Twentieth Century Islamic Natural TheologySaid Nursi’s Twentieth Century Islamic Natural Theology73725210.30470/phm.2026.2081997.2799FAEdwardMoadDepartment of Comparative Humanities, Habib UniversityJournal Article20251225Of twentieth century theologians, the Kurdish Said Nursi (1877-1960) has probably the largest influence on the Muslim community of today’s Türkiye. This is largely due to his creative application of the insights of classical Islamic philosophical theology to the twentieth century scientific picture of the world, in response to challenges modern science allegedly raises to the continued relevance of traditional religious belief. This paper will examine the ‘32nd Word,’ and ‘23rd Flash’ from Said Nursi’s (1877-1960) magnum opus, Risale-I Nur. First, we will review a parable Nursi uses to present his ‘second proof’ of God in the context of a modern “scientific” image of the Cosmos. Secondly, we will examine the metaphysical principles operative in the proof, showing that they are as applicable to the modern scientific paradigm of Nursi’s context, as they were to the Aristotelian paradigm of his predecessors in the classical period of Islamic theology. Finally, we will show how Nursi anticipates the ‘historical turn’ in the philosophy of science, pose the question whether the prospect of relativism it raises threatens his theological project, and propose an answer, based on Nursi’s text, which responds to a central theme in the story of modern philosophy.Of twentieth century theologians, the Kurdish Said Nursi (1877-1960) has probably the largest influence on the Muslim community of today’s Türkiye. This is largely due to his creative application of the insights of classical Islamic philosophical theology to the twentieth century scientific picture of the world, in response to challenges modern science allegedly raises to the continued relevance of traditional religious belief. This paper will examine the ‘32nd Word,’ and ‘23rd Flash’ from Said Nursi’s (1877-1960) magnum opus, Risale-I Nur. First, we will review a parable Nursi uses to present his ‘second proof’ of God in the context of a modern “scientific” image of the Cosmos. Secondly, we will examine the metaphysical principles operative in the proof, showing that they are as applicable to the modern scientific paradigm of Nursi’s context, as they were to the Aristotelian paradigm of his predecessors in the classical period of Islamic theology. Finally, we will show how Nursi anticipates the ‘historical turn’ in the philosophy of science, pose the question whether the prospect of relativism it raises threatens his theological project, and propose an answer, based on Nursi’s text, which responds to a central theme in the story of modern philosophy.https://phm.znu.ac.ir/article_737252_b8cda327e7c9ec1ed2b94b815b2f271b.pdfدانشگاه زنجانتأملات فلسفی2228-52531637(Crises of Contemporary Humanity)20260622Epistemological Intimacy and the Hermeneutics of Transaction: some notes for an attempt at a deconstruction of current philosophical discourseEpistemological Intimacy and the Hermeneutics of Transaction: some notes for an attempt at a deconstruction of current philosophical discourse73725310.30470/phm.2026.2084839.2818FAStevenPeñaUniversity of Arizona, Global Campus, United States of America0000-0002-1541-288XJournal Article20260207This article offers some notes toward a theory of the putative transactional nature of modern human relationships, especially as these relate to the academic and intellectual world. I consider first the nature of ontological and conceptual theses in order to situate my own within this broad division. I then take up the concept of metanarratives and the nature of human immersion within a given conceptual scheme. This leads to the suggestion that there is a transactional or commodity-driven paradigm operating at the level of human mental exchange. It is proposed that this reduction of human relations to the transactional is tied, at least in part, to the dominance of deductive reasoning and the a-historical approach to philosophical reflection and cultural analysis. The third, and now somewhat ignored mode of reasoning in Aristotle’s logical canon, dialectic, will be explored as a possible alternative to the dominant, winner-takes-all, deductive mode of reasoning. This mode of reasoning, it will be shown, is more suited to a communitarian approach to the pursuit of truth, which, in turn, may serve as an antidote to the dominance of the transactional in current human affairs.This article offers some notes toward a theory of the putative transactional nature of modern human relationships, especially as these relate to the academic and intellectual world. I consider first the nature of ontological and conceptual theses in order to situate my own within this broad division. I then take up the concept of metanarratives and the nature of human immersion within a given conceptual scheme. This leads to the suggestion that there is a transactional or commodity-driven paradigm operating at the level of human mental exchange. It is proposed that this reduction of human relations to the transactional is tied, at least in part, to the dominance of deductive reasoning and the a-historical approach to philosophical reflection and cultural analysis. The third, and now somewhat ignored mode of reasoning in Aristotle’s logical canon, dialectic, will be explored as a possible alternative to the dominant, winner-takes-all, deductive mode of reasoning. This mode of reasoning, it will be shown, is more suited to a communitarian approach to the pursuit of truth, which, in turn, may serve as an antidote to the dominance of the transactional in current human affairs.https://phm.znu.ac.ir/article_737253_251c436e4c3d9b844e6aa2a9a0801cac.pdfدانشگاه زنجانتأملات فلسفی2228-52531637(Crises of Contemporary Humanity)20260622NON-REDEMPTIVE HOPE AND THE FRAGILITY OF MEANING DESPAIR, INJURY, AND THE ETHICS OF FUTURITY: DESPAIR, INJURY, AND THE ETHICS OF FUTURITYNON-REDEMPTIVE HOPE AND THE FRAGILITY OF MEANING DESPAIR, INJURY, AND THE ETHICS OF FUTURITY73725410.30470/phm.2026.2083070.2810FATintoTDDiscipline of Philosophy
School of Humanities and Social Sciences
INDIAN INSTITUTE OF Technology Indore0000-0001-6265-2790UpendraChidellaDepartment of Philosophy
School of Humanities and Social Sciences
Indian Institute of Technology Indore
Indore, India0000-0001-7373-1451Journal Article20260105Proceeding through a series of scenes of injury, violence, and the collapse of the meaningful, the article offers an account of the post-redemptive nature of hope, despair, and futurity. Where redemption and moral improvement are proffered, hope instead becomes an ontological rift in the self, the world, and temporality (Kierkegaard; Nietzsche; Ricœur; Merleau-Ponty). In line with Veena Das, Elaine Scarry, and Judith Butler, the article then reconsiders despair in the ordinary life of an injured and precarious world, in which meaning gradually thins rather than breaks down. Drawing on Nietzsche, Weber, Camus, Matuštík and Tracy B. Strong, the article accounts for despair as an instance of the modern "scarcity of hope", where redemptive narratives are both ethically indecent and philosophically untenable. Adopting the position of responsibility, relational permanence and fragile world-binding (Levinas; Arendt; Nancy), the article shows how non-redemptive hope can align with despair against nihilism and consolation. The final sections develop an ethics of fragile futurity and a conception of political judgment that remain reflective and plural without metaphysical assurances, and ethical without political guarantees. It argues that this meaning and responsibility can remain after the collapse of redemption, but only if understood not as a question of triumph or restoration but of the fragility of continuing life in wounded worlds.Proceeding through a series of scenes of injury, violence, and the collapse of the meaningful, the article offers an account of the post-redemptive nature of hope, despair, and futurity. Where redemption and moral improvement are proffered, hope instead becomes an ontological rift in the self, the world, and temporality (Kierkegaard; Nietzsche; Ricœur; Merleau-Ponty). In line with Veena Das, Elaine Scarry, and Judith Butler, the article then reconsiders despair in the ordinary life of an injured and precarious world, in which meaning gradually thins rather than breaks down. Drawing on Nietzsche, Weber, Camus, Matuštík and Tracy B. Strong, the article accounts for despair as an instance of the modern "scarcity of hope", where redemptive narratives are both ethically indecent and philosophically untenable. Adopting the position of responsibility, relational permanence and fragile world-binding (Levinas; Arendt; Nancy), the article shows how non-redemptive hope can align with despair against nihilism and consolation. The final sections develop an ethics of fragile futurity and a conception of political judgment that remain reflective and plural without metaphysical assurances, and ethical without political guarantees. It argues that this meaning and responsibility can remain after the collapse of redemption, but only if understood not as a question of triumph or restoration but of the fragility of continuing life in wounded worlds.https://phm.znu.ac.ir/article_737254_21b880c57eecc8907ea15b40262339ed.pdfدانشگاه زنجانتأملات فلسفی2228-52531637(Crises of Contemporary Humanity)20260622Justice without religion? – How progress through secularism is slowly dividing societyJustice without religion? – How progress through secularism is slowly dividing society73725510.30470/phm.2026.737255FATimoSchmitzhD student, Department of Philosophy, Trier University, Trier, Germany0000-0002-3619-0438Journal ArticleIn the past, religion and state were intermingled in Western society; however, with the dawn of Enlightenment, the state was considered the only legitimate political actor with religion being dethroned. While this is often regarded to be a progress in humanity, the author wants to show that secularism leads to anti-religiosity and anti-religiosity to social division because the fundaments of a society are based on metaphysics. The common understanding of law and justice are shaped by faith-based understanding through and through. As such, the author argues that anti-religious secularism is a factor in fueling social rupture which is why faith-based actors remain important in “healing” the society.In the past, religion and state were intermingled in Western society; however, with the dawn of Enlightenment, the state was considered the only legitimate political actor with religion being dethroned. While this is often regarded to be a progress in humanity, the author wants to show that secularism leads to anti-religiosity and anti-religiosity to social division because the fundaments of a society are based on metaphysics. The common understanding of law and justice are shaped by faith-based understanding through and through. As such, the author argues that anti-religious secularism is a factor in fueling social rupture which is why faith-based actors remain important in “healing” the society.https://phm.znu.ac.ir/article_737255_e8d557e064d1e85c31d8e7d427048bf9.pdfدانشگاه زنجانتأملات فلسفی2228-52531637(Crises of Contemporary Humanity)20260622The Animal is Not Just Meat: A Critical Appraisal of Yoruba Ethics of Animal ConsumptionThe Animal is Not Just Meat: A Critical Appraisal of Yoruba Ethics of Animal Consumption73725610.30470/phm.2026.2081466.2791FARIDWAN ISHOLAMOGAJIDepartment of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts, Lagos State University, Ojo, Lagos, Nigeria0009-0007-2093-2971Sheriff OlasunkanmiIBIYEMIDepartment of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts, Lagos State University, Ojo, Lagos, Nigeria0000-0002-5290-5835Adewale OluwaseunMOTADEGBEDepartment of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts, Lagos State University, Ojo, Lagos, Nigeria0009-0004-4515-326XJournal Article20251220Currently, Non-human animals have the popular identity of being regarded as food on the plate or tool for exploitation. In response, philosophers like Peter Singer and Tom Regan objected from the place sentience and entitlement to rights. However, this issue persists, where some scholars called the pretentious claim of change in practice to be a modification of their approach to exploit, which we consider, is due to the failure to emphasis on the ontology of these animals. Hence, this research paper aims to approach it from an African perspective of spirituality, particularly from the Yoruba worldview. To the Yoruba, the environment, just like humans, has its respective spirits, purposes, and relevance. It is not to be treated with disdain or abused. In the case of animals, they, in their traditional settings, have always treated animals with respect and reverence, considering their ontological being. Even if used for the purpose of consumption, or sacrifices, animals are treated with a certain dignity, and not just as meats, as against the unethical view of animals, most especially the consumable ones as mere foods on the plate. As a framework for ensuring the responsible consumption of animals in present time, this research paper presents the Yoruba approach to giving reverence to animals, which is well-documented in their folklores. It surveys how within the Yoruba settings animals are treated with dignity and reverence, considering their communal belonging, spiritual consciousness, and ecological relevance, all of which would contribute to the global walk to environmental sustainability.Currently, Non-human animals have the popular identity of being regarded as food on the plate or tool for exploitation. In response, philosophers like Peter Singer and Tom Regan objected from the place sentience and entitlement to rights. However, this issue persists, where some scholars called the pretentious claim of change in practice to be a modification of their approach to exploit, which we consider, is due to the failure to emphasis on the ontology of these animals. Hence, this research paper aims to approach it from an African perspective of spirituality, particularly from the Yoruba worldview. To the Yoruba, the environment, just like humans, has its respective spirits, purposes, and relevance. It is not to be treated with disdain or abused. In the case of animals, they, in their traditional settings, have always treated animals with respect and reverence, considering their ontological being. Even if used for the purpose of consumption, or sacrifices, animals are treated with a certain dignity, and not just as meats, as against the unethical view of animals, most especially the consumable ones as mere foods on the plate. As a framework for ensuring the responsible consumption of animals in present time, this research paper presents the Yoruba approach to giving reverence to animals, which is well-documented in their folklores. It surveys how within the Yoruba settings animals are treated with dignity and reverence, considering their communal belonging, spiritual consciousness, and ecological relevance, all of which would contribute to the global walk to environmental sustainability.https://phm.znu.ac.ir/article_737256_a456c4050e08099ba862bef8ae5dc8de.pdfدانشگاه زنجانتأملات فلسفی2228-52531637(Crises of Contemporary Humanity)20260622From Rational Human to Algorithmic Human: Rethinking Human Ontology in the Age of Artificial IntelligenceFrom Rational Human to Algorithmic Human: Rethinking Human Ontology in the Age of Artificial Intelligence73726010.30470/phm.2026.2081304.2787FAسید مهدیبیابانکیاستادیار دانشکده الهیات و معارف اهل البیت ع دانشگاه اصفهان0000-0002-0541-2958Journal Article20251219The rapid advancement of artificial intelligence has reignited fundamental philosophical questions concerning rationality and the nature of the human being. While contemporary AI systems increasingly exhibit behaviors traditionally associated with human intelligence, this convergence has obscured crucial ontological distinctions between human and algorithmic forms of rationality. This article offers a philosophical and ontological analysis of rationality as it transitions from a classical human-centered concept to an algorithmic framework embedded in artificial intelligence.<br><br>Drawing on classical philosophy, contemporary AI theory, and critical perspectives in philosophy of technology and theology, the article argues that human rationality constitutes an existential mode of being rather than a mere functional capacity. Human rationality is inseparable from embodiment, lived experience, moral responsibility, and openness to meaning. By contrast, algorithmic rationality operates as a computational mode of operation, defined by optimization, prediction, and instrumental goal satisfaction, without access to phenomenological or ethical dimensions of existence.<br><br>The central claim of this study is that the primary ontological risk posed by artificial intelligence does not lie in the possibility that machines may become human-like, but in the gradual redefinition of the human according to algorithmic standards of rationality. Such a reduction risks undermining the conceptual foundations of human dignity, agency, and responsibility. The article concludes that a robust ethical and theological engagement with artificial intelligence must be grounded in a renewed account of human ontology that resists the reduction of rationality to computation.The rapid advancement of artificial intelligence has reignited fundamental philosophical questions concerning rationality and the nature of the human being. While contemporary AI systems increasingly exhibit behaviors traditionally associated with human intelligence, this convergence has obscured crucial ontological distinctions between human and algorithmic forms of rationality. This article offers a philosophical and ontological analysis of rationality as it transitions from a classical human-centered concept to an algorithmic framework embedded in artificial intelligence.<br><br>Drawing on classical philosophy, contemporary AI theory, and critical perspectives in philosophy of technology and theology, the article argues that human rationality constitutes an existential mode of being rather than a mere functional capacity. Human rationality is inseparable from embodiment, lived experience, moral responsibility, and openness to meaning. By contrast, algorithmic rationality operates as a computational mode of operation, defined by optimization, prediction, and instrumental goal satisfaction, without access to phenomenological or ethical dimensions of existence.<br><br>The central claim of this study is that the primary ontological risk posed by artificial intelligence does not lie in the possibility that machines may become human-like, but in the gradual redefinition of the human according to algorithmic standards of rationality. Such a reduction risks undermining the conceptual foundations of human dignity, agency, and responsibility. The article concludes that a robust ethical and theological engagement with artificial intelligence must be grounded in a renewed account of human ontology that resists the reduction of rationality to computation.https://phm.znu.ac.ir/article_737260_9d2ff0718b6c1714b14723224be52b91.pdfدانشگاه زنجانتأملات فلسفی2228-52531637(Crises of Contemporary Humanity)20260622The Semiotic in Kristeva’s Thought: The Place of Resistance Against Contemporary TotalitarianismThe Semiotic in Kristeva’s Thought: The Place of Resistance Against Contemporary Totalitarianism73768710.30470/phm.2026.2079781.2778FAحسنفتحزادهگروه فلسفه، دانشکده علوم انسانی، دانشگاه زنجان0000-0002-0901-7330مرضیهدارابیدانشجوی دکتری دانشگاه وروسلاو، لهستان0000-0001-6117-0888Journal Article20251202Through a critical reading of Julia Kristeva’s major works – especially in relation to phenomenology – this article argues that meaning and identity do not emerge from a fixed point or transcendental position, but arise within the dynamic dialectic of the semiotic and the symbolic, and in the moments of thetic break. Through the process of signification, the “subject-in-process” is understood as a linguistic–corporeal construct that appears through the rhythmic tensions and intertwining of the pre-linguistic (maternal) with the law and norms of the symbolic (paternal). The article then explores the epistemological and political implications of this view: both the critiques raised against linking the chora/semiotic to the maternal body – and the consequent risk of falling back into essentialism – and the emancipatory potential of foregrounding lived experience and linguistic–corporeal practices of resistance. Kristeva’s thought entails a return to the authenticity of maternal space as a way out of the totalitarian tendencies of contemporary thought. On this basis, we argue that one may draw upon Kristeva’s theoretical resources – while preserving phenomenological sensitivity to experience and remaining alert to the discursive mechanisms of power – to reinterpret contemporary cultural processes in a way that both facilitates analyses of the formation of the living subject within historical contexts and avoids reproducing patriarchal totalitarianism, including binary oppositions and symbolic exclusion.Through a critical reading of Julia Kristeva’s major works – especially in relation to phenomenology – this article argues that meaning and identity do not emerge from a fixed point or transcendental position, but arise within the dynamic dialectic of the semiotic and the symbolic, and in the moments of thetic break. Through the process of signification, the “subject-in-process” is understood as a linguistic–corporeal construct that appears through the rhythmic tensions and intertwining of the pre-linguistic (maternal) with the law and norms of the symbolic (paternal). The article then explores the epistemological and political implications of this view: both the critiques raised against linking the chora/semiotic to the maternal body – and the consequent risk of falling back into essentialism – and the emancipatory potential of foregrounding lived experience and linguistic–corporeal practices of resistance. Kristeva’s thought entails a return to the authenticity of maternal space as a way out of the totalitarian tendencies of contemporary thought. On this basis, we argue that one may draw upon Kristeva’s theoretical resources – while preserving phenomenological sensitivity to experience and remaining alert to the discursive mechanisms of power – to reinterpret contemporary cultural processes in a way that both facilitates analyses of the formation of the living subject within historical contexts and avoids reproducing patriarchal totalitarianism, including binary oppositions and symbolic exclusion.https://phm.znu.ac.ir/article_737687_ecdd63a796d12fa692dcab1de5332c44.pdfدانشگاه زنجانتأملات فلسفی2228-52531637(Crises of Contemporary Humanity)20260622A Critical Analysis of “Radical Hope” versus “Optimism” in Terry Eagleton’s ThoughtA Critical Analysis of “Radical Hope” versus “Optimism” in Terry Eagleton’s Thought73726110.30470/phm.2026.2083017.2808FAعلیفتحیگروه فلسفه دانشکده الهیات دانشکدگان فارابی دانشگاه تهران0000-0001-7652-1433Journal Article20260104This research undertakes a critical investigation of the ontological distinction between "Hope" and "Optimism" within the intellectual framework of Terry Eagleton. The central problem concerns the critique of the ideology of optimism as a neoliberal construct—one that, by denying the "Tragic" and erasing historical memory, reproduces subjective passivity in the face of structural catastrophes. Employing a descriptive-analytical method and a critical approach, this paper argues that by synthesizing radical Marxism with virtue theology, Eagleton formulates "Radical Hope" not as a mere psychological desire, but as a political praxis and a rational virtue that germinates only through the acceptance of failure and the traversal of the realm of catastrophe.<br><br>The findings indicate that while Eagleton's thought faces challenges regarding its metaphysical foundations and cultural universality—revealing certain aporias in explaining the transcendent source of hope when compared to concepts such as Raja in Islamic Wisdom—his ability to shatter the idol of false optimism and reconstruct human agency in an "age of closure" remains undeniable. Ultimately, this article demonstrates that, according to Eagleton, "Hope without Optimism," grounded in moral stamina and fidelity to the excluded subjects of history, is the only path toward reclaiming human dignity and resisting global disasters. It is a hope that links activism not to the guarantee of victory, but to the truth of standing against the necessity of evil.This research undertakes a critical investigation of the ontological distinction between "Hope" and "Optimism" within the intellectual framework of Terry Eagleton. The central problem concerns the critique of the ideology of optimism as a neoliberal construct—one that, by denying the "Tragic" and erasing historical memory, reproduces subjective passivity in the face of structural catastrophes. Employing a descriptive-analytical method and a critical approach, this paper argues that by synthesizing radical Marxism with virtue theology, Eagleton formulates "Radical Hope" not as a mere psychological desire, but as a political praxis and a rational virtue that germinates only through the acceptance of failure and the traversal of the realm of catastrophe.<br><br>The findings indicate that while Eagleton's thought faces challenges regarding its metaphysical foundations and cultural universality—revealing certain aporias in explaining the transcendent source of hope when compared to concepts such as Raja in Islamic Wisdom—his ability to shatter the idol of false optimism and reconstruct human agency in an "age of closure" remains undeniable. Ultimately, this article demonstrates that, according to Eagleton, "Hope without Optimism," grounded in moral stamina and fidelity to the excluded subjects of history, is the only path toward reclaiming human dignity and resisting global disasters. It is a hope that links activism not to the guarantee of victory, but to the truth of standing against the necessity of evil.https://phm.znu.ac.ir/article_737261_0f5dc5b00a6b2679b6106df3bf65cf73.pdfدانشگاه زنجانتأملات فلسفی2228-52531637(Crises of Contemporary Humanity)20260622Rethinking the Crisis of Meaning, in Light of the Connection between Robert Salomon's Theory of the Meaning of Life and Lakoff and Johnson's Theory of Conceptual MetaphorsRethinking the Crisis of Meaning, in Light of the Connection between Robert Salomon's Theory of the Meaning of Life and Lakoff and Johnson's Theory of Conceptual Metaphors73726210.30470/phm.2026.2083864.2814FAمژگانمحمدیاستادیار پژوهشگاه علوم انسانی و مطالعات اجتماعی جهاد دانشگاهی0000-0003-1876-2604فاطمهشریفی زادهاستادیار گروه علوم کامپیوتر، دانشکده علوم ریاضی، دانشگاه الزهراء، تهران، ایرانJournal Article20260129The crisis of meaning in the present era is considered one of the most important challenges of human and social life, and paying attention to it from various angles can make a significant contribution to solving many of the individual and social problems of today's humanity. Therefore, in this article, with an interdisciplinary approach in philosophy and cognitive linguistics, and with a descriptive-analytical method, we examine and rethink the issue of the crisis of meaning. From Salmon's perspective in philosophy, the question of the meaning of life requires a metaphor, in which man sees himself as having a specific role, this perspective is the determining factor of human life. On the other hand, Lakoff and Johnson believe that conceptual metaphors, beyond a linguistic tool, shape the structure of thought, perception, and action. The connection of these two theories caused us to examine and review the issue of the crisis of meaning from the perspective of the crisis in the dominant metaphors in life. From this perspective, the crisis of meaning is the inability of dominant metaphors to organize the experience of the world, when previous metaphors are unable to make sense of suffering, death, hope, the future, or moral action. Therefore, overcoming the crisis requires the creation or revival of new metaphors that can make new experiences understandable. This requires examining the context of the crisis of meaning in dominant metaphors, and the prevalence of dark metaphors, and then considering the requirements for overcoming this crisis with new metaphors.The crisis of meaning in the present era is considered one of the most important challenges of human and social life, and paying attention to it from various angles can make a significant contribution to solving many of the individual and social problems of today's humanity. Therefore, in this article, with an interdisciplinary approach in philosophy and cognitive linguistics, and with a descriptive-analytical method, we examine and rethink the issue of the crisis of meaning. From Salmon's perspective in philosophy, the question of the meaning of life requires a metaphor, in which man sees himself as having a specific role, this perspective is the determining factor of human life. On the other hand, Lakoff and Johnson believe that conceptual metaphors, beyond a linguistic tool, shape the structure of thought, perception, and action. The connection of these two theories caused us to examine and review the issue of the crisis of meaning from the perspective of the crisis in the dominant metaphors in life. From this perspective, the crisis of meaning is the inability of dominant metaphors to organize the experience of the world, when previous metaphors are unable to make sense of suffering, death, hope, the future, or moral action. Therefore, overcoming the crisis requires the creation or revival of new metaphors that can make new experiences understandable. This requires examining the context of the crisis of meaning in dominant metaphors, and the prevalence of dark metaphors, and then considering the requirements for overcoming this crisis with new metaphors.https://phm.znu.ac.ir/article_737262_d7ba0f916554086404da94f3ac629366.pdfدانشگاه زنجانتأملات فلسفی2228-52531637(Crises of Contemporary Humanity)20260622Modern Technology as a Philosophical Problem: A Typology of Critical and Affirmative Attitudes in Light of Three Fundamental PropositionsModern Technology as a Philosophical Problem: A Typology of Critical and Affirmative Attitudes in Light of Three Fundamental Propositions73726310.30470/phm.2026.2077174.2765FAسیدمرتضیطباطبائیگروه فلسفه، دانشکده ادبیات و علوم انسانی، دانشگاه ادیان و مذاهب، ایران، قمJournal Article20251108This paper examines modern technology not merely as a collection of tools and processes but as a philosophical problem concerning the nature, value, and existential orientation of humankind. The study aims to reconstruct a coherent conceptual framework for analyzing four principal responses to technology—resistance, critical passivity, reform and substitution, and support and advancement—and to evaluate them in light of three fundamental propositions: (1) the overall harmfulness of modern technology, (2) whether technological harms are intrinsic or incidental, and (3) the human possibility of resisting technological expansion. The methodology combines conceptual analysis, argumentative evaluation, and comparative study of major contemporary positions, focusing especially on representative thinkers such as Martin Heidegger,, Andrew Feenberg, Theodore Kaczynski, Ray Kurzweil, and proponents of traditionalist schools. The findings indicate that each of the four approaches rests upon a distinct set of philosophical and value-laden assumptions, and that the proposed tripartite criterion enables a more precise differentiation of technological policies. Furthermore, the study argues that the deepest divergences stem from competing conceptions of the autonomous human being and its relation to nature and the technical order. In conclusion, the paper proposes the conceptual and ethical conditions necessary for a potential rapprochement among these perspectives and outlines the research requirements for developing a reliable medium-term strategy toward technology.This paper examines modern technology not merely as a collection of tools and processes but as a philosophical problem concerning the nature, value, and existential orientation of humankind. The study aims to reconstruct a coherent conceptual framework for analyzing four principal responses to technology—resistance, critical passivity, reform and substitution, and support and advancement—and to evaluate them in light of three fundamental propositions: (1) the overall harmfulness of modern technology, (2) whether technological harms are intrinsic or incidental, and (3) the human possibility of resisting technological expansion. The methodology combines conceptual analysis, argumentative evaluation, and comparative study of major contemporary positions, focusing especially on representative thinkers such as Martin Heidegger, Andrew Feenberg, Theodore Kaczynski, Ray Kurzweil, and proponents of traditionalist schools. The findings indicate that each of the four approaches rests upon a distinct set of philosophical and value-laden assumptions, and that the proposed tripartite criterion enables a more precise differentiation of technological policies. Furthermore, the study argues that the deepest divergences stem from competing conceptions of the autonomous human being and its relation to nature and the technical order. In conclusion, the paper proposes the conceptual and ethical conditions necessary for a potential rapprochement among these perspectives and outlines the research requirements for developing a reliable medium-term strategy toward technology.https://phm.znu.ac.ir/article_737263_d5adabd218a5920458cfc8a670e32ef2.pdfدانشگاه زنجانتأملات فلسفی2228-52531637(Crises of Contemporary Humanity)20260622Aesthetics of Moral Crisis: The Ethical Function of Ugliness in the Age of Artificial HumanityAesthetics of Moral Crisis: The Ethical Function of Ugliness in the Age of Artificial Humanity73726410.30470/phm.2026.2076982.2767FAمحسنکرمیاستادیار، گروه هنرهای رسانهای، دانشکده دین و رسانه، دانشگاه صدا و سیما، تهران، ایران0000-0003-3669-1029Journal Article20251109In the contemporary technological milieu—marked by the rise of artificial intelligence, biotechnology, and digital embodiment—moral perception has undergone a subtle yet profound transformation. The crisis of our time does not arise from ignorance of ethical principles but from an erosion of aesthetic responsiveness to suffering, vulnerability, and imperfection. This paper argues that a renewed philosophical reflection on ugliness can provide a pathway toward restoring moral sensibility in the age of artificial humanity. Drawing upon critical and postmodern aesthetics and recent typological distinctions of ugliness, the study contends that the experience of the ugly—when artistically and interpretively mediated—functions as a site of ethical revelation. Through hermeneutic and conceptual analysis of selected artworks by Francis Bacon, Lucian Freud, Stelarc, and Eduardo Kac, as well as contemporary AI-generated grotesques, the paper demonstrates how aesthetic dissonance can reactivate moral attention that technological perfection tends to anesthetize. Ugliness, in this sense, is not merely the negation of beauty but a moral event that disrupts perceptual complacency and summons the viewer to ethical reflection on the boundaries of humanity. By linking the aesthetics of ugliness with the moral crisis of artificial humanity, the article offers a novel framework for understanding how art can cultivate moral imagination under posthuman conditions. The conclusion highlights the ethical and pedagogical implications of confronting aesthetic negativity in both Iranian and global contexts, suggesting that the courage to face the ugly may be the last refuge of moral life in an age of artificial beauty.In the contemporary technological milieu—marked by the rise of artificial intelligence, biotechnology, and digital embodiment—moral perception has undergone a subtle yet profound transformation. The crisis of our time does not arise from ignorance of ethical principles but from an erosion of aesthetic responsiveness to suffering, vulnerability, and imperfection. This paper argues that a renewed philosophical reflection on ugliness can provide a pathway toward restoring moral sensibility in the age of artificial humanity. Drawing upon critical and postmodern aesthetics and recent typological distinctions of ugliness, the study contends that the experience of the ugly—when artistically and interpretively mediated—functions as a site of ethical revelation. Through hermeneutic and conceptual analysis of selected artworks by Francis Bacon, Lucian Freud, Stelarc, and Eduardo Kac, as well as contemporary AI-generated grotesques, the paper demonstrates how aesthetic dissonance can reactivate moral attention that technological perfection tends to anesthetize. Ugliness, in this sense, is not merely the negation of beauty but a moral event that disrupts perceptual complacency and summons the viewer to ethical reflection on the boundaries of humanity. By linking the aesthetics of ugliness with the moral crisis of artificial humanity, the article offers a novel framework for understanding how art can cultivate moral imagination under posthuman conditions. The conclusion highlights the ethical and pedagogical implications of confronting aesthetic negativity in both Iranian and global contexts, suggesting that the courage to face the ugly may be the last refuge of moral life in an age of artificial beauty.https://phm.znu.ac.ir/article_737264_36e17628313f05c8250de71c4b3d5455.pdfدانشگاه زنجانتأملات فلسفی2228-52531637(Crises of Contemporary Humanity)20260622Bildung as the Condition of Possibility of the Ideal Life in Modern Philosophical AnthropologyBildung as the Condition of Possibility of the Ideal Life in Modern Philosophical Anthropology73770910.30470/phm.2026.2091672.2858FAحمیدرضاسعادت نیاکیعضو انجمن فلسفی کانادا0000-0002-9804-1163Journal Article20260615This article examines the possibility of rethinking the concept of the ideal life in modernity through the concept of Bildung. Its central problem arises from a crisis caused by the collapse of premodern metaphysical horizons and the establishment of the autonomy of the subject. Within this crisis, a unified and binding conception of the good life is weakened, giving rise to a lasting tension among individual freedom, historical plurality, and the need for normativity.<br><br>The article shows that the three dominant responses to this condition—perfectionism, self-actualization, and relativism—each face a structural limitation. Perfectionism fixes a rigid model of the human being; self-actualization reduces human formation to a predominantly inward process; and relativism weakens any shared horizon of judgment and meaning.<br><br>Against these approaches, the article argues that Bildung should be understood as the condition of possibility of thinking about the ideal life. Conceptual analysis shows that Bildung is grounded in a fundamental tension between force and form, individuality and a shared world, and historical openness and normativity. From this perspective, the ideal life cannot be understood as a final model. Rather, it functions as a regulative horizon that directs human formation without becoming fixed in a static form.<br><br>The article ultimately shows that Bildung preserves normative judgment without falling into dogmatism, and historicity and plurality without collapsing into the absence of standards. Thus, Bildung is reconstructed not merely as an educational concept but as a philosophical structure for rethinking the relation between modern existence and the ideal life.This article examines the possibility of rethinking the concept of the ideal life in modernity through the concept of Bildung. Its central problem arises from a crisis caused by the collapse of premodern metaphysical horizons and the establishment of the autonomy of the subject. Within this crisis, a unified and binding conception of the good life is weakened, giving rise to a lasting tension among individual freedom, historical plurality, and the need for normativity.<br><br>The article shows that the three dominant responses to this condition—perfectionism, self-actualization, and relativism—each face a structural limitation. Perfectionism fixes a rigid model of the human being; self-actualization reduces human formation to a predominantly inward process; and relativism weakens any shared horizon of judgment and meaning.<br><br>Against these approaches, the article argues that Bildung should be understood as the condition of possibility of thinking about the ideal life. Conceptual analysis shows that Bildung is grounded in a fundamental tension between force and form, individuality and a shared world, and historical openness and normativity. From this perspective, the ideal life cannot be understood as a final model. Rather, it functions as a regulative horizon that directs human formation without becoming fixed in a static form.<br><br>The article ultimately shows that Bildung preserves normative judgment without falling into dogmatism, and historicity and plurality without collapsing into the absence of standards. Thus, Bildung is reconstructed not merely as an educational concept but as a philosophical structure for rethinking the relation between modern existence and the ideal life.