



Revisiting Truth, Ethics, and Evil in the Meeting Points of Badiou's Philosophy and Lacanian Theory

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Abstract: Truth, ethics, and Evil are significant concepts for philosophy and Alain Badiou attempted to approach them with a new perspective. However, he reconsidered these concepts in engagement with Lacanian psychoanalysis. This study aims to shed light more on Badiou's ideas of situation, knowledge, event, void, truth, Evil, and ethics, with a focus on meeting points with Lacanian terms and theory. The first six terms are examined concerning Lacanian theory of four Discourses in order to represent how truth changes a situation and frameworks of knowledge through the appearance of the event and in what way a philosopher or analyst can approach them through truth-procedures. On the other hand, Badiou elaborates on Evil with respect to ethics and truth. This study also introduces neurosis, pervert, and psychosis as structures to analyze Evil since they might be involved in it as simulacrum, betrayal, and disaster, respectively. Ultimately, this exploration contributes to a deeper understanding of the complexities of truth, ethics, and Evil, emphasizing the need for critical inquiry and ethical reflection in navigating the challenges of a situation and knowledge.

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Introduction

No doubt, Alain Badiou's philosophical work has been fashioned out of addressing psychoanalysis, particularly with Lacanian theory. Despite possible disagreements, Lacan's positive influence on Badiou is unassailable. As Clemens states, "From the moment his teacher, Louis Althusser, sent him to report on the psychoanalyst's seminar in 1959, right up to the present day, Lacan has marked Badiou's thought explicitly and implicitly" (Clemens, 2008, p. 271). The major concepts of Badiou such as situation, knowledge, being, void, truth, and conditions, in one way or another, are guided and determined by Lacanian terms of the Symbolic, the Real, subject, lack, signifier, discourse, structure, etc. The conception of Lacan for the analyst helps Badiou to redefine a philosopher as an analyst having a critical procedure to the truth. Even, the subject of the truth needs reconsideration

concerning Lacanian subjectivity as "no conceptual apparatus is adequate unless it is homogeneous with the theoretico-practical orientations of the modern doctrine of the subject, itself internal to practical processes" (Badiou, 2005, p. 2). Lacan is of use to Badiou to recognize the limits of thought and knowledge which finally results in Badiou's manifesto for philosophy.

Alain Badiou writes in his essay "Truth: Forcing and Unnameable" that "A contemporary philosopher, for me, is indeed someone who has the unfaltering courage to work through Lacan's anti-philosophy" (Badiou, 2008, p. 129). Anti-philosophy is a term applied by some theoreticians to their challenging approaches to the tradition of philosophy, particularly Enlightenment. Lacan is no exception in this regard. When he attributes philosophy to the discourse of University, he proclaims his psychoanalysis anti-

philosophical in its practice to be insubordinate to the dominant educating repressive system of knowledge. Anti-philosophy is not the opposition of or antagonism to philosophy, but a critical approach and a reactionary act against some philosophical certainties. Badiou believes considering anti-philosophy is essential for new conceptions in philosophy, especially for a philosopher like him looking for a manifesto for philosophy. Two significant concepts in his philosophy are truth and knowledge, and according to his assertion, anti-philosophy requires a different approach to truth and rests on a kind of knowledge outside of the mainstream organization. Only by looking at the titles of some of the books and essays by Badiou does it appear that his philosophy includes concepts and acts about truth, ethics, subject, being, love, etc., which are all explicated by Lacan. In other words, Lacanian theory can introduce trials, breaks, alterations, and cross-overs to

philosophers if they seek new openings in this field of study. The most important point about such methods and approaches is that they are not in the service of any authority, territory, objective, theory, or paradigm. Lacan set light on the knowledge that there is a lack of the radical suspension of truth and there is a limit to the modern conception of the subject, and Badiou, in the following, introduced his theory off the back of the event that helps the subject recognize the void after the event and look for the truth where a situation and knowledge confronts with limits and ends. This paper seeks to bridge the intellectual frameworks of Badiou and Lacan to revisit key questions about ethical responsibility and the manifestations of Evil. It explores how Badiou's conceptualization of fidelity aligns with Lacan's understanding of the subject's ethical engagement with the Real – the ungraspable kernel of experience. By investigating

how these frameworks converge and diverge, the discussion highlights the transformative potential of embracing the void or lack that lies at the heart of both Badiou's philosophy and Lacanian psychoanalysis. Thus, this study attempts to elaborate on the meeting points of Badiou's philosophy of ethics, truth, and event and Lacan's theories of discourses and structures in order to reach a method for analysis of any kind of ethical encounter with truth

Event, Truth, and Four Discourses

An event, in Badiou's account, can be analyzed concerning the situation and its knowledge and being. The situation is the context for the knowledge to initiate and form concepts, acts, laws, and values, and through them, beings are defined and practiced. In fact, the situation routinizes life, knowledge, and beings. The event is determined and defined by its relation to the situation. The event is extraordinary, which is in contrast to the ordinary situation. As

Badiou recognizes, the event is "something that happens in situations as something that they and the usual way of behaving in them cannot account for" (Badiou, 2001, p. 41). The event is a supplement to a situation in a way a subject of being and knowledge in it must make new decisions. The event then requires a subjective transformation and conclusion that causes the entrance to a new subjective mode; it is a condition with a moment to act as it "brings to pass 'something other' than the situation, opinions, instituted knowledges; event is a hazardous, unpredictable supplement" (Badiou, 2001, p. 67). The significance of the event rests in its contravention and interruption of the situation into new modes that result in restructuring and modification in the conceptual basis of the knowledge practiced in a situation. Christopher Norris states in this regard "Events, on the other hand, are just those strictly unforeseeable and - as

they appear at the time in question - wholly contingent irruptions of the new that may turn out to exert a uniquely powerful and lasting effect but which elude ontological specification precisely insofar as they belong to no existing (i.e. up-to-now thinkable) order of things” (Norris, 2009, p. 9). Apted by void, potential with disregarded barriers, unsettled inconsistencies, and uncounted knowledge, the event is becoming that disrupts the orders of beings. The borderline of the dichotomy of being and event is void which marks a disruption in existing modes of knowledge, as it addresses the void of knowledge, where the situation meets its ends and limits. A void is essential to determine the event since it is a power and forcing that makes knowledge immobilized and incapable. The event is then that absent cause in the situation that can no longer be reduced to the existing possibilities of knowledge and beings. Badiou maintains that it is a site of

multiple as he explains “evental site an entirely abnormal multiple; that is, a multiple such that none of its elements are presented in the situation. The site, itself, is presented, but ‘beneath’ it nothing from which it is composed is presented. As such, the site is not a part of the situation. I will also say of such a multiple that it is on the edge of the void, or foundational” (Badiou, 2005a, p. 175). As the event addresses multiple and the void, the subject has only access to its traces that remain after the event on a situation.

The paradox resting between the event and situation is that the latter can summon the event with its un-presentability as a situation initiates its ruin by pointing to a void, then one can conclude that the event develops knowledge in this way and traverses a subject to a new position. Badiou explicates the effect and condition of the event interestingly, exemplifying a poem by Mallarmé, It would come to existence, (‘might it have existed other

than as hallucination’) it would be enclosed within its limits (‘might it have begun and might it have ended’), having emerged amidst its own disappearance (‘welling up as denied’), and having closed itself within its own appearance (‘closed when shown’), it would be multiple (‘might it have been counted’); yet it would also be counted as one (‘evidence of the sum however little a one’). In short, the event would be within the situation, it would have been presented. But this presentation would either engulf the event within the neutral regime of indeterminate presentation (‘the identical neutrality of the gulf’), allowing its eventual essence to escape, or, having no graspable relation with this regime, it would be ‘worse / no / more nor less / indifferently but as much / chance’, and consequently it would not have represented either, via the event of the event, the absolute notion of the ‘there is’. (Badiou, 2005a, pp. 195–196)

To add other examples, Badiou considers Cantor an event that radically renders the possibilities of creative-exploratory thought through speculation on the infinite. Or, The French Revolution is an event concerning politics as truth-procedure. The event is unfathomable within the prevailing situation or ontology, appearing as concealed problems, unremarked irregularities, unsettled inconsistencies, or uncounted ideas. Thus, the situation cannot be the same before the appearance of the event since it overturns the existing order of knowledge. In other words, the event arises out of a sudden break with existing order and organization within a social or cultural framework, established science, systems of signification, or human communication. In so doing, it is unpredictable as it cannot be decided and foreseen through established knowledge and situation. For beings then, it is

intransitive, imparting, disjunctive, and forcing.

The relations of situation, knowledge, and being with an event can be further observed and examined through the Lacanian theory of Discourses. Lacan introduces the four discourses of Master, University, Hysteric, and Analyst that provoke, respectively, four main social conditions of “(1) educating/indoctrinating; (2) governing/commanding; (3) desiring/protesting; and (4) analyzing/transforming/revolutionizing” (Bracher, 1993, p. 153). For appropriation to Badiou’s terms, these discourses can be renamed the discourses of Situation, Knowledge, Event, and Philosophy, respectively.

A situation provokes a self-directed ego by establishing dominance through signifiers, as they are determined by master signifiers, which practice and force that governance to every level of a subject’s knowledge and being.

In fact, if a subject is to be articulated, s/he has to admit systems of articulation that a situation introduces. It forces its structure by its promise of unity and wholeness, which a subject may desire for stability. However, this procedure is fulfilled by covering the truth about the master signifiers which are, like any other signifier, a being of language and cause of division. In other words, a situation practices itself on subjects by hiding the fact that there is a void in its ontology and knowledge. It achieves all by determining the Symbolic Other, that is the decisive authority, origin or genesis of meaning. To fulfill meaning and identification, a subject is invited and tantalized to take a position within the situation that results in beings. What is followed by a subject is then a situation’s ego that renders a sense of logic, endurance, and consistency, a sense of being that fulfills a subject’s desire to evade anxiety. Lacan adds, in this

regard, that master signifiers, that a subject invests his/her identity and being on, make a situation readable (Lacan, 1991, p. 218). The possibility of a situation is dependent on its master signifiers and despite other signifiers, its value and legitimacy go without question and justification. The incontestable and undeniable condition of master signifiers provides their protection against the void and impasse they conceal. Whatever function within the umbrella of a situation such as culture, science, politics, social relationships, legal system, and language is based on the master signifiers that cause a desire in a subject to bear the identity and being they promise.

On the other hand, knowledge rationalizes and legitimizes a situation's position by securing permanency, harmony, and totality. Knowledge fixes and establishes a situation by structuring systems of articulation and meaning-making procedures. In other

words, knowledge provides hegemony for a situation by incorporating master signifiers into the structures of beings and identities. Knowledge forms the links between signifiers and organizes then systems of signification, through them, a subject can identify and fashion being. Knowledge is an expressive factor, and, in a way, connects one signifier to another, which defines the type of their relationship. As a result, there may be different kinds of knowledge. Knowledge, according to its relation to the master signifier, explains the relevant identity and creates important relationships such as perception, worldview, or even ontology. In fact, it justifies the cause and condition of a situation and the way it must be. Moreover, the most integral role of knowledge is to ensure the exclusion of the Real, which bears the void, and the operation of a situation's Symbolic Other fully. The event appears exactly against this function and role of knowledge in a situation: to

display there is a void in the exclusion of the Real. Knowledge is the manifestation and incarnation of a situation, circulating its image veiled underneath a methodical and organized structure. The event then exposes this systematic function to what is hidden - the truth underlying the limits of knowledge. The significance of the event lies in the confrontation of a subject with the lack in a situation and void in knowledge, in a way knowledge is not practical and forcing in justifying a situation. That is why the event causes resistance, complaint, conflict, and protest. The subject repudiates a situation and its knowledge and being by coming to know “subjective division, the contradiction between conscious and unconscious, and thus the conflictual, or self-contradictory nature of desire itself” (Fink, 1995, p. 133). However, the event is not enough to generate a replacement for a situation, and,

in so doing, a situation still has its solidarity. The appearance of the event is only a signal and warning that a situation cannot be practiced and followed any longer. A subject becomes alienated from a situation, but s/he is still unable to recognize the Real of void and begin a separation. The event is actually a desire to attain what is excluded or missing from a situation and knowledge. In other words, it can be concluded that the event “is a signifier which introduces a void, an absence in the Real. But at the same time the Real is in itself a hole, a gap, an opening in the middle of the symbolic order—it is the lack around which the symbolic order is structured” (Žižek, 1989, p. 170).

By the event's emergence, knowledge can no longer exercise a situation's power and dominance. It is not always an easy and available procedure. For instance, Lacan maintains that Marx's discourse as a political event was ineffectual in ousting imperialism and

capitalism in shifting the circulation of its power (Lacan, 2007, p. 237). For a full change in a situation and knowledge, a system with opposite structures is needed, which is available only to a philosopher, in terms of Badiou, or to an analyst, in terms of Lacan, to figure out the truth and its conditions. A philosopher or an analyst is to pass the new knowledge based on truth, to traverse the fantasy of a situation. The discourse of truth is a counter-discursive foundation that breaks the conventions of a situation dynamically. The truth presents itself “in an alteration of things that are strictly opposed, which is necessary to make turn around each other” (Badiou, 2001, p. 110). Badiou maintains that “the essence of truth can be submitted to thought are negative: undecidability, indiscernibility, the generic not-all, and unnamable” (Badiou, 2004, p. 58). Then a philosopher is to capture the Real, the void in the knowledge, the missing of a situation, in order to

restructure both a situation and knowledge as Žižek adds “But the Real is at the same time the product, remainder, leftover,... the excess which escapes symbolization and is as such produced by the symbolization itself” (Žižek, 2006, p. 169).

Badiou maintains that the conditions through which truth can be analyzed are art (poem), science (mathematics), politics, and love, and he calls them truth-procedures. Badiou correspondingly cautions a philosopher not to count on one truth-procedure in enlightening truth and calls this misleading method ‘suture’: dominating other possibilities approving of one possibility. This is the reason for his claim that each of these conditions and possibilities can capture one aspect of truth and missing one may cause an unfulfilled traverse of truth to a situation. So, the compossibility of truth-procedures is needed. Badiou considers the truth-procedure of art ‘intraphilosophical,’ a producer of truth in an

inaesthetic relation to philosophy. It means art gets hold of mystery and philosophy is supposed to unveil that mystery, so philosophy desacralizes the art with “an interruption of the collusion organized by the poem between truth and the sacred” (Badiou, 2008, p. 36). He adds that art is immanent in the sense that truth is an internal characteristic of art and it is singular in the sense that the type of truth in the art is not presented in other fields concerning truth-procedure. As art is “the presence of the present in the transfixion of realities; and the name of the event in a leap outside of calculable interests” (Badiou, 2008, p. 42), it calls the philosophy’s attention to an inconsistency in the sense-making of knowledge. Thus, Badiou’s philosophy and analysis begins “when the stake is no longer to interpret the real procedures in which truth resides, but to found a unique place where, ... , is it stated how and why a truth is, not a sense

but rather, a hole in sense” (Badiou, 2008, p. 43). In other words, art outlives interpretation and seizes the nonsense in order to capture the void of truth. In Lacanian terms, art renders possibilities for truth just like when the unconscious appears in the language through metaphorization. The void in knowledge is hidden and perhaps repressed, so, in case it is to be articulated, it must appear as a metaphor in the signifiers of a situation, yet representing a different structure. Art, just like ‘the unconscious is structured like a language’ (Lacan, 1993, p. 167), however, it does not mean that it follows the structures of a situation. It makes a unique kind of language in order to represent what is hidden.

The condition of science (mathematics), Badiou considers, is a truth-procedure that enforces that element of truth resisting historicism or finitude. He states “as Lacan repeatedly stated, mathematics is the science of the real, we can

thus be sure that this singular subtraction from the marking of the pure multiple by the effect of One of the language is genuinely real” (Badiou, 2008, p. 118). Science is against any sovereignty or finitude of any being, history above all, since it prefigures the ‘first principles’ allowing knowledge of truth to be written, so establishes the independence of truth from other situations of beings. Historicism, another name for situation or an autonomy of finitude and being, is inclined to temporalize the concept of truth binding it to specific time and finitude, yet science is localized and has no sense of time. The problem of historicism is that “the infinite becomes the Open for the temporalization of finitude and, because it is in thrall to History, it remains in thrall to the One” (Badiou, 2008, p. 99). Suppose the condition of science is not applied to philosophy. In that case, history will continue with the finitude of its Oneness as it “localizes the infinite in the

temporalization of the concept qua historical envelopment of finitude” (Badiou, 2008, p. 110), resisting the prefiguration of truth in beings of indifferent multiples and in discontinuity. Discontinuity is vital to understanding truth since truth is the effect of the event which is itself a discontinuity in the situations of beings. That is the reason science’s ‘paradigmatic value’ rests in its powerlessness in intruding on the regimes of thoughts and beings. The problem of a situation rests in what is absent: void. Science, on the other hand, is forcing that absence, which is an invisible, unoccupiable, or impossible, occluded by knowledge, to be present. In other words, science is the forcing of the Real of void to the Symbolic order of a situation, since the Real is where “there is no absence” (Lacan, 1991, p. 313) and “absolutely without fissure” (Lacan, 1991, p. 97). In other words, science helps one to think the Real beyond the Symbolic interplays of a

situation, in so doing, it is the place-holder of the truth as truth. As Tomšič (2015) adds, science or mathematics “can undoubtedly be seen as a suspension of transference and of the ‘master’s discourse’ (in both meanings of the term), the aim of which is to produce a strict formalization of the real” (p. 199). As the void of Real is the impasse of formalization, science formalizes truth as impossible, in a way, it represents the formalization of a situation as an impasse, a border where truth lies. Science includes the impossibility of truth in symbolization and representation, in so doing, it captures a condition for the multiplicity of truth, a condition in which truth cannot be One. Multiple is available to science by it is reminder that a subject is always castrated about the truth. And this love of castration is forcing of truth since Lacan says “The love of truth is the love of that weakness whose veil we have lifted; it is the love of that which is hidden by truth, and

which is called castration” (Lacan, 2007, p. 14), which is admitted by Badiou that this interruption in the condition of castration is of the order of the infinite

Politics, as truth-procedure, is the unpredictability of truth, in the sense of not being willed, formed, and objectified. It is un-situated so it cannot be promised or avowed; and, it is coming that cannot be incorporated into operation. The impossibility of truth, embraced by politics, is resistant to consistency in a way it “prevents politics from falling under idea” (Badiou, 2008, p. 150). If politics takes a shaping in advance, it cannot be a medium of objective possibility of the impossibility of truth, so “a political prescription has no need first to establish its possibility in terms of realization” (Badiou, 2008, pp. 151-152). Therefore, if politics demands to be emancipatory, it needs to be unconditioned and un-situated, relegated to it by the void of situation truth

causing. So, the relation of politics to philosophy lies in:

A politics (of ‘emancipation’ or of ‘justice’, which are philosophical names; or ‘in interiority’, which is a name that Sylvain Lazarus would assign to politics itself) is a singularity in situation, dependent on an event affecting the collective, of which, in sequential fashion, it presents the truth (but ‘truth’ remains a philosophical name, since the effectuation of the procedure does not name itself as such). Politics disposes its own operators, which are operators of thought and enquiry. Philosophy (or a philosophy) endeavors to seize this truth and therefore to anticipate its being, which, as generic, has on principle not yet taken place: what exists is its (finite) subject, not its (eternal) being. To perform this seizing, philosophy will dispose its own names and its own operations. (Badiou, 2008, p. 154)

Politics practices the truth into a situation by subtraction of rules

and structures that a situation depends on. It is in this way that the truth re-fashions a situation. As mentioned above, a situation is dominated by its master signifiers as they provide meanings to other signifiers, and beings are identified by those. As well, a situation works to “plug the hole of politics”. Politics must ensure the charge and mobility of holes in a situation rather than sustaining the holes. Politics reverses this process and subtracts meanings already established in a situation. Badiou’s politics accordingly particularizes a logic that totally opposes the predictable structure of a situation. It works within a situation with the aim of rendering all structures, hierarchies, orders, and predictions impossible. In this way, and by rendering generic possibilities, politics makes truth impossible to be totalized. And, the condition of love is not just about love experience, yet its function matters as Badiou interestingly states:

Let us say that love is a process that arranges immediate experiences of the like, without the law of these experiences being decipherable from within them. We might also say: the experience of the loving subject, as the matter of love, does not constitute any knowledge of love. This is in fact a distinct feature of the amorous procedure (by contrast to science, art or politics): the thought that constitutes love is not the thought of itself. As an experience of thought, love does not think itself (*s'impense*). A familiarity with love certainly demands that the power of love has been experienced, and especially the power of its thinking. But it is also intransitive to that power (Badiou, 2008, pp. 182-183). Love renders two rather than one. One is about dominance, yet two is about opening and infinity, discovering difference of two in the same of one. The main function of love as truth-procedure is disjunctive synthesis. There are indeed two

positions in love experience, man and woman looking into love from different positions. These two positions are disjunct in a way love experience is not the same in these two positions, both have different knowledge of truth. Badiou maintains that truth has a trans-positional function and answers to the paradox of if there are two positions and they are disjunct, how then truth can be trans-positional by saying that “love is an operation articulated around a paradox. Love does not relieve the paradox; it treats it. More precisely, it makes the truth of the paradox itself” (Badiou, 2008, p. 186). In other words, processing two restores truth, void of situation, that has already been disappeared. Badiou, in this regard, maintains that “this yields the specific numerical schema of the amorous procedure. What this schema expresses is that the Two fractures the One and meets with (*éprouve*) the infinity of the situation. Such is the numericity of the amorous

procedure: One, Two, Infinity.
... Of the situation such as two
disjunct positions exist in it”
(Badiou, 2008, p. 189).

Evil and Evental Structures

The philosophical situation, for Badiou, is significant when there is a fundamental encounter. It is about a condition in which there might be opposing thoughts and considerations that force a subject to choose or make a decision. Moreover, a situation may be about a gap to which there is no proper answer or it is typically excluded from the state of thought or orders of being. Whether involved in paradoxical thoughts or gap, a situation is considerable for a philosopher when there is a problem with this situation and there must be a choice. Ethics, for Badiou, begins then on the question of how to decide as a subject, who is being of a situation and its knowledge, around a point of undecidability. This point is inevitably about the truth. As

truth is un-presentable, undecidable, indiscernible, the generic not-all, and unnamable, the closest term in Lacanian theory to this concept can be *jouissance*. It is meaningless, floating, non-relation, non-symbolizable, and located in the Real and unfulfilled. Just like the truth that disappears in the appearance of the event, *jouissance* disappears in the pleasure it addresses. A subject can recognize both by their effects. The event requires an ethical act on the side of a subject to discover truth, and then reconsider a situation, knowledge, and being. Likewise, the reaction of a subject to *jouissance* determines his/her ethical encounter. So, the most evental site in psychoanalysis can be the Oedipus complex and the response that a subject renders in encountering *jouissance*, which permits Lacan to theorize his structures of neurosis, perversity, and psychosis. These structures can help a

philosopher or an analyst realize Evil in a more significant way. Unlike ‘ethics of other’ and ‘ethics of difference,’ supported by Levinas or Derrida, Badiou maintains ethics of the Same. The Same is required for the inclusion of infinity in the ethical experience that “in effect, is not what is but what comes to be” for “the only genuine ethics is of truths in the plural-or, more precisely, the only ethics is of processes of truth” (Badiou, 2001, pp. 27-28). After the event, it is conceivable for a subject to trust the former situation, knowledge, and being since it is exposed to its void. Dissimilar to Levinas and Derrida who sustain an ethical experience aporic and undecidable, Badiou accredits undecidability to the truth to emphasize what is to come rather than an obstruction to being, the very being which is itself about uniformities and founded on decisions (Riera, 2005, p. 95). Speaking about Evil in ethics of truth is because of the possibility of fallacies,

falsification, ignorance, and distortion in proceduring truth. Badiou attempts, in fact, to introduce ethics as a complement to truth-procedures in order to safeguard truth from contamination with Evil. He maintains that Evil “is an unruly effect of the power of truth” (Badiou, 2001, p. 61) and ethics “is what tries to ward off the Evil” (Badiou, 2001, p. 67). Badiou maintains three forms of evil that can arise in relation to a truth-procedure in a way “[a] to believe that event convokes not the void of the earlier situation, but its plenitude, is Evil in the sense of simulacrum, or terror; [b] to fail to live up to a fidelity is Evil in the sense of betrayal, betrayal in oneself of the Immortal that you are; [c] to identify truth with total power is Evil in the sense of disaster” (Badiou, 2001, p. 71). Regarding simulacrum and terror, it is highlighted that the event dissolves in its supplementary effect on the situation and it is the beginning or representative of truth due to

its weight on the particularity of a situation concerning the void. A simulacrum of truth is the case “when a radical break in a situation, under names borrowed from real truth-processes, convokes not the void” (Badiou, 2001, p. 73). A simulacrum of truth inspires all qualities of truth, even the interruption from the situation, however, it counts on the particularity of the situation rather than the universality of the void. In fact, a situation is equated to a former evental situation bearing truth, and the only way to distinguish it from real truth procedure is to figure out about the void, as an inseparable part of truth embedded in an evental situation. The neurotic feels responsible toward the truth and devises fantasies to exhaust the truth, yet it is too prejudiced to see the faults and gaps. The neurotic wants to end the process of questioning the truth, which is supposed to remain open-ended. The neurotic is a patient of truth who is involved

properly in the narrative to reformulate the concepts. It attempts to reformulate his oedipal encounter of truth into the pre-existing framework, yet in an individualized form, as the primitive perception of truth is transformed into a representation the Symbolic situation. In other words, the neurotic adapts the experience of truth to the already existing order and structure of a situation rather than re-considering a situation in the face of its void. In fact, it is historicizing the truth. The neurotic has a fantasmatic approach to the enigma of truth, “nevertheless, the central issue for him is that his truth is always on the side of desire, not of jouissance” (Rabinovich, 2011, p. 217). This desire must not be about the desire of fulfillment but the desire of the void. As Lacan maintains about the neurotic that “if we proceed from the definition of myth as a certain objectified representation of an epos or as a chronicle expressing in an imaginary way

the fundamental relationships characteristic of a certain mode of being human at a specific period, if we understand it as the social manifestation-latent or patent, virtual or actual, full or void of meaning-of this mode of being, then it is certain that we can trace its function in the actual experience of a neurotic” (Lacan, 1953/2001, p. 408). In the fantasies that a neurotic devising for the encounter with truth, it must be taken into account that the truth is “an imaginary scenario that attempts to lend a space and a meaning to the jouissance left hanging for the subject as result of the Other’s failing” (Apollon, Bergeron, & Cantin, 2002, pp. 123-124). The neurotic, in order to evade simulacrum, must face the impasses of a situation and look for knowledge different from what already exists for it lacks a true relationship to the truth, and in the face of this impasse, it considers desire as unsatisfied and absolute jouissance is unreachable.

Betrayal, on the other hand, is not a predisposition to make space for the break and void. It is here that fidelity to truth is demanded, as a kind of responsibility, as a kind of commitment to the image of truth. In betrayal, one is not committed to becoming. Fidelity requires a subject in ethical experience to be dedicated to the void of knowledge already in beings, otherwise, truth is reduced to the former knowledge and the void is disregarded. Initially, Freud defined perversion as typically a deviation in socially sexual behavior with symptoms such as voyeurism, exhibitionism, sadism, and masochism. However, Lacan modifies this definition by elevating the perversion to a structure:

What is perversion? It is not simply an aberration in relation to social criteria, an anomaly contrary to good morals, although this register is not absent, nor is it an atypicality according to natural criteria,

namely that it more or less derogates from the reproductive finality of the sexual union. It is something else in its very structure. (Lacan, 1988, p. 221) The structure of perversion, Lacan elaborates, “refuses or is denied castration, and so he suffers from an excess of jouissance” and “the pervert has a limited ability to desire. His identity is determined by being the actual object of jouissance of the Other... the lawgiving Other exists, but only precariously; the pervert fervently tries to make the Other whole and to give it a stable existence” (Swales, 2012, p. 55). The pervert is not able to rely on the truth and inversely asks others not to be involved in the process of knowing it since they will face with lack finally anyway. Hence, the structure of perversion is the discourse of disavowal or betrayal; the pervert disavows any fidelity to truth. Perhaps, the reason is that the pervert feels any truth procedure to practice truth will result in a void finally that will

be cycled forever. So, the pervert lacks the will to truth. In this regard, Feher-Gurewich states “the pervert can access psychic gratification only by becoming the agent of the other’s fantasy (his target and/or partner), in order to expose the fundamental anxiety that such a fantasy camouflages. This, no doubt, explains why perverse desire produces horror, fear, and dismay in those who witness its mode of operation” (Feher-Gurewich, 1996, p. 192). Moreover, the pervert denies being castrated; castration here means a lack of full access to truth as a whole. If it admits to articulate truth in procedure and calls it upon the void of the Symbolic situation, it has to acknowledge castration. The pervert is alienated from a situation and its knowledge, yet the separation that brings about disavowing it and restoring truth is not initiated as Swales puts it properly that a pervert “is a subject who has undergone alienation, but who has disavowed separation” (Swales,

2012, p. 54). Hence, the pervert's approach to truth is non-pathological, believing that any truth procedure or value system will one day be revealed about the lack. It can be said that it mystifies that the void of a situation is different from the lack of full access to truth. It should be noted that "the mechanism of disavowal should be understood as a defense, not against lawgiving Other's demand that the child sacrifice jouissance, but against the inadequacy of the lawgiving Other. Disavowal is a creative attempt to prop up the Law and to set limits to the excess in jouissance experienced" (Swales, 2012, p. 78). Betrayal to truth, for a pervert, originates from its resistance to desiring and it is committed to the "eradiation of desire" (Cantin, 2002, p. 157). The structure of pervert can be claimed to be distrustful of any truth-procedures, considering them as a kind of desire yet mistaking that it is a desire for a void. Like "Sade thus stopped, at the point

where desire is knotted together with the law" (Lacan, 2006, p. 74), the pervert does not continue with a truth proceduring, having will-to-void but having-no-will-to-its knowledge

And the last Evil is disaster that Badiou calls unnamable as well. As truth points to the void in a situation, it is presumed that it demands changes in that situation which entails with change in its names of elements. There are two kinds of naming in truth procedure that must not be twisted: "we must admit, then, that in addition to the language of the objective situation, which enables the communication of opinions, there exists a subject-language (the language of the subjective situation) which enables the inscription of truth" (Badiou, 2001, p. 82). Disaster happens if it is assumed that the language of the objective situation can be totally organized by a subjective language for the inscription of truth, and the latter can totalize the former in a way of

replacement. Obviously, it is against multiples of a situation and interpretation. The subjective language not only cannot totalize and absolutize the language of the situation, but also has no power “to name all the elements of the situation” (Badiou, 2001, p. 85). The best example, provided by Lacan, is Joyce who devises a style or a type of signification in which signifier and signified are not conventionally utterable in a way signifying articulation exists, yet it generates difficulty, even sometimes impossibility, in the level of a message. By his metaphoric language that includes coining words in “a density that sometimes manifests itself in the very form of the signifier, giving it this frankly neologistic character” (Lacan, 1993, p. 32), Joyce makes halts in the metonymic level of language. The neologistic words are autonomous and self-directed in signification, in a way, by changing the relationship between signifier and signified,

they do not enter into metonymic process of signification. Joyce’s style, because of this implementation, is perplexing, mysterious, ambiguous, oblique, confusing, and ironical, agitating the course of expectation and development of meaning. What is indefinite about his style is that these neologistic words cannot be challenged, which is because of two reasons: first, the signifier-signified relationship bears in one way or another something personal (personal view of the image of truth), and second, by eliminating the metonymic power of the language, the context to which the truth can be counterclaimed is not in hand. In fact, Joyce attempts to replace his subjective language with objective language. It happens when the truth is foreclosed for a subject, which means s/he is unable to apply truth-procedure to the void. So, the psychotic remains in the enigma of a situation, which is void. Instead of applying truth

to a situation and re-define it, the psychotic creates and devises a different situation as Grigg points “the neurotic finds a response, in the form of a neurotic compromise, a more or less satisfactory solution to the questions of the law ... [the psychotic], on the other hand, finds himself completely incapable of resolving them because the materials he needs to do so, the requisite signifiers, are missing” (Grigg, 1991, p. 10), so it fabricates materials. The procedure, in Lacanian theory, is from the Imaginary and ego to the Symbolic and the realm of language, yet what happens for the psychotic is the reversal of this formula. Grigg, in this regard, adds “Lacan considers that in psychosis there is a form of regression involved; there is regression, which is topographical rather than chronological regression, from the symbolic register to the imaginary. Thus, when he declares that what has been foreclosed from the symbolic reappears in the real, it is

marked by the properties of the imaginary” (Grigg, 1991, p. 10). What, in fact, the psychotic invests and sees in the mirror of ego is the truth itself which locks the reality to be included or interfered. Then the psychotic subject is captivated by the Imaginary. Unlike the pervert’s rationality, the logic of the psychotic is not to reject the truth and lack of action to include it in the social functioning, yet to distort reality for the sake of the image of truth. Thus, the disaster is that a psychotic’s truth is hallucinatory and delusional. “A hallucination is an unchained signifier responding to a rupture in the signifying chain” (Vanheule, 2011, p. 86) and “in delusion, signifiers are “absolute” and words have only one closed meaning” (Bergeron, 2002, p. 74). In both cases, the Symbolic-objective situation is replaced by a subjective language. In other words, a psychotic substitutes its ego to the ego of a situation, and in so doing, truth is overlooked

Conclusion

This study concentrated on the interface of Alain Badiou's philosophy and Jacques Lacan's psychoanalytic theory, emphasizing their shared focus on truth, ethics, and the role of rupture in transforming subjective and societal structures. Both thinkers engage with the notion of a void—a foundational absence or disruption that unsettles established systems of knowledge and being. For Badiou, the event represents an extraordinary break with the order of a situation, demanding a subjective fidelity to the emerging truth. Lacan's framework complements this through lack by examining how the subject navigates the symbolic structures that shape identity and meaning, particularly through the lens of desire and *jouissance*. Revisiting the meeting points of Badiou's philosophy and Lacanian theory underscores the necessity of engaging with

rupture not as a source of existential paralysis, but as a catalyst for reimagining what is possible. Their shared commitment to truth as a transformative force remains a vital resource for navigating the ethical and philosophical challenges of the contemporary moment, reaffirming the enduring relevance of their ideas for a world in flux.

The exploration of Badiou's truth-procedures—art, science, politics, and love—demonstrates the multiplicity of ways in which truth can be enacted. Each truth-procedure highlights a distinct pathway to challenging the limits of knowledge and engaging with the Real. Lacan's theory of the four discourses—master, university, hysteric, and analyst—similarly provides a framework for understanding how desire and knowledge interact to sustain or disrupt the a situation. By aligning these frameworks, this paper has shown how truth disrupts the stability of knowledge,

exposing the void and inviting new possibilities for transformation.

Crucially, both Badiou and Lacan illuminate the ethical dimensions of engaging with truth. Fidelity to the event, as Badiou posits, requires a commitment to the void, challenging the subject to resist the temptation of simulacrum, betrayal, or disaster. Lacan's insights into neurosis, perversion, and psychosis reveal the psychological mechanisms that can obstruct or distort this ethical engagement, offering a nuanced understanding of the challenges inherent in truth-procedures. Together, their theories provide a robust framework for identifying the risks of ethical failure while emphasizing the transformative potential of embracing truth as a dynamic and open-ended process.

In the context of broader philosophical and psychoanalytic discourse, the convergence of Badiou and Lacan offers profound

implications for contemporary debates on ethics, subjectivity, and societal change. By foregrounding the role of the void in destabilizing the status quo, their ideas challenge us to rethink how to confront the limits of the Symbolic situation. This study invites further exploration of how their insights might inform critical issues such as political resistance, cultural transformation, and the ethics of truth in an increasingly complex and fragmented world.

Ultimately,

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