University of ZanjanPhilosophical Meditations2228-5253102420200822Explaining the Incompatibility of Emergentism with Physicalism by an Emphasis on the Ontological Perspective; And Propose a New Emergentist PositionExplaining the Incompatibility of Emergentism with Physicalism by an Emphasis on the Ontological Perspective; And Propose a New Emergentist Position11423631110.30470/phm.2019.102292.1553FAMassoudToossi SaeidiPhD Candidate for Philosophy of Religion, Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies0000-0001-8394-8507Seyed HassanHosseiniDepartment for Philosophy of Science, Faculty Member, Sharif University of Technology, Tehran, IranJournal Article20190120In this paper, first Physicalism is defined by the suggestion of David Lewis, and through the use of the concept of Supervenience. Afterwards, it is explained that among a variety of Emergentist's positions, a small number can be chosen to have an ontological inconsistency with Physicalism. In this regard, the Substantial Emergentism, based on the thoughts of Hasker, Lowe and Toner, and the Causal Emergentism, based on O'Connor and Wong's ideas, and their incompatibility with physicalism is explained. In the following, the relation of each of these ideas, with each other and with Physicalism and Cartesian Dualism, is analyzed. In the end, based on a metaphysical analysis, a new Emergentist's position is proposed; which its ontology is not a basically different plan from Physicalism, but at the same time inconsistent with it. It is also explained that the non-differentiation of this proposal with physicalism in terms of its ontological outline is its advantage over the emergentist's positions which are examined in this paper.In this paper, first Physicalism is defined by the suggestion of David Lewis, and through the use of the concept of Supervenience. Afterwards, it is explained that among a variety of Emergentist's positions, a small number can be chosen to have an ontological inconsistency with Physicalism. In this regard, the Substantial Emergentism, based on the thoughts of Hasker, Lowe and Toner, and the Causal Emergentism, based on O'Connor and Wong's ideas, and their incompatibility with physicalism is explained. In the following, the relation of each of these ideas, with each other and with Physicalism and Cartesian Dualism, is analyzed. In the end, based on a metaphysical analysis, a new Emergentist's position is proposed; which its ontology is not a basically different plan from Physicalism, but at the same time inconsistent with it. It is also explained that the non-differentiation of this proposal with physicalism in terms of its ontological outline is its advantage over the emergentist's positions which are examined in this paper.https://phm.znu.ac.ir/article_36311_fb5dc7f2fdd8cb3c0c885f0c269039da.pdfUniversity of ZanjanPhilosophical Meditations2228-5253102420200822پدر- مادری: مساله مجوزدهی
نقد و بررسی طرح هیو لافولیتپدر- مادری: مساله مجوزدهی
نقد و بررسی طرح هیو لافولیت43704467510.30470/phm.2020.112750.1665FAMohsenJahedAssociate Professor of philosophy- University of ZanjanMaryamKhoshdelAli AkbarAbdolabadiJournal Article20190810هیو لافولیت با پیشنهاد طرحی زیر عنوان« مجوزدهی برای پدر-مادری»، استدلال کرده است که از آن جا که « اقدام به پدر و مادر شدن می تواند مستلزم ضرر و زیان وسیع و عمیق به کودکان باشد»، لازم است دولت ها طرحی برای مجوزدهی به زوج‌های متقاضیِ فرزندآوری داشته باشند و آنها را ملزم کنند در آزمون‌هایی استاندارد شرکت کنند، چنانچه از این آزمون‌ها با موفقیت عبور کردند به آن ها مجوز فرزندآوری بدهند، امّا چنانچه بیماری جسمی یا روانی آنان احراز شود، آنها را ملزم کنند خود را مداوا کرده یا آموزش‌های لازم را دیده و صلاحیت های حداقلی را کسب کنند، سپس اقدام به فرزندآوری کنند. این طرح به لحاظ نظری و عملی با اشکالاتی مواجه است. لافولیت آنها را طرح کرده پاسخ داده است. در این نوشتار، مدعا و استدلال لافولیت و نقد‌های منتقدانِ وی و نیز پاسخ‌های او را با روشی تحلیلی طرح کرده، مورد نقد و بررسی قرار داده ایم و در پایان موضع خود را بیان کرده‌ایم.هیو لافولیت با پیشنهاد طرحی زیر عنوان« مجوزدهی برای پدر-مادری»، استدلال کرده است که از آن جا که « اقدام به پدر و مادر شدن می تواند مستلزم ضرر و زیان وسیع و عمیق به کودکان باشد»، لازم است دولت ها طرحی برای مجوزدهی به زوج‌های متقاضیِ فرزندآوری داشته باشند و آنها را ملزم کنند در آزمون‌هایی استاندارد شرکت کنند، چنانچه از این آزمون‌ها با موفقیت عبور کردند به آن ها مجوز فرزندآوری بدهند، امّا چنانچه بیماری جسمی یا روانی آنان احراز شود، آنها را ملزم کنند خود را مداوا کرده یا آموزش‌های لازم را دیده و صلاحیت های حداقلی را کسب کنند، سپس اقدام به فرزندآوری کنند. این طرح به لحاظ نظری و عملی با اشکالاتی مواجه است. لافولیت آنها را طرح کرده پاسخ داده است. در این نوشتار، مدعا و استدلال لافولیت و نقد‌های منتقدانِ وی و نیز پاسخ‌های او را با روشی تحلیلی طرح کرده، مورد نقد و بررسی قرار داده ایم و در پایان موضع خود را بیان کرده‌ایم.https://phm.znu.ac.ir/article_44675_601d951f4f2552d36955ef1cd551253a.pdfUniversity of ZanjanPhilosophical Meditations2228-5253102420200822Relationship between epistomology, moral of scepticism and form of life according to Cavell's WittgensteinRelationship between epistomology, moral of scepticism and form of life according to Cavell's Wittgenstein711033693710.30470/phm.2019.113185.1671FAMozhganKhaliliAllame Tabatabaei UniversityAli AkbarAhmadi AframjaniPhilosophy, Humanities, Allameh Tabatabai, Tehran, IranJournal Article20190820According to Cavell, on one hand relation between moral values and the reality based on the grammatical criteria of Wittgenstein is not rational; on the other hand, disability of moral criteria is not logical .From this point of view, the claim of having access to the pure reality is meaningless, because there is not a logical possibility of such success that one can or cannot do it. In other words, we don't have the natural possibility for having a logical and rational way to solve moral problems. Therefore moral issues are not rational.From the view of Cavell’s Wittgenstein, meaning is appearing during using language game inside its form of life. So, in the process of responding to an ethical request, Wittgenstein's human, responds to the reality in certain situations, depending on the conditions, with the intention and moral judgment, Thus from his view point, before using words in moral language games, we do not have meaning.According to Cavell, on one hand relation between moral values and the reality based on the grammatical criteria of Wittgenstein is not rational; on the other hand, disability of moral criteria is not logical .From this point of view, the claim of having access to the pure reality is meaningless, because there is not a logical possibility of such success that one can or cannot do it. In other words, we don't have the natural possibility for having a logical and rational way to solve moral problems. Therefore moral issues are not rational.From the view of Cavell’s Wittgenstein, meaning is appearing during using language game inside its form of life. So, in the process of responding to an ethical request, Wittgenstein's human, responds to the reality in certain situations, depending on the conditions, with the intention and moral judgment, Thus from his view point, before using words in moral language games, we do not have meaning.https://phm.znu.ac.ir/article_36937_26da9d37357b01ee4fe35ce3fc969b1e.pdfUniversity of ZanjanPhilosophical Meditations2228-5253102420200822Khafri Innovation in God's SpeakingKhafri Innovation in God's Speaking1051253630810.30470/phm.2019.100285.1543FAMohammadAbbaszadh JahromiDepartment of literature and humanity science, Jahrom university, Jahrom, IranMasumahAmiriNarjes Institute of daughter HowzehJournal Article20181225کلام الهی یکی از مسائل مهم و جنجال‌برانگیز در دانش کلام و آغازگر شکل‌گیری این دانش بوده است. پیرامون این موضوع در بین مسلمانان دو دیدگاه کلی مطرح شده است: متکلمین امامیه و معتزله غالبا کلام الهی را لفظی، حادث و مخلوق می‌دانند. اشاعره آن را نفسی، قدیم و عین ذات او می‌داند.<br />در نوشتار حاضر ضمن مروری مختصر بر دو نگرش فوق، به نگاه علامه خفری پرداخته شده است. وی کلام را مشترک لفظی و برای آن دو معنا را ارائه میکند. کلام الهی طبق یک معنا قدیم و بر اساس معنای دیگر حادث است. کلام به معنای «تکلم» قدیم و به معنای «ما به التکلم» حادث و لفظی است.<br />به سه بیان می‌توان تکلّم حقیقی الهی را قدیم دانست: با استفاده از رابطه علم و کلام الهی، تکلّم حقیقی بر علم اجمالی ذاتی، منطبق و قدیم خواهد شد. مطابق توجیه دوم، تکلّم نوعی انتقال آگاهی و بالعکس علم هم نوعی تکلّم است، لذا این نظریه از اتّحاد علم و کلام و یکسانی اوصاف آنها دفاع میکند. توجیه سوم تکلم حقیقی را قدرت القای ذات واجب تفسیر میکند و با استفاده از این ارتباط و نظر به قدمت قدرت، تکلم را نیز قدیم می‌داند.کلام الهی یکی از مسائل مهم و جنجال‌برانگیز در دانش کلام و آغازگر شکل‌گیری این دانش بوده است. پیرامون این موضوع در بین مسلمانان دو دیدگاه کلی مطرح شده است: متکلمین امامیه و معتزله غالبا کلام الهی را لفظی، حادث و مخلوق می‌دانند. اشاعره آن را نفسی، قدیم و عین ذات او می‌داند.<br />در نوشتار حاضر ضمن مروری مختصر بر دو نگرش فوق، به نگاه علامه خفری پرداخته شده است. وی کلام را مشترک لفظی و برای آن دو معنا را ارائه میکند. کلام الهی طبق یک معنا قدیم و بر اساس معنای دیگر حادث است. کلام به معنای «تکلم» قدیم و به معنای «ما به التکلم» حادث و لفظی است.<br />به سه بیان می‌توان تکلّم حقیقی الهی را قدیم دانست: با استفاده از رابطه علم و کلام الهی، تکلّم حقیقی بر علم اجمالی ذاتی، منطبق و قدیم خواهد شد. مطابق توجیه دوم، تکلّم نوعی انتقال آگاهی و بالعکس علم هم نوعی تکلّم است، لذا این نظریه از اتّحاد علم و کلام و یکسانی اوصاف آنها دفاع میکند. توجیه سوم تکلم حقیقی را قدرت القای ذات واجب تفسیر میکند و با استفاده از این ارتباط و نظر به قدمت قدرت، تکلم را نیز قدیم می‌داند.https://phm.znu.ac.ir/article_36308_c12080d604250769c6f136f5641425c4.pdfUniversity of ZanjanPhilosophical Meditations2228-5253102420200822Suhrawardi’s release from the correspondence and identity challengeSuhrawardi’s release from the correspondence and identity challenge1271463693010.30470/phm.2019.103988.1567FAMohsenAkbariPhilosophy department, Shahid Beheshti university, instructor tuition; Low department, Azad university, assistant professor tuition.Muhammad HusseinHeshmatpoorIslamic Philosophy and Theology department, Qom university, assistant professorJournal Article20190214In his Illuminationist Hikmatic System, Suhrawardi started from himself and his intuitive self-conscousness and then he reached at the God. On the one hand, he found the identity of himself and his light causes as “presence by oneself”, and on the other hand, he explained the agency (origin-ness) and the other-consciousness of substantial lights by illuminationist relation. According to those parts of the philosopher’s constructive works which are devoted to the explanation of the identity and determination of the status of illumination and intuition in the spheres of existence and cognition, one can conclude that “existence” and “presence” are identical in Suhrawardi’s philosophy and the necessary generality of this function can be proven based on the self-consciousness and other-consciousness of the Light of Lights. By this approach, any possible gap between ontology and epistemology are systematically overcome. In fact, by tracing the knowledge by correspondence (mediated) back to the knowledge by presence (immediate), by founding the human cognition upon the intuitive necessity and certainty, Suhrawardi left behind the challenge of unrecognizability of correspondence between known-by-itself (the subjective) and known-by-something-else (the objective), and explained the recognition of personal identity.In his Illuminationist Hikmatic System, Suhrawardi started from himself and his intuitive self-conscousness and then he reached at the God. On the one hand, he found the identity of himself and his light causes as “presence by oneself”, and on the other hand, he explained the agency (origin-ness) and the other-consciousness of substantial lights by illuminationist relation. According to those parts of the philosopher’s constructive works which are devoted to the explanation of the identity and determination of the status of illumination and intuition in the spheres of existence and cognition, one can conclude that “existence” and “presence” are identical in Suhrawardi’s philosophy and the necessary generality of this function can be proven based on the self-consciousness and other-consciousness of the Light of Lights. By this approach, any possible gap between ontology and epistemology are systematically overcome. In fact, by tracing the knowledge by correspondence (mediated) back to the knowledge by presence (immediate), by founding the human cognition upon the intuitive necessity and certainty, Suhrawardi left behind the challenge of unrecognizability of correspondence between known-by-itself (the subjective) and known-by-something-else (the objective), and explained the recognition of personal identity.https://phm.znu.ac.ir/article_36930_2be04f1d84d0ab9d40313956f0472223.pdfUniversity of ZanjanPhilosophical Meditations2228-5253102420200822Global Information Ethics: Analysis and Critique of Charles Ess ViewGlobal Information Ethics: Analysis and Critique of Charles Ess View1471873631010.30470/phm.2019.97644.1518FAMohammad AminBaradaran NikouNational Research Institute for Science PolicyArashMousaviNational Research Institute for Science PolicyKeivanAlastiNational Research Institute for Science Policy0000-0001-9915-7283Journal Article20181114Information technology makes possible the relationship between people around the world. Hence, the information ethics theorists, such as Charles Ess, are trying to propose a global ethical theory. Ess believes that this global theory in the field of meta-ethics requires some kind of pluralism, in the name of interpretive pluralism, and in the normative field of care ethics, virtue ethics and confucian ethics. This paper, by using library research method and conceptual analysis, while introducing the view of Charles Ess, illustrates some of the most important theoretical gaps in his project. His interpretive pluralism does not solve the problem of relativism in relation to ethical judgment about “the other”. Also, his defense of interpretive pluralism based on two incorrect assumptions. First, he has supposed that cultural differences necessarily entail ethical differences; secondly, he argues that pluralism is an accepted theory in all ethical approaches of the world. In the normative field, the defense of the ethics of care, virtue and Confucius, in contrast to consequentialism and deontologism, is not justified. The critiques do not falsify the whole project, proposing a global information ethics; these clarify the future paths of research to strengthen it.Information technology makes possible the relationship between people around the world. Hence, the information ethics theorists, such as Charles Ess, are trying to propose a global ethical theory. Ess believes that this global theory in the field of meta-ethics requires some kind of pluralism, in the name of interpretive pluralism, and in the normative field of care ethics, virtue ethics and confucian ethics. This paper, by using library research method and conceptual analysis, while introducing the view of Charles Ess, illustrates some of the most important theoretical gaps in his project. His interpretive pluralism does not solve the problem of relativism in relation to ethical judgment about “the other”. Also, his defense of interpretive pluralism based on two incorrect assumptions. First, he has supposed that cultural differences necessarily entail ethical differences; secondly, he argues that pluralism is an accepted theory in all ethical approaches of the world. In the normative field, the defense of the ethics of care, virtue and Confucius, in contrast to consequentialism and deontologism, is not justified. The critiques do not falsify the whole project, proposing a global information ethics; these clarify the future paths of research to strengthen it.https://phm.znu.ac.ir/article_36310_18cd6ebfb5567eb228c7ea1e1b792099.pdfUniversity of ZanjanPhilosophical Meditations2228-5253102420200822The Place of Illeity: How God is Described by Emmanuel LevinasThe Place of Illeity: How God is Described by Emmanuel Levinas1792053693510.30470/phm.2019.110251.1634FAMohammadmahdiAbdolalinejadjjftdfAhmadFazelifdjhj0009-0000-8105-3187Journal Article2019062510- Levinas, E., 1993, God, Death, and Time, Trans. Bettina Bergo, Stanford University Press<br /> 11- Levinas, E., 1998, Of God Who Comes to Mind, trans: Bettina Bergo, Stanford University Press, California (A)<br /> 12- Levinas, E., 2003, On Scape, Trans. by Bettina Bergo, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California <br /> 13- Levinas. E, 1991, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, trans. by Alphonso Lingis, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers<br /> 14- Levinas, E., 1969, Totality and Infinity, trans. Alphonso Lingis, Duquesne University Press<br /> 15- Llwelyn, John, 1995, Emmanuel Levinas: The Genealogy of Ethics, (London and New York: Routledge)<br /> 16- Newman, Michael, 2000, “Sensibility, Trauma, and theTrace: Levinas from Phenomenology to the Immemorial” in The Face of the Other & the Trace of God, edited by Jeffrey Bloechl, Fordham University Press<br /> 17- Putnam, Hilary, 2004, “Levinas and Judaism”, The Cambridge Companion to Levinas, Cambridge university press<br /> 18- Urbano, Ryan, 2012, “Approaching The Divine: Levinas on God, Religion, Idolatry, and Atheism”, in Logos, volume 15, number1<br /> 19- Visker, Rudi, 2000, “The Price of Being Dispossessed: Levinas's God and Freud's Trauma”, in The Face of the Other & the Trace of God, edited by Jeffrey Bloechl, Fordham University Press<br /> 20- Westphal, Merold, 2000, “Commanded Love and Divine Transcendence in Levinas and kierkekaard”, in The Face of the Other & the Trace of God, edited by Jeffrey Bloechl, Fordham University Press10- Levinas, E., 1993, God, Death, and Time, Trans. Bettina Bergo, Stanford University Press<br /> 11- Levinas, E., 1998, Of God Who Comes to Mind, trans: Bettina Bergo, Stanford University Press, California (A)<br /> 12- Levinas, E., 2003, On Scape, Trans. by Bettina Bergo, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California <br /> 13- Levinas. E, 1991, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, trans. by Alphonso Lingis, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers<br /> 14- Levinas, E., 1969, Totality and Infinity, trans. Alphonso Lingis, Duquesne University Press<br /> 15- Llwelyn, John, 1995, Emmanuel Levinas: The Genealogy of Ethics, (London and New York: Routledge)<br /> 16- Newman, Michael, 2000, “Sensibility, Trauma, and theTrace: Levinas from Phenomenology to the Immemorial” in The Face of the Other & the Trace of God, edited by Jeffrey Bloechl, Fordham University Press<br /> 17- Putnam, Hilary, 2004, “Levinas and Judaism”, The Cambridge Companion to Levinas, Cambridge university press<br /> 18- Urbano, Ryan, 2012, “Approaching The Divine: Levinas on God, Religion, Idolatry, and Atheism”, in Logos, volume 15, number1<br /> 19- Visker, Rudi, 2000, “The Price of Being Dispossessed: Levinas's God and Freud's Trauma”, in The Face of the Other & the Trace of God, edited by Jeffrey Bloechl, Fordham University Press<br /> 20- Westphal, Merold, 2000, “Commanded Love and Divine Transcendence in Levinas and kierkekaard”, in The Face of the Other & the Trace of God, edited by Jeffrey Bloechl, Fordham University Presshttps://phm.znu.ac.ir/article_36935_53087acd60be68abef4c92b984f833f2.pdfUniversity of ZanjanPhilosophical Meditations2228-5253102420200822Reflection on the Contemporary Exponents of Transcendent Wisdom in the Relationship of Nature with BeingReflection on the Contemporary Exponents of Transcendent Wisdom in the Relationship of Nature with Being2072334467610.30470/phm.2019.115709.1701FARohollahAdinehThe faculty of Imam Khomeini International UniversityRoghayehMosavisJournal Article20191013Existence is the basis of Mulla Sadra's philosophy and his particular philosophical views. In the meantime, the question of the authenticity of existence is of great importance and is the basis of important debates in transcendent wisdom. Sadra has interpreted existence and essence in different interpretations, and each of the contemporary exponents of transcendent wisdom, on the basis of his own particular accepted principles, such as, acceptance of Sadra's personal unity of existence or form, and Sadra's various interpretations of existence and essence, somehow relate the essence to being. Mulla Sadra's commentary and commentary carry that interpretati. The present study is a descriptive-analytic one which seeks to determine the correct interpretation of the type of relationship of nature to existence. Therefore, in this paper, the interpretations of contemporary scholars on the question of the nature of the relation of nature to existence, are described and criticized. The author needs to distinguish between the ontological argument (the world of proof) and the epistemological one (the world of proof) in order to interpret the relation of nature to existenceIn this case, the apparent contradictions in Mulla Sadra's word will be resolved. Thus Amoli's Javidian theory that nature is the limit of existence, although true, seems to be true, but not true, since it only specifies the type of relation of nature to existence in the world of proof.Existence is the basis of Mulla Sadra's philosophy and his particular philosophical views. In the meantime, the question of the authenticity of existence is of great importance and is the basis of important debates in transcendent wisdom. Sadra has interpreted existence and essence in different interpretations, and each of the contemporary exponents of transcendent wisdom, on the basis of his own particular accepted principles, such as, acceptance of Sadra's personal unity of existence or form, and Sadra's various interpretations of existence and essence, somehow relate the essence to being. Mulla Sadra's commentary and commentary carry that interpretati. The present study is a descriptive-analytic one which seeks to determine the correct interpretation of the type of relationship of nature to existence. Therefore, in this paper, the interpretations of contemporary scholars on the question of the nature of the relation of nature to existence, are described and criticized. The author needs to distinguish between the ontological argument (the world of proof) and the epistemological one (the world of proof) in order to interpret the relation of nature to existenceIn this case, the apparent contradictions in Mulla Sadra's word will be resolved. Thus Amoli's Javidian theory that nature is the limit of existence, although true, seems to be true, but not true, since it only specifies the type of relation of nature to existence in the world of proof.https://phm.znu.ac.ir/article_44676_fa14e26aa100e41821a2050bf4edfb67.pdfUniversity of ZanjanPhilosophical Meditations2228-5253102420200822Conceptual metaphor and its role in ethicsConceptual metaphor and its role in ethics2352553693610.30470/phm.2019.110434.1637FAMasoudSadeghiaz0000-0001-9733-3300Journal Article20190629The main concern in this article is the study of the role of conceptual metaphors in the field of ethics. After defining and conceptual metaphor, with emphasis on the views of Lakoff, Johnson and Movement, generality, inherent conceptuality, and system structure as the three main components of this kind of metaphor introduced, and its structural, ontological and guiding types were discussed. It was also stated that morality is a metaphorical nature and can not be conceived without conceptual metaphors. The introduction of metaphor to morality is shaped in two main forms: metaphorical conceptualization of metaphorical concepts and conceptualization of a particular moral situation. On the basis of these two points, the probability of falling metaphorical ethics in the context of relativity and critique and analyzing it continued to work. The main findings and innovations of this paper are in the design of three criteria for measuring the efficiency of metaphors in the field of ethics. The type and extent of the effect of metaphor on ethical reality, the type and extent of the effect of metaphor on moral motivation and the type and extent of the effect of metaphor on the objectification or tangibility of moral concepts are criteria that can both prevent relativity in metaphoric ethics and facilitate their grading of value.The main concern in this article is the study of the role of conceptual metaphors in the field of ethics. After defining and conceptual metaphor, with emphasis on the views of Lakoff, Johnson and Movement, generality, inherent conceptuality, and system structure as the three main components of this kind of metaphor introduced, and its structural, ontological and guiding types were discussed. It was also stated that morality is a metaphorical nature and can not be conceived without conceptual metaphors. The introduction of metaphor to morality is shaped in two main forms: metaphorical conceptualization of metaphorical concepts and conceptualization of a particular moral situation. On the basis of these two points, the probability of falling metaphorical ethics in the context of relativity and critique and analyzing it continued to work. The main findings and innovations of this paper are in the design of three criteria for measuring the efficiency of metaphors in the field of ethics. The type and extent of the effect of metaphor on ethical reality, the type and extent of the effect of metaphor on moral motivation and the type and extent of the effect of metaphor on the objectification or tangibility of moral concepts are criteria that can both prevent relativity in metaphoric ethics and facilitate their grading of value.https://phm.znu.ac.ir/article_36936_447c076ca136c51e3b7446b61f70c9d8.pdfUniversity of ZanjanPhilosophical Meditations2228-5253102420200822Moore’s Open Question and Moral Normativity: A Reply to Paul BloomfieldMoore’s Open Question and Moral Normativity: A Reply to Paul Bloomfield2572883630710.30470/phm.2019.86070.1404FARezaMosmerDepartment of Philosophy of Mind, Institute for Cognitive Science Studies, Tehran , IranSeyed AliKalantariDepartment of Philosophy, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, IranJournal Article20180513In his so-called Open Question Argument, Moore (1903) argues that the concept of "good" cannot be defined on the basis of natural concepts as well as non-natural ones. Following Darwall, Gibbard and Railton (1992), Paul Bloomfield has explained the non-reducibility of the concept of good based on its normativity. Moreover, he claims that the normativity is commensurable and similar to the so called normativity of meaning. According to Wittgenstein's rule following argument, meaning is normative, namely, expressions' meaning have action-guiding role; in other words, meaning normatively constrains an expression's use in language. Our aim in this paper is to consider Bloomfield's claim and compare normativity in ethics with the normativity of meaning. In order to do so, we will elucidate the open question argument and the normativity of meaning. We will then reconstruct Bloomfield's argument, and finally argue that, contra Bloomfield, the normativity in ethics and the normativity of meaning are not similar.In his so-called Open Question Argument, Moore (1903) argues that the concept of "good" cannot be defined on the basis of natural concepts as well as non-natural ones. Following Darwall, Gibbard and Railton (1992), Paul Bloomfield has explained the non-reducibility of the concept of good based on its normativity. Moreover, he claims that the normativity is commensurable and similar to the so called normativity of meaning. According to Wittgenstein's rule following argument, meaning is normative, namely, expressions' meaning have action-guiding role; in other words, meaning normatively constrains an expression's use in language. Our aim in this paper is to consider Bloomfield's claim and compare normativity in ethics with the normativity of meaning. In order to do so, we will elucidate the open question argument and the normativity of meaning. We will then reconstruct Bloomfield's argument, and finally argue that, contra Bloomfield, the normativity in ethics and the normativity of meaning are not similar.https://phm.znu.ac.ir/article_36307_8fc133b1ae4b3a3bc830bf46021eb7e9.pdfUniversity of ZanjanPhilosophical Meditations2228-5253102420200822The Emergent Dualism and the Bodily Hoduth of the Soul, A Comparative StudyThe Emergent Dualism and the Bodily Hoduth of the Soul, A Comparative Study2893133631210.30470/phm.2019.103474.1563FAFahimeShariatiFerdowsi university of MashhadYasserKhoshnevisپژوهشگاه علوم انسانی و مطالعات فرهنگیJournal Article20190206Abstract<br />Emergent dualism is a recent view about the nature of the soul introduced by William Hasker in 1999. He moves away from the main stream reductionist and physicalist theories about mental properties and mind and advances a view which has affinities with MullaSadra's bodily Hoduth of the Soul. In this paper, we examine these tow theories comparatively.<br />A working theory about the nature of the soul have to provide us with plausible answers to two main problems: the problem of pairing and the problem of the survival of the soul after the bodily death. Emergent dualism endorses the emergence of a novel substance from a physiological base which has irreducible mental properties and is a distinct endurable entity. While this theory has similarities with Sadraean view, there are differences in the way of articulating the arguments as well as background metaphysical theories. These differences are particularly important in addressing the problem of the survival of the soul after the bodily death.Abstract<br />Emergent dualism is a recent view about the nature of the soul introduced by William Hasker in 1999. He moves away from the main stream reductionist and physicalist theories about mental properties and mind and advances a view which has affinities with MullaSadra's bodily Hoduth of the Soul. In this paper, we examine these tow theories comparatively.<br />A working theory about the nature of the soul have to provide us with plausible answers to two main problems: the problem of pairing and the problem of the survival of the soul after the bodily death. Emergent dualism endorses the emergence of a novel substance from a physiological base which has irreducible mental properties and is a distinct endurable entity. While this theory has similarities with Sadraean view, there are differences in the way of articulating the arguments as well as background metaphysical theories. These differences are particularly important in addressing the problem of the survival of the soul after the bodily death.https://phm.znu.ac.ir/article_36312_9bf7386a84415b80b67c90f0c1c743c7.pdfUniversity of ZanjanPhilosophical Meditations2228-5253102420200822Matching the question of self-knowledge from prespective of Kierkegaard and sheikh eshraghMatching the question of self-knowledge from prespective of Kierkegaard and sheikh eshragh3153364467710.30470/phm.2019.95870.1501FACiminEsfandiariphilosophy. razi university. kermanshsh. iranAzadehElyasikermanshahJournal Article20181017The present article to examine the topic of self-knowledge of the mystical and philosophical dimension from the point of view of the two eastern and western mystic philosophers sheikh shahabudinsuhrawardi and sorenkierkegaard with comparative look. Kierkegaard consistently belives in his philosophy to handle the general affairs and the nature of things has causel the human to not know and ignor his ownself.sheikheshragh also in numerous works especially in his encoded stories have always been the factores of human neglect of its essence including human downfall attachment to its belongins and his entangled in prison body. <br /> What Kierkegaard as existential movement to achieve self-knowledge express at different stages. He most approached suhrawardis mystical teachings because he introduces heart to God and endeavours with faith and seriousness for evolution in the inner that are the most important tools of self- knowledge. Of course in this regard there is fundamental difference with suhrawardi because in his thinking he has no belief in using rational propositions and analyzes in relation to the question of self- knowledge. However suhrawardiapplay the only correct way to your own truth to both the rational and the mystical method which complement each other.The present article to examine the topic of self-knowledge of the mystical and philosophical dimension from the point of view of the two eastern and western mystic philosophers sheikh shahabudinsuhrawardi and sorenkierkegaard with comparative look. Kierkegaard consistently belives in his philosophy to handle the general affairs and the nature of things has causel the human to not know and ignor his ownself.sheikheshragh also in numerous works especially in his encoded stories have always been the factores of human neglect of its essence including human downfall attachment to its belongins and his entangled in prison body. <br /> What Kierkegaard as existential movement to achieve self-knowledge express at different stages. He most approached suhrawardis mystical teachings because he introduces heart to God and endeavours with faith and seriousness for evolution in the inner that are the most important tools of self- knowledge. Of course in this regard there is fundamental difference with suhrawardi because in his thinking he has no belief in using rational propositions and analyzes in relation to the question of self- knowledge. However suhrawardiapplay the only correct way to your own truth to both the rational and the mystical method which complement each other.https://phm.znu.ac.ir/article_44677_12b5aec8a9910b09c5104fb61cb35336.pdfUniversity of ZanjanPhilosophical Meditations2228-5253102420200822مسئله شر از دیدگاه ملاصدرا و نورمن گیسلرمسئله شر از دیدگاه ملاصدرا و نورمن گیسلر3373643693110.30470/phm.2019.105967.1591FAMahdiShajarianIslamic Sciences and Culture AcademyJournal Article20190408این مقاله به دنبال تبیین «مساله‌شر» و پاسخ‌های ارائه‌شده به آن در دیدگاه ملاصدرای شیرازی و نورمن گیسلر است. به‌رغم تمایزی که نامبردگان در غایت تبیین مساله‌شر دارند به‌گونه‌ای که ملاصدرا درصدد پاسخ به «شبهه ثنویت» و گیسلر در مقام حل «مساله‌منطقی‌شر» است اما این تحقیق با روش تحلیلی ـ انتقادی از خلال کتب آنها سه محور مشترک را اصطیاد کرده، دیدگاه‌های آنها را در این سه مقایسه تطبیقی نموده است. محور ابتدائی مسئله «چیستی‌شر» است در این مسئله هر دو باوجود برخی تمایزات جزئی، دیدگاهی قریب به هم دارند و در این‌میان نکات قابل‌تأملی نیز وجود دارد؛ دومین محور مربوط به مسئله «شر ادراکی» است که هر دو تصریحاً یا تلویحاً توجه ویژه‌ای به آن داشته، با پیش‌فرض قابل‌نقض «ملازمه میان شر ادراکی و فعل غیر حکیمانه» بحث از آن را پیش برده‌اند و حوزه سوم «پاسخ‌های انی و لمی» است که به مساله‌شر داده‌اند؛ پاسخ‌های انی هردو هرچند فی‌الجمله گوشه‌ای از حکمت برخی شرور را تبیین می‌کنند اما از حل شبهه با نظر به انواع و افراد متکثر شر توفیق چندانی ندارند؛ درمقابل پاسخ‌های لمی پاسخ‌های تامی هستند که با توجه به برخی نکات مکمل می‌توانند به‌صورت تفصیلی شبهه شرور را مرتفع سازند.این مقاله به دنبال تبیین «مساله‌شر» و پاسخ‌های ارائه‌شده به آن در دیدگاه ملاصدرای شیرازی و نورمن گیسلر است. به‌رغم تمایزی که نامبردگان در غایت تبیین مساله‌شر دارند به‌گونه‌ای که ملاصدرا درصدد پاسخ به «شبهه ثنویت» و گیسلر در مقام حل «مساله‌منطقی‌شر» است اما این تحقیق با روش تحلیلی ـ انتقادی از خلال کتب آنها سه محور مشترک را اصطیاد کرده، دیدگاه‌های آنها را در این سه مقایسه تطبیقی نموده است. محور ابتدائی مسئله «چیستی‌شر» است در این مسئله هر دو باوجود برخی تمایزات جزئی، دیدگاهی قریب به هم دارند و در این‌میان نکات قابل‌تأملی نیز وجود دارد؛ دومین محور مربوط به مسئله «شر ادراکی» است که هر دو تصریحاً یا تلویحاً توجه ویژه‌ای به آن داشته، با پیش‌فرض قابل‌نقض «ملازمه میان شر ادراکی و فعل غیر حکیمانه» بحث از آن را پیش برده‌اند و حوزه سوم «پاسخ‌های انی و لمی» است که به مساله‌شر داده‌اند؛ پاسخ‌های انی هردو هرچند فی‌الجمله گوشه‌ای از حکمت برخی شرور را تبیین می‌کنند اما از حل شبهه با نظر به انواع و افراد متکثر شر توفیق چندانی ندارند؛ درمقابل پاسخ‌های لمی پاسخ‌های تامی هستند که با توجه به برخی نکات مکمل می‌توانند به‌صورت تفصیلی شبهه شرور را مرتفع سازند.https://phm.znu.ac.ir/article_36931_132e0a7afc6812c80743111c6237f12e.pdfUniversity of ZanjanPhilosophical Meditations2228-5253102420200822Eximination of Avicenna and atomist theologians’ disagreement on the applicability of mathematical idealizations in natural philosophyEximination of Avicenna and atomist theologians’ disagreement on the applicability of mathematical idealizations in natural philosophy3653943693210.30470/phm.2019.106729.1598FASeyyed AliHosseiniIslamic Philosophy and Theology, Theology and Islamic teachings, Ferdowsi, Mashahd, Iran0000-0001-7005-6219Journal Article20190426In this article we examined the conflicts of Avicenna as an Aristotlian philosopher and two groups of Islamic theologians on the applicability of mathematical idealizations in natural philosophy. for our aim, we considered two ideal thought experiments suggested by theologians in which the geometrical idealization was emphsised. by considering the reactions to theses cases, we found that there are two different views on applicability of this method: in the theologians' side, their metaphysical assumption, atomism, led them to a limitless method which could make their theory satisfactory and one of the ways among this boundless domain is mathematical idealization. in the other side, Avicenna and the other prepatetic philosophers didn't require this method for proving their metaphysical assumption and also believed in some bounded method in natural philosophy, in which hypothetical possibilities weren’t allowed. according to this limited method, mathematical idealization counted as an abstract hypothesis and may noy be used in concrete natural inquiriesIn this article we examined the conflicts of Avicenna as an Aristotlian philosopher and two groups of Islamic theologians on the applicability of mathematical idealizations in natural philosophy. for our aim, we considered two ideal thought experiments suggested by theologians in which the geometrical idealization was emphsised. by considering the reactions to theses cases, we found that there are two different views on applicability of this method: in the theologians' side, their metaphysical assumption, atomism, led them to a limitless method which could make their theory satisfactory and one of the ways among this boundless domain is mathematical idealization. in the other side, Avicenna and the other prepatetic philosophers didn't require this method for proving their metaphysical assumption and also believed in some bounded method in natural philosophy, in which hypothetical possibilities weren’t allowed. according to this limited method, mathematical idealization counted as an abstract hypothesis and may noy be used in concrete natural inquirieshttps://phm.znu.ac.ir/article_36932_c1709353fcf7b3bda8f3b8c30d58eab5.pdfUniversity of ZanjanPhilosophical Meditations2228-5253102420200822Nietzsche and Saeb: Two irrationalist thinkersNietzsche and Saeb: Two irrationalist thinkers3954224467810.30470/phm.2020.101704.1550FAMohammadKhakpourAssistant professor at University of TabrizJournal Article20190113In this article, we try to investigate and compare the thought of the two intellectuals of two completely different cultures, an Iranian thinker and poet Saeb Tabrizi, a German thinker and philosopher Nietzsche. Nietzsche, with the predominance of the elements of Dionysius against the elements of Apollonius, opposed the intellect, and Saeb was also influenced by the style of Hindi and with such things as the expensive psychic reason; incompleteness; arrogance; weakness and disability; capturing; enchantment; controversy; Tragic in his poems. Nietzsche and Saeb were both heavily influenced by the tradition of Hindu Buddhism, and in this tradition the intellect was incapable of understanding the nature of reality and human life. To illustrate the similarity of these two thinkers, we divide the article into two parts. In the first part, we discuss Nietzsche's irrationalism, and in the second part we deal with irrationalism of Saeb, and in the section of the result we have evaluated this issue in the form of a diagram to these two thinkers. In this article we have tried to use the main sources of these two thinkers..In this article, we try to investigate and compare the thought of the two intellectuals of two completely different cultures, an Iranian thinker and poet Saeb Tabrizi, a German thinker and philosopher Nietzsche. Nietzsche, with the predominance of the elements of Dionysius against the elements of Apollonius, opposed the intellect, and Saeb was also influenced by the style of Hindi and with such things as the expensive psychic reason; incompleteness; arrogance; weakness and disability; capturing; enchantment; controversy; Tragic in his poems. Nietzsche and Saeb were both heavily influenced by the tradition of Hindu Buddhism, and in this tradition the intellect was incapable of understanding the nature of reality and human life. To illustrate the similarity of these two thinkers, we divide the article into two parts. In the first part, we discuss Nietzsche's irrationalism, and in the second part we deal with irrationalism of Saeb, and in the section of the result we have evaluated this issue in the form of a diagram to these two thinkers. In this article we have tried to use the main sources of these two thinkers..https://phm.znu.ac.ir/article_44678_b2e2d846bb30c25159b2eac1b55bddcb.pdf