Philosophical Meditations

From Disposition to Love: Understanding Architect's Work in Sadrian School

Maryam Nikoofard; Zahra Ahari; Hadi Nadimi; Maryam Salem

Volume 13, Issue 30 , August 2023, Pages 17-49

https://doi.org/10.30470/phm.2022.538104.2083

Abstract

Abstract: The Sadrian School has a high potential to answer many questions in architecture. This study is an attempt to explain the architect's work based on the Sadrian School. The ... Read More Abstract: The Sadrian School has a high potential to answer many questions in architecture. This study is an attempt to explain the architect's work based on the Sadrian School. The research method is to analyze, interpret and infer from Mulla Sadra's thoughts to explain the architect's task in different aspects. The architect's work is one of the three basic crafts; it meets the fundamental need for living places on different levels. Therefore, a system of concepts related to the architect, from craftmanship and purpose, encompassment and disposition, order and cause, and beauty and love, is extracted from Mulla Sadra's words and discussed. As a purposeful creator, the architect has imaginal and intellectual forms of man's life and his acts. He tries to provide a place for living as a platform for doing different activities by the disposition of the environment and changing dimensions and relationships in nature. According to his existential level, the architect encompasses the world and recognizes causes and effects in the perfect system of existence. By dispositioning the environment to make a place for human life, he actualizes an order in nature that becomes the ground for humans and other beings to reach their desired perfection. By perceiving beauty and choosing the beloved, he regulates his intrinsic faculties. Through this inner order, the architect disposes and changes the world, and his activity becomes the manifestation of the beloved's perfect form, desirable attributes and actions. Keywords: Architect's work, Mulla Sadra, Encompassment, Disposition, Causal order, Manifestation of love Introduction: Today architects do different activities, work on various scales and deal with different areas of knowledge and human work. Therefore, a question is posed: what does an "architect" really do? Architectural theorists with different philosophical views have addressed this issue. Mullā Ṣadrā's School of Thought provides a great ability to understand the architect's work. Although some efforts have been made to bring the ideas of the Sadrian School to architecture, there is no coherent conceptual system that can be used to explain the architect's work. This research has relied on a general meaning of architecture as a work that provides a place for human life, inferred from Mullā Ṣadrā (Mullā Ṣadrā, 1376 SH). Creating a suitable place for life requires various knowledge and ways of changing the environment (Mullā Ṣadrā, 1379 SH). Therefore, we can discuss the different levels of an architect's work, with various purposes, in a conceptual system. Method: Mullā Ṣadrā has no distinct discussion about architecture. Therefore, this research tries to construct a system of primary and secondary concepts and their relations by logical argumentation based on Sadrian philosophy. Findings: In the first part, the architect is introduced through the main concepts of creator (Mullā Ṣadrā, 1382 SH), disposer and encompasser (Mullā Ṣadrā, 1368 SH). These concepts show how the work of an architect can be distinguished in purpose, material and form (Mullā Ṣadrā, 1382 SH). The second part expresses how understanding the ordering of things, causes and effects (Mullā Ṣadrā, 1368 SH) can lead to encompassing and disposing of the environment to establish some order for human life (Mullā Ṣadrā, 1379 SH). The final part brings the architect's work from a wise profession to a lovingly manifestation. The concepts of love, beauty and pleasure (Mullā Ṣadrā, 1368 SH) can show the different dimensions of the architect's existence and give his work a different meaning on each level. Conclusions and discussions: This research presents a conceptual system based on the Sadrian School to understand the architect's work in such a way that it includes the activities of different architects at various levels. The architect's work is to provide a place for human life. By changing the measures and relationships in elements, materials and plants, architect preserves the human body and help flourish various human talents. To this end, the architect makes a thorough disposition of himself and the environment and tries to encompass different levels of existence and give an order to nature. The actualization of such an order in the best system of existence depends on the internal order of the architect's faculties and talents. What orders the architect inside is his perceptions, inclinations and beloveds. On the one hand, based on an intellectual form of human life and activities, the architect devises a way to order the place of human life and determinates nature. Here, the architect's work relies on knowing the world in various levels of existence and man and his needs and wants in his existential journey. On the other hand, the architect's heartfelt attachments create a form of man and his desirable life in the architect's soul. If the architect's beloved is his position and fame, he cares only about himself. As a result, the architect's desired form of human life will not include higher human wants. On a higher level, the architect wants the carnal self and the divine perfections of man and the flourishing of human potentialities. Eventually, the architect can reach a degree where he is sincerely passionate about bringing others a sensible and true life. Therefore, his governance is so comprehensive that it encompasses him, humans, and other creatures of nature. His ordinance in nature is so precise as to provide the desired order for everyone's life. Sadrian School is about a journey, and the architect is always on the move. Suppose the architect orders his carnal desires in the direction of the true beloved, who is the manifestation of human perfection. In that case, he is moving from selfishness to altruism and divinity As a result, architects' work is approaching a more complete and beautiful order in providing a place for real human life. References: Mullā Ṣadrā. (1363 SH). Mafātīḥ al-Ghayb. Tehran: Muʼassisa-yi MuṭāliꜤāt va Taḥqīqāt-i Farhangī [In Arabic] Mullā Ṣadrā. (1366 SH). Sharḥ Uṣūl al-Kāfī (with the Glosses of ꜤAli Nūrī, ed. Muḥammad Khājavī). Tehran: Muʼassisa-yi MuṭāliꜤāt va Taḥqīqāt-i Farhangī [In Arabic] Mullā Ṣadrā. (1422 AH). Sharḥ al-hidāya al-athīriyya (ed. Muḥammad Muṣṭafā Fūlādkār). Beirut: Muʼassisa al-Tārikh al-ꜤArabiyya [In Arabic] Mullā Ṣadrā. (1368 SH). Al-Ḥikma al-MutaꜤāliya fi al-Asfār al-ꜤAqliyya al-arbaꜤa (with the Glosses of Hādi Sabzivārī, Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabāī and et al., Introd. by Muḥammad Riḍā Muẓaffar). Qom: Maktaba al-Muṣṭafāvī [In Arabic] Mullā Ṣadrā. (n.d.). Al-Mabdaʼ wa al-MaꜤād. Tehran: Anjuman-i Ḥikmat va Falsafi-yi Īrān [In Arabic] Mullā Ṣadrā. (1382 SH). Sharḥ va TaꜤlīqi-yi Ṣadr al-Mutaʼallihīn bar ilāhīyāt-i Shafā (ed. Najafghulī ḥabībī). Tehran: Bunyād-i Ḥikmat-i Islāmī-yi Ṣadrā [In Arabic] Mullā Ṣadrā. (1375 SH). Al-Shawahid al-Rubūbiyya fī al-Manāhij al-Sulūkiyya (with the Glosses of Hādi Sabzivārī, introd. and ed. by Jalāl al-dīn Āshtiyanī). Beirūt: Muʼassisa al-Tārikh al-Arabiyya [In Arabic] Mullā Ṣadrā. (1376 SH). Mathnavī-yi Mullā Ṣadrā (ed. by Muṣṭafā Fiyḍī). Qom: Kitābkhāni-yi Āyatullāh al-Uẓmā MarꜤashī Mullā Ṣadrā. (1378-1380 SH). Al-Ḥikma al-MutaꜤāliya fi al-Asfār al-ꜤAqliyya al-arbaꜤa. Translated by: Muḥammad Khājavī. Tehran: Mowlā Mullā Ṣadrā. (1383 SH). Al-Shawahid al-Rubūbiyya. Translated by: Javād Muṣliḥ. Tehran: Surūsh

Time as the Central Signifier in Dariush Shaygan’s Thought

fateme Pasalari Behjani; rostam shamohammadi; ghodrat allah khayatian

Volume 13, Issue 30 , August 2023, Pages 57-86

https://doi.org/10.30470/phm.2022.550583.2193

Abstract

Abstract: The present paper, drawing on a descriptive-analytical research method, tries to examine the position of time in Dariush Shaygan's intellectual system, especially its appearance ... Read More Abstract: The present paper, drawing on a descriptive-analytical research method, tries to examine the position of time in Dariush Shaygan's intellectual system, especially its appearance and emergence in the realm of traditional and modern culture, poetry, painting, architecture and novel. The results show that he considers time to be the central signifier or core of culture which in traditional Oriental cultures is mythical time and in modern Western culture is linear time. With a deep attachment which has to with the mythical time and its manifestations, he tries to find it by digging into various thoughts. According to Shaygan, although with the advent of modernity in Western culture, the mythical time was abolished and replaced by linear time, at the end of the twentieth century, following the electronic revolution, linear time gave its place to the global present time which has great affinity with mythical time. Of course, their ontological differences should not be disregarded. Eventually, this effort of Shaygan leads him to the novel, and he finds the time of the early myths in Marcel Proust's novel In Search of Lost Time. Keywords: Dariush Shaygan, Culture, Time, Mythical Time, Mythical Time Disappearance, Electronic Revolution Introduction Dariush Shaygan (1935-2018), a contemporary Iranian philosopher and spiritualist, seems to be mainly concerned with culture, which rooted in the confrontation between tradition and modernity. On the one hand, because of his oriental identity and belonging to the traditional cultures of the Orient, he seeks to gain a deeper understanding of these cultures. On the other hand, by paying attention to the intellectual-epistemological products of the modern Western world, he tries to clarify the unknown dimensions of culture. The main question is whether it is possible to find a central core in his culturology that is the key to understanding of his ideas? The present article argues that this key is the category of time. Methodology This study employs descriptive-analytical method through analyzing and examining Shaygan's different works to show how Shaygan uses category of time to understand the traditional and modern culture. Findings In his first period of thought, Shaygan focused on the phenomenological study of the traditional cultures of the Orient and realized that their world view was rooted in a common spiritual experience. In this spiritual experience, the origin experience - an experience based on a kind of inner feeling to achieve "absolute timelessness" and "eternity" - precedes everything. Shaygan interprets this "timelessness" as a "mythical time." Concept of "trust" in Islamic mysticism, the "repository of consciousness" in the Mahayana Buddhist school, the "golden testicle" in Hindu mythology, and the "mnemosyne" in Greek mythology are examples of "mythical time". However, in Shaygan’s view, the man lived only in their initial stage in the "mythical time", when they were immersed in their eternal sleep. But with the awakening of consciousness and the consolidating concept of "I" as a very crucial rift occurred in the concept of time, and time took various forms without losing its mysterious power (Shaygan, 1371(a)sh). Shaygan sometimes uses the phrass of "time as presence" to refer to "mythical time" and thereby shows its manifestation in the worldview of five great Iranian poets (Ferdowsi, Khayyam, Mulavi, Saadi, and Hafez) and Iranian arts. According to the emotional content of the poet, the presence times of these five poets are different but all of them are like a melody that has been played in various positions (Shaygan, 1376sh). According to Shaygan, with the advent of modernity in the sixteenth century in the West, the "mythical time" disappeared and a "linear time" dominated the Western worldview. "Linear time", unlike "mythical time", can be divided into past, present and future; also it moves in a straight forward and irreversible line. More importantly, it is a time free of myths and devoid of content. The demythologization of time has caused a deep rift between nature and man on the one hand and man and God on the other hand. Yet, with the advancement of technology and the advent of the electronic revolution in the twentieth century, a kind of global present time emerged that had obvious similarities to "mythical time". Global present time has three qualities, "omnipresence, momentum, and immediacy", which were attributed to the divine essence; and also this time is the basis for the emergence of intangible and imperceptible things that mystics speak of them. It should be noted, however, that "the present time" arising from the electronic revolution and the "mythical time" do not fall into the same ontological status. In other words, the former is at the level of the sensory world, but the latter is in the vertical order of existence and in the realm of “esoteric observation "(Shaygan, 1380sh). Shaygan, in the last period of his life and his last work, The Magic Lantern of Time, analyzes time in Marcel Proust’s In Search of lost Time. The central issue of this novel is time, but not time in the calendar and everyday sense; rather, the time depicted in this novel is more like a "mythical time" which the past is always present or in other words "the synchronicity of successive moments" (Shaygan, 1396sh). Conclusions From Shaygan's viewpoint, the central core of culture is time. Time in traditional cultures has manifested in the form of "mythical time". But with the advent of modernity in the West in the 16th century, the "mythical time" disappeared and a "linear time" dominated. However, in the 20th century, two other times emerged which have very similar to " the mythical time". One is the "global present time" that took shape after the electronic revolution, and the other is "the present time" that appeared in the novel. Of course, it should be kept in mind that their ontological status is not the same. References The Qurān Ahmadi Bābak, (1386 SH) Heidegger va Purseshe Buniādēn, Tehran: Markaz. Ebrahimi Dinani, Gholam Hossein (1393 SH) MUʿmmāye Zamān va Hudūth Jahān, Tehran: Hekmat va Phalsaphe. Eliade, Mircea (1382 SH) Myth, Dream, Mystery, Translated by: Roya Monajjem, Tehran: Elm. Dabbagh, Soroush (1397 SH) Ābye Daryāye Bikarān: ṭarhvāreē az erfān Mudern, Toronto: Bonyad Sohrevardi. Dhāker, Manochehr (1392 SH) Barresye Khāṭere, Vafādāri va Nawʿshenāsye Akhlāghi bā Estefāde az Kārkardhāe yūngi, Taammulate Phalsaphi, 3(9):30-47. Shaygan, Dariush (1378 SH) Asiā dar barābar Gharb, Tehran: Amirkabir. ___________ (1395 SH) Panj Eghlēme Huzūr (Ferdowsi, Khayyām, Mulavi, Saʿdi, and Hāfez), Tehran: Farhang Moaser. ___________ (1371 SH) Henry Corbin: The Horizons of Spiritual Thought in Iranian Islam, translated by: Bagher Parhām, Tehran: Agah. ___________ (1395 SH) Dar Justejūye Phazāhāye Ghumshude: A Collection of Articles Related to Visual Arts, Tehran: Farhang Moaser. ___________ (1371 SH) Buthāye ḏhehni va khātereye Azali, Tehran: Amirkabir. ___________ (1380 SH) New Enchantment: Forty-Piece Identity and Mobile Thinking, translated by: Fatemeh Valiani, Tehran: Farzan Rooz. ___________ (1376 SH) Under the Skies of the World: Dariush Shaygan's Conversation with Ramin Jahanbegloo, translated by: Nazi Azima, Tehran: Farzan Rooz. ___________ (1396 SH) Fānūs jādūie zamān: Negāhi be Zamān az Dast Rafte, Asar Marcel Proust, Tehran: Farhang Moaser. Tull, Eckhart (1399 SH) The power of Now: A Guide to Spiritual enlightenment, Translated by: Masiha Barzegar, Tehran: Zehn Avis.

A Critique of Wolfson's Method in Reading Philosophical and Theological Texts

reza gandomi nasrabadi

Volume 13, Issue 30 , August 2023, Pages 93-117

https://doi.org/10.30470/phm.2022.554850.2224

Abstract

Abestract Wolfson, a well-known Jewish philosopher, sought to rewrite the history of Western philosophy with a focus on Judaism. In so doing, he used the hypothetical-inferential ... Read More Abestract Wolfson, a well-known Jewish philosopher, sought to rewrite the history of Western philosophy with a focus on Judaism. In so doing, he used the hypothetical-inferential method or the Talmudic method of studying texts. He sought unresolved problems, unknown sources, unknown relationships, and unknown paths of philosophy. The challenge of understanding the origin, structure, and diversity of philosophical systems was fascinating to him. Although there was no connection between Talmudic study and philosophical research, he made the best use of a methodological affinity between them. This method is based on the assumption that there is no real contradiction in the thoughts of a real thinker. Obviously, by finding a case of violation, one can question the above assumption and, consequently, Wolfson's method. Coherent and systematic presentation of a thinker's thoughts and expression of the unspoken and unwritten thoughts of his thoughts, linking irrelevant contents and resolving the apparent contradictions of a thinker's thoughts are the most important functions of this method. His use of terms regardless of their historical evolution, imposing his intellectual framework on the thinker in question, exaggeration and arbitrariness in choosing the text, and Judaizing the history of thought and his support for Jewish thought are the most important criticisms of his method. Key words: Wolfson, Hypothetical-inferential method, Talmudic method, Philo, Spinoza, Crescas. Introduction What attracts attention more than any other honor during Wolfson’s scientific life is the use of hypothetical-inferential method in the study of philosophical and theological texts, or in short, the method of guess and test. Wolfson's method can be delivered to the following question: How should one read philosophical and theological texts? Based on the hypothetical-inferential method in the study of philosophical and theological texts, first a question is raised and speculation is made based on the available data, and in the next step, by studying the texts part by part and carefully, supporting evidence and clues are gathered and Violations are not given much attention. The method proposed by Wolfson, like the Talmudic method, is based on the assumption that a text is written so carefully that every term, interpretation, generalization or exception is important, not only its apparent meaning, but also its implications. One of the functions and goals of the hypothetical-inferential method is to reach the intellectual structure of a thinker and to reveal the invisible processes of their reasoning. The subtitle of Wolfson's book Spinoza's Philosophy is well indicative of the purpose and function of the aforementioned method. Spinoza's philosophy has to do with the process of revealing the process of hidden arguments. In the hypothetical-inferential method, the goal is to find the origin of a theory, and by applying this method, the hidden process of philosophical thinking is revealed. Access to the unsaid and unwritten of a thinker is another function of using the hypothetical-inferential method of studying texts. According to Wolfson, a text is not an express expression of the author in a specific situation and at a specific time and for a specific audience, but rather it is to address unspoken and deep thoughts. He points out that the words spoken by philosophers, in their best and most complete state, remain floating and moving objects on the water, indicating the existence of unspoken thoughts submerged or under water. Method Our method in this article is to show the shortcomings and weaknesses of Wolfson's hypothetical-inferential method. In fact, he claims that there is no real contradiction in the thought of the discussed philosophers, and that their thoughts are consistent and coherent. Any attempt leads to violation of these two claims and questioning Wolfson's method. Findings Some criticisms of Wolfson's proposed method are mentioned. Wolfson's method is always threatened by the danger of applying the aforementioned paradigm and intellectual and mental framework in understanding the thoughts of thinkers. This danger occurs in two ways: It is considered a theory and based on this, it attributes a theory to the author that it was not possible to adopt this theory in his time, or he required materials that did not exist at that time in terms of concepts and meanings. Undoubtedly, the meaning of the terms undergoes changes over time and their current meaning is different from their previous meaning. Wolfson only attributes a theoretical text to the author due to the family similarity of the words, which was not possible to propose at that time. One of the problems of the coherent method proposed by Wolfson is to show an author who has presented many inconsistent and incoherent materials. For example, comparing the treatises of Philo of Alexandria with the coherent and uniform interpretation that Wolfson gave in two volumes of Philo of Alexandria, fundamentals of Religious Philosophy in Judaism, Christianity and Islam have been obtained from him is enough to confirm the above point. One of the flaws of the hypothetical-inferential method, and to put it better, the biggest problem of the said method, is its reliance on this presupposition or the principle of the matter that there is no real contradiction in a true and real thinker, and on what appears to be a contradiction or inconsistency at first glance. It turns out that by analyzing the data, you can find out that they are not real. Conclusion and Discussions Judaizing the history of philosophy or rewriting the history of philosophy centered on Judaism is one of the serious criticisms of Wolfson. He wanted to publish a multi-volume history of philosophy with the general title of Structure and Development of Philosophical Systems from Plato to Spinoza. As noted, the beginning and end point of the seventeen-century period of religious thought was very dear to Wolfson, and he was very unhappy that his conceptual plan did not have a wide impact on the periodization of the history of philosophy. Wolfson's research draws attention to the confiscation of opinions and views of Christian and Muslim thinkers in favor of Jewish philosophy. His main goal was to prove Jewish philosophy and even beyond that to prove the centrality of Jewish thought in various types of religious philosophy. References Gandami Nasrabadi, Reza, (2012), Philo: Founder of Religious Philosophy, Samt Publications and Adian University Publications. ____________________,(1389),Wolfson's philosophical methodology (hypothetical-inferential method), methodology in human sciences, 16th year, number 64-65,pp. Wolfson, Harry Austryn, (1368),Philosophy of Kalam, translated by: Ahmad Aram, Tehran: Al-Hadi. _____________,( 1389 ), Philosophy of the Fathers of the Church, translated by: Ali Shahbazi, Qom: University of Religions and Denominations Publications. ______________ ,( 1387 ),Reflections of the Islamic Kalam in the Jewish Kalam, translated by Ali Shahbazi, Qom: University of Religions and Denominations Publications. Mortazavi, Seyyed Khodiar, (2018), an exploration of the methodology of the history of political ideas (case study: Skinner's critique of the methodology of textual reading), Politics Quarterly, Faculty of Law and Political Science Magazine, Volume 39, Number 1, Spring 2018, pp. 285 -304. Goodenough,Ervin R,)1940(,Introduction to philo judaus,Oxford university press. Hegel,G.W.F,)1995(,Lectures on the History of philosophy,trans by E.s.Haldane,university of Nebraska press. Haberman, Jacob,(2011), Harry A. Wolfson's Utilization of the Hypothetico-Deductive Method of Text Study, Shofar , Vol. 30, No. 1 (Fall 2011), pp. 104-128. Lewy,j.N.D,(2004),selected writings philo of Alexandria,harper. Runia, David (1990), Exegesis and Philosophy: Studies on Philo of Alexandria,Variorum, Aldershot. Twersky,Isidore,(1976),Harry Austryn Wolfson(1887-1974),The American Jewish Year book,vol.76,pp.99-111.Wolfson, Harry Austryn (1934), The Philosophy of Spinoza, Harvard University Press.___________________(1982), Philo: Foundations of Religious Phliisiphy In Judaism,Christianity ,and Islam, 5th ed., Harvard University Press.

Review and critique of the view of Eric J. Wielenberg in The Value and Virtue in a Godless World

Hossein Ebadaty; SEYED AHMAD FAZELI

Volume 13, Issue 30 , August 2023, Pages 127-159

https://doi.org/10.30470/phm.2022.526792.1975

Abstract

A Review and Critique of Eric J. Weillenberg’s Point of View on Value and Virtue in a Godless Universe Abstract: In Value and Virtue in in a Godless Universe, Weillenberg considers ... Read More A Review and Critique of Eric J. Weillenberg’s Point of View on Value and Virtue in a Godless Universe Abstract: In Value and Virtue in in a Godless Universe, Weillenberg considers naturalism as an atheistic account of the universe. He first introduces the meaninglessness of life in the absence of God with four narrations and then challenges it with the help of three perspectives. He then takes up the ways of the ontological basis of morality on religion and tries to show that these ways are dead ends. In this book he does not clarify his alternative view, but in the book Strong Ethics, it is revealed that he is an anti-naturalist. In response to the question at to why one should live morally, he wants to show that there is a possibility of moral motivation apart from God, although God can also be a good supporter of morality. In introducing virtues to his proposed ecosystem, he no longer suffices to present a positive view and tries to show that some virtues are born in the absence of God, or at least have a deeper meaning. The most important criticism which can be leveled at him is the identification of theism with being a Christian. Keywords: meaning of life, atheism, virtue, realism, theory of the divine Introduction and Methodology Eric J. Weillenberg is a moral realist who seeks to portray this moral reality in a world without God. While stating his atheistic arguments (which are generally arguments against Christian beliefs), he first seeks to explain the meaning of life in a world without God and then critiques the ontological and epistemological relationship between religion and morality. He then introduces moral duties and motives for moral action in such a world, using selfishness and utilitarianism. Findings Chapter One: God and the Meaning of Life- In the first chapter of the book Value and Virtue in a Godless Universe, Weillenberg first outlines and then critiques four arguments that life without God has no esoteric meaning. Of course, the first three arguments are answered in the first chapter through the three escape routes by Richard Taylor, Peter Singer, and Aristotle, and the fourth argument is left to the next chapter. The four arguments for the need for God to make life meaningful are as follows: 1- Argument of the final consequence: Weillenberg, referring to the speech of William Len Carrigg, says that according to this argument, because according to scientists, the end of the world is not all human beings, so if there is no God, we are like prisoners waiting to be executed. 2- Argument of aimless existence: Life without supernatural meaning is a life without mission. Therefore, we will not have any criteria for happiness. 3- Argument without concern from a valuable person: This argument is taken from the article The Meaning of Susan Wolf's Life. Life has an inner meaning only when a worthy and valuable being is attached to it; or, in other words, caring about it. Who is this precious being other than God? 4- God's argument as the source of morality: Without God, there is no value in the world (Wielenberg, 2005, pp. 15-18). Richard Taylor Solution: Create the meaning of your life: He outlines Taylor's solution, citing an example from the ancient Greek myth of Sisyphus, which Taylor cites at the end of his book, Good and Bad (called the Meaning of Life) (Taylor, 1970, pp. 187-202). Citing quotes from Leo Tolstoy in My Confession, and quotes from Stephen Drol about Aristotle, Weillenberg goes on to say that such a life is not worth living if the meaning of life is merely satisfied with the difference between Sisyphus and those interested in it (Wielenberg, 2005, pp. 18-23). Peter Singer's solution: Make life meaningful by eliminating suffering Using the George test method of Moore (Moore , 1903, p. 91). Singer argues that if something is still independent of anything else, it has intrinsic value. According to Singer, suffering has an inherent evil, and therefore the removal of suffering will have intrinsic value, whether it is God or not (singer, 1995). Weillenberg says that if the whole universe could be destroyed without any pain, it would naturally reduce the total suffering, and in fact the problem of negative suffering would lead to the elimination of the subject. But Singer certainly does not consider this to have intrinsic value (Wielenberg, 2005, pp. 23-31). Aristotle's solution: in his book Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle says that all virtues, as inherently good actions, have the value of a means to attain happiness, which he calls eudaimonia. According to Aristotle, virtue means the activity of the soul according to the highest virtues (Aristotle, 2021, p. 46). Wellinberg writes that Aristotle introduces the highest actions of intrinsic value as deep thinking. In this way, Aristotle introduces a meaning to live independently of any transcendental being (Wielenberg, 2005, pp. 31-37). The author's critique of the proposed views in Chapter One: 1- Using the modified version of Moore's open-ended argument formulated by Michael Ridge, the definition of the meaning of life to the satisfaction of living lacks the necessary conditions of a definition. At the same time, the meaning of every human being's life must be commensurate with his or her innate talents. Basically, no minimum can be imagined to preserve the meaning of life for human beings, and therefore the argument to prove something that is not possible otherwise would be meaningless. Peter Singer pinpoints conflict between the suffering of the minority and the pleasure of the majority. The third proposed way that Weillenberg derives from Aristotle's Nicomachean ethics is in fact a misunderstanding of Aristotelian ethics. Aristotle writes in the most important verse of Lambda about God that "actuality is the intellect of life and God is this actuality." Apart from that, Aristotle, by defining the movement of passion, actually tied the meaning of life to the desire for existence in the beauty of God (Safari, 2015, pp. 380-394), so such an interpretation of Aristotle seems fundamentally incorrect. Chapter Two: God and Morality- Weillenberg's main approach in this chapter is to reject all the views that make morality (in the realm of ontology) somehow dependent on God. He proposes two propositions and divides the competing views (pro-DCM) based on the acceptance of both propositions, or only the second proposition, into strong and weak views, and refutes both views. Chapter 3: God as the Guarantor of Perfect Justice- The subject of the third chapter is more related to the psychological relationship between God and morality. In fact, this is a kind of attention to the gap between must and is, which David Hume spoke about. In fact, this discussion is one of the main ways to enter the issue of introversion or extroversion in ethics. Weillenberg seeks to solve the problem of the motivation of moral action in the absence of God, while retaining his unnatural realism, which he referred to in the previous chapter. In his first answer, using the views of Aristotle and Hume separately, he shows in two ways that the best kind of bio-human is bio-moral (Wielenberg, 2005, pp. 70-79). Chapter 4: Moral character in a world without God- The fourth chapter deals with the consequences of accepting naturalism (narrated by Weillenberg). He has tried to show how in the world of a true naturalist, good sources are explained. He first shows why pride is a great sin in Christianity by quoting Christian scriptures and the works of people like Lewis and Milton. But on the other hand, for a true naturalist (who Aristotle thinks is the best representative of this view), the desire to rise to a higher position and to have a high-minded spirit is not only a mistake but also the basis of man's attainment of bioethics (Wielenberg, 2005, p. 103). In the meantime, two different views on virtue are shown: On the one hand, Julia Driver, who considered humility as a result of negligence (Jahed, 1393, p. 85), and McIntyre, who called the image of the Aristotelian metaphysician horrible (MacIntyre, 1998, p. 79), and on the other hand, Aristotle, who considered pride as a virtue. it is introduced with the approach of conscious desire to improve one's position and know one's true position (Aristotle2, 1999, pp. 94، NE 1123b10-15). Weillenberg's narrative is critical from two perspectives. First, what he narrates about religiosity is merely a kind of perversion with a superficial and second-hand reading. But apart from this view, Weillenberg wants to remain both realistic and atheist. In such a situation it is easier to fall into the view of John Mackey and believe in the theory of error. Something that Weillenberg himself considered possible in his book, Powerful Ethics. Another critique of Weillenberg's extraterrestrial approach to the motivation of moral action can be found in the book Value and Goodness in a Godless World by Bernard Williams's critique of moral extraversion in the realm of action motivation. Williams argues that reasons that are independent of a person's mental state are incapable of explaining a person's actions (Wielenberg, 2005, pp. 35-45). Conclusions and discussions: In the first chapter, Weillenberg tries to challenge the claims that want to make the meaning of life unique to God, and he succeeds. At the same time, his alternatives, as he himself has criticized, are not strong enough. He goes on to critique the views of the proponent of the theory of the divine. Although in many cases Weillenberg's critiques of the claims about the ethics of theism are commendable, both ontologically and semantically, his circle of encounters in this, in particular, is very limited, thus impairing his conclusion. Of course, in his book Strong Ethics, he was able to use evolutionary theories to solve the problem of motivation of moral action to a great extent. References Aristotle. (2021). Nicomachean Ethics. Tehran: Tarhe no. Aristotle2. (1999). Nicomachean Ethics. (T. Irwin, Trans.) Hackett Publishing Company. Jahed, M. (1393). Modesty from the point of view of Muslim thinkers. MacIntyre, A. (1998). A short history of ethics. Notre Dame: Univ.of Notre Dame Press. Moore , G. E. (1903). Principia Ethica. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press. Safari, G. (2015). The theory of Form in Aristotle's philosophy. Tehran: Hekmat. singer, p. (1995). How are we to live? Ethics in an age of self-interest. Amherst. Taylor, R. (1970). Good and Evil: A New Direction. New York: Macmillan. Wielenberg, E. J. (2005). Value And Virtue In A Godless Universe. Cambridge: Cambridge.

Religious Answers to the Existential Problem of Evil

abbasali mansouri; asad allah azhir; Seyyed Fazlullah Roshan

Volume 13, Issue 30 , August 2023, Pages 167-200

https://doi.org/10.30470/phm.2022.557887.2245

Abstract

Religious Answers to the Existential Problem of Evil Abstract The problem of evil has different formulations, one of which is called the existential problem of evil; this means that ... Read More Religious Answers to the Existential Problem of Evil Abstract The problem of evil has different formulations, one of which is called the existential problem of evil; this means that when the evils and sufferings of the world actually affect man, man is psychologically unable to continue his former relationship with God and it seems that his emotions are not contended with God. In such a case, man's priority is not to resolve the logical contradiction between the existence of evil and the existence of God but requires an answer that repairs this relationship. The present article argues that religious answers can better resolve the existential problem of evil and repair a person's relationship with God, or at least prevent the complete severance of his relationship with God. The religious answer means an answer that is first of all derived from religious texts; second, it is based on the cosmological, anthropological, and theological presuppositions accepted by religions. The eight religious answers to the existential problem of evil in this article are: calamity for trial, illusion of evil due to ignorance and imperfect knowledge, warning for return and repentance, difficulties in preventing rebellion, retribution for actions in this world, abandonment of this world and engagement in the hereafter, compensation in hereinafter for worldly suffering, and evil for flourishing. Key words The problem of evil, The Existential Problem of Evil, Religion and Evil, Religious Answers to Problem of Evil Introduction The problem of evil is one of the old and difficult problems in theology and philosophy, which is still discussed and disputed. Although the problem of evil is not only the problem of the theists, it is considered one of the most serious arguments against theism today. The problem of evil in our time is usually formulated in three ways: 1- The logical problem of evil 2- The relative problem of evil 3- The existence problem of evil. According to the origin of the answers - the answers to the problem of evil can be divided into three categories: 1- Philosophical answers 2- Psychological answers 3- Religious answers The religious answer is the answer that is explicitly or implicitly stated in the sacred religious texts (in the case of Islam: the Holy Quran and the Sunnah) and is based on accepted cosmological, anthropological, and theological presuppositions of religion. Therefore, calling these answers religious does not mean that these answers are only based on religious texts, but the rational, psychological, and moral reflections of humans may also lead to some of these answers. Therefore, the religiousness of the answers does not mean that they are irrational. The subject of this article is such that it is expected that many articles have been written in this direction. But as far as I have searched in detail, this issue has not been investigated independently and in detail. Of course, there have been references to this discussion in various research that these research records can be classified as follows: In some books or articles that have investigated the issue of divine justice, some of these answers have been briefly mentioned. In some articles that have reviewed the answers to the problem of evil in a general and general way, some religious answers have been mentioned in a very comprehensive way and with minimal mention of evidence. In the articles that have examined the issue of evil from the point of view of Muslim theologians, they have mentioned some of these answers (with minimal mention of narrative or Quranic evidence). But their central topic has been to examine the views of theologians about the rule of mercy and justice. Method To examine religion's response to the existential problem of evil, three forms of the famous problem of evil have been mentioned. Then, by searching and reflecting on verses and traditions, religious answers are categorized into eight answers. In each answer, first the Quranic evidence and then the narrative evidence has been presented. The method of this article is based on library study. In this way, in the first step, the propositions in the religious texts that were related to the issue in question were classified descriptively. In the second step, it has been tried to analyze the persuasiveness of these propositions in response to the existential problem of evil. Findings Religious answers to the problem of evil can be answers to the logical problem of evil and to the relative problem of evil and to the existential problem of evil. Religious answers, compared to philosophical answers, can better answer the existential problem of evil and restore a person's relationship with God or at least prevent the complete disconnection of the relationship with God. Rather than having a philosophical concern and an answer to the logical problem of evil, religious answers have an existentialist approach. For this purpose, they take the first step by accepting the existence of suffering in the world. Quran and hadiths accept the existence of suffering. Besides the direct answers to the problem of evil, religion offers its followers a worldview that works in line with the persuasiveness of religious answers. In this worldview, first of all, many examples of evil are not unavoidable and a person's life can turn out in a different way. In response to a believer's prayer, God may remove the suffering and calamity from him. That is, in his worldview, there is hope to get rid of suffering, and this hope itself makes it possible to endure suffering. Secondly, the foundation of the world is on mercy and forgiveness, and what happens to man from hardships and calamities is much less than what the servant deserved due to his shortcomings and sins. Also, the blessings given to man are much more than what he deserves. Conclusions and discussions Religious answers can better answer the existential problem of evil that is, they can maintain the religious person's trust and hope in God and make it easier to bear the suffering, for such answers raise the issue of evil less as a mental and philosophical issue, but rather have an existential approach. Another reason that makes religious answers more robust in making the sufferings of the world more bearable for us is that these answers are easy to understand and based on objective life experiences. It means that people have communicated with most of these answers in real life. Religious texts, in response to the problem of evil, are not satisfied with one answer, but have offered various answers. In the text of the article, eight answers have been examined in detail. These answers are: 1-suffering for trial; 2- Limitation of human cognitive abilities 3- warning to return and repentance 4- Difficulty is an obstacle for rebellion 5- Punishment for actions in the world 6 Attention to the hereafter 7- Afterlife compensation instead of worldly suffering; 8- Evil for prosperity. References - The Holy Quran - Faiz al-Kashani, Mulla Mohsen Mohammad Ibn Mortaza (1416 AH) al-Tafsir Al-Safi, Qom: Al-Sadr Maktabh .[In Arabic] - Faiz al-Kashani, Mullah Mohsen Mohammad Ibn Mortaza (1406 AH), Al-Wafi, Isfahan: Imam Amir al-Momineen Ali Library. [In Arabic] - Kolaini, Mohammad Ibn Yaqub (1379 SH) Usul Kafi, Tehran: Daftar-e motaliat-e Tarikh va Maarif-e islami. [In Persian] - Majlesi, Mohammad Baqer (1384 SH) Bihar al-Anwar, Tehran: Dar al-Kitab al-Islami. [In Persian] - Mohammadi Ray Shahri, Mohammad (1386 SH) Mizan Al-Hikmah, Qom: Dar al-Hadith. [In Persian] - Sheikh al-Mofid, Muhammad Ibn Ali (1406 AH) Thawab al-'Aamal w Iqab al-'Aamal‌, Qom: Dar al-Sharif al-Razi. [In Arabic] - Sheikh al-Mofid, Muhammad Ibn Muhammad (1413 AH) al-Amali, Qom: Sheikh Mofid Congress. [In Arabic] - Tabatabaii, Mohammad Hossein (1378 SH) Tafsir-e Almizan, Qom:Jamiah Modaresin. [In Persian] - Sobhani, Jaafar (1383 SH) Manshur-e Javid, Qom: Imam Sadiq Publication. [In Persian] - Sheikh al-Tusi, Muhammad Ibn Hasan (1414 AH) Al-Amali, Qom: Dar al-Thaqafah. [In Arabic] - Makarem Shirazi, Nasser (1380 SH) Tafsir-e Nemuneh, Tehran: Dar al-Kutub al-Islami. [In Persian] - Ibn Shu’bah Harani, Hassan Ibn Ali (1404 AH) Tuhaf al-Uqul, Qom: alnashr al-Islami. [In Arabic] - Tamimi Amadi, Abd al-Wahid Ibn Muhammad (1410 AH) Ghurar al-Hikam wa Durar al-Kalim, Qom: Dar al-Kitab al-Islami. [In Arabic]

Acceptance of a Proposition upon Insufficient Evidence Based on the Critique of the Constructional Concept from the View of William James and ‘Allāma Tabātabā’ī

Mohammad Hosin davoodi; Nafise sate

Volume 13, Issue 30 , August 2023, Pages 207-232

https://doi.org/10.30470/phm.2022.552070.2202

Abstract

Abstract “Constructional” is a commonly used term in epistemology. James makes use of credibility as an evasion of strong rationalism and considers that as believing in ... Read More Abstract “Constructional” is a commonly used term in epistemology. James makes use of credibility as an evasion of strong rationalism and considers that as believing in a proposition based on its practical usefulness so that the consequent evidence effective under the influence of this credibility shows truth or falsehood of that proposition. Basic criticisms to the theory of James involve the correspondence between a constructional issue and a reality in development or substantiation and reducing truth to usefulness. Construction in ‘Allāma Tabātabā’ī’s theory of constructional perceptions (artificial conceptions) is interpreted as artificiality and constructing some concepts to fulfill humans’ basic needs. Although ‘Allāma’s theory does not claim truth for the constructional perceptions, it restricts cognition to practical reason with respect to human basic needs and the faculty of reason to use constructional function. By offering a new explanation of constructional, without any alteration in the meaning of truth and restricting constructional to practical and unverified issues, the present study aims to present a solution for the epistemological problem concerning some necessary and useful beliefs for which there is not sufficient evidence. According to the obtained results, by considering the constructional function of mind as “assumption of belief” or “perceiving acceptance”, such beliefs can be accepted in a way that without attributing them to truth, the consequences of a belief apply to them and constructional perceptions be acknowledged as valid in the realm of theoretical and practical science. Key words: Construction, Usefulness, Truth, Justification, Perceiving Acceptance Introduction: With the dominance of rationalism in the Enlightenment Movement, epistemological justification for believing in available rational evidence is illuminated. However, sometimes we are confronted with many necessary, vital, and useful propositions for which there is no sufficient evidence available to reach either acceptance or rejection. One of the famous epistemological ideas adopted in this challenge is agnosticism as an evasion of accepting a proposition without any sufficient evidence. Significant and serious criticisms to this theory have led to presenting other approaches. Method: Using an analytic-deductive method, the present article analyzes some relevant data in this regard which are collected, classified, and coded by the library method. The main purpose of the research is to present a solution for the epistemological problem under discussion that also avoids critiques of the views of James and ‘Allāma. According to the research assumption, by distinguishing between belief in a proposition and its constructional acceptance we can make use of the function of validating a proposition without connecting that to truth and so to accept it in a way that it does not involve consequences of a belief. Findings: By analyzing the mental and rational faculties of a human and emphasizing on the other aspects of human existence, James introduces validation in a new meaning as one of human mental activities and accordingly justifies some beliefs that have no evidence. In construction, mind saves a version of reality in itself and based on this version, constructs an image of reality in mind and regards it true and factual. This duplication is under the condition that it facilitates practical and rational development to achieve objective purposes in life. The constructed conceptions in mind, on the one hand, should be a means to approach objective, current, and developing reality that per se verifies or nullifies that constructed belief, and on the other hand, it should serve as guide for our new experiences and perceptions to the old experiences and perceptions saved in our mind. He maintains that “liveableness, inevitability, and lack of chance to return” are three basic features for the mental validity of belief upon insufficient evidence (James, 1897: 3). Adopting a different approach to solve epistemological predicaments in the realm of practical reason, Tabātabā’ī raises the concept of constructional perceptions. In his outlook, “constructional perceptions are assumptions constructed by the human mind to fulfill vital needs. They are contractual, hypothetical, and credit-based so they do not deal with the reality and Nafs al-Amr” (Tabātabā’ī, 1364, vol. 2: 138). In his viewpoint, construction is one of the functions and activities of practical reason applied by the human mind in order to satisfy some vital needs and have easier access to practical purposes in life. They compose a second division of science called constructional perceptions. The perspectives of James and Tabātabā’ī face with numerous criticisms such as: reducing truth to usefulness and gradual development of objective truth in James’ theory; and restricting the act of construction in practical reason and lowering human basic epistemological needs in the realm of theoretical reason in Tabātabā’ī’s view. Conclusions and discussions: According to the author’s view, the credibility of a proposition can be accepted as a mental function and by the expansion of its meaning, it can be interpreted as perceiving acceptance or non-epistemological acceptance of a proposition in order to be adopted as a suitable solution for some propositions that are built upon insufficient evidence. When a proposition is given credibility and accepted, it is neither claimed to be true nor constructed to be an artificial and contractual proposition; but when the confirmation of a proposition is not permissible due to lack of sufficient evidence, it is treated with an epistemological view as if the proposition is accepted so that the consequences of this acceptance apply to the credibility and acceptance. According to the requirements of rationality, the admissibility and even suitability of giving credibility to a proposition is restricted to special conditions. Three required conditions for the credibility of a proposition without claiming truth and having practical consequences include: 1. Reasons for and against a proposition are completely equal and there is no preference to either accept or reject any side; 2. Adopting agnosticism in accepting an impossible belief requires accepting one side of the theorem; 3. The belief has such an importance that either accepting or rejecting it has a profound impact on human life. Whenever logical evidence and reason gains priority on either side and rational reasoning issues an order, even if indefinite, we are obliged to follow the rational evidence. Therefore, in addition to obeying the governance of reason, we do not let any false belief enter our mind. Thereby, we do our epistemological and moral duty in front of our beliefs, and also make use of the practical consequences of accepting the beliefs. References Tabātabā’ī, Mohammad Hoseyn. (1364 SH). Osūl-e Falsafe Va Ravesh-e Re’ālīsm. Qom: Sadrā. Tabātabā’ī, Mohammad Hoseyn. (1374 SH). Tafsīr Al-Mīzān. Vol.8. Translated by: Mohammad Bagher Mosavi Hamedani, Qom: Nashr-e Islāmī. Tabātabā’ī, Mohammad Hoseyn. (1388 SH). Insān Az Āghāz Tā Anjām. Qom: Būstān-e Ketāb. Tabātabā’ī, Mohammad Hoseyn. (1416 AH). Nahāyat al-Hekmah. Qom: Al-Nashr Al-Islāmī. James, William. (1396 SH). Pragmatism. Translated by: ‘Abdol Karīm Rashīdīyān. Tehran: ‘Ilmī Farhangī. James, William. (1343 SH). The Psychology of Religion. Translated by: Mehdī Ghā’enī. Tehran: Bongāh-e Tarjomeh Va Nashr-e Ketāb. James, William. (1397 SH). The Varieties of Religious Experience. Translated by: Hoseyn Kīyānī. Tehran: Hekmat. James, William. (1897), Will to belief and other Essays in Popular Philosophy. www. gutenberg.org James, William. (1907), Pragmatism: A New Name for some old ways of Thinking, New York, Longmans, Green & co. James, William. (1948), Essays in pragmatism, New York, Heffner publishing James, William, stanford.edu.4. Essays in Popular Philosophy Russell, Bertrand. (1946), A History of Western Philosophy, www. amazon. Com Pragmatic argument and Belief in God, plato,stanford.edu The ethics of belief, plato,stanford.edu Will to belief, Wikipedia.com

On the Necessity of Moral Judgment Requiring Moral Principles

SeyyedAli Asghari

Volume 13, Issue 30 , August 2023, Pages 239-270

https://doi.org/10.30470/phm.2022.551889.2199

Abstract

Abstract In recent decades, the principled theories of ethics have been criticized by the moral particularists. Criticisms, objections, and oppositions of particularists against those ... Read More Abstract In recent decades, the principled theories of ethics have been criticized by the moral particularists. Criticisms, objections, and oppositions of particularists against those theories are diverse. An objection or challenge which has been one way or another put forth by many particularists is that the emphasis of the principled ethics theorists on moral principles is at the expense of neglecting the importance of moral judgement. This paper addresses this objection. The aim is to show that the generalist not only can acknowledge the importance of moral judgment but also have the means to develop an acceptable theory about moral judgement. This paper’s answer to the objection is proposing a special view towards moral judgement and moral principles according to which moral judgement itself depends on moral principles. In this view, both the nature of moral principles and the nature of moral judgement is crucial. Moral principles are neither mechanical decision mechanisms nor just theoretical principles. Moral principles are practical principles and a kind of extended determinations of the agent. Capacity of moral judgement requires some sensitivities; and sensitivities depend on our character. Finally, this paper analyses the roles of extended internal determinations, and especially moral principles, in the character of the agent. Keywords: Principled Ethical Theories, Particularism, Generalism, Extended Determinations, Practical Principles Introduction Investigating why moral judgement requires moral principles is important because moral judgement is important for our moral life. Moral judgement is the capacity to bridge the gap between moral principles and particular situations. What tells the agent that the particular situation facing him falls under a certain principle, and how he should satisfy that principle, is not the principle itself but the capacity of judgement. In life situations, it is not a simple matter for us to know what the best way of implementing the principle of, for example, “one should take a stand against injustice” is, and requires that we discern the details. Many moral particularists object to principle-based theories, arguing that moral principles are not required by good moral judgement. In response to this objection, this article adduces a special view towards moral judgement and moral principles according to which moral judgement relies on moral principles. Methodology Some moral philosophers’ criticism of traditional principled theories’ inattention to moral judgement is based on those philosophers’ extreme conception of the nature of moral philosophers. They regard moral principles as entirely mechanical decision-procedures which can be applied without any perception, imagination, or judgement. For example, Charles Larmore remarks that Kantians and utilitarians have been in agreement “in seeking a fully explicit decision procedure for settling moral questions”, and that is why “they have missed the central role of moral judgement” (Larmore, 1987, p. 12). Despite these remarks, no reasonable generalist considers moral principles as mechanical decision-procedures. For example, Mill (1998) points out that any ethical standard whatever will work ill, if we suppose universal idiocy to be conjoined with it (70). Kant (1996) emphasizes that correct application of the Categorical Imperative requires “judgement sharpened by experience, partly to distinguish in what cases [the categorical imperative is] applicable and partly to provide [it] with access to the will of the human being…” (45). Findings The particularist’s objection to the non-algorithmic conception of moral principles is that if we need the capacity of moral judgement to apply moral principles to particular situations, why not use it directly and independently in moral thinking? Some particularists suggest that we can and should rely on this capacity alone (Gleeson, 2007; Dancy, 1983p. 543). This means that in their point of view moral principles are not necessary for moral judgement. In response to this problem, the argument that is propounded in this article is based on the idea that moral principles are necessary for the capacity of moral judgement because the latter relies on the former. The generalist not only can admit the importance of moral judgement but also have the possibilities on which he can build an acceptable theory about moral judgement. To understand the nature of the capacity of moral judgement and to explain it, we should know what kind of sensitivities is required by right moral judgement and how we can develop that kind of sensitivities. Such sensitivities and their development greatly depend on the agent’s character. If the process of the agent’s moral development is successful, moral principles will transform from external educational commands and tools to his internal extended determinations. The agent will no longer behave only in obedience to practical moral principles but assumes a favouring (or opposing) attitude towards the act-type that the principle prescribes, and intends to act in a certain way from now to the future. Moral principles as extended internal determinations play two roles in the constitution of the agent’s character: a) form his moral sensitivities; b) have a crucial role in his identity and unity over time. a) extended determinations determine the structure of our lives. One improves their moral sensitivities through organizing their life and world in a way that makes the joint fulfilment of their moral principles possible. Gradually one becomes more sensitive to the needs of others and to the details of situations in which they finds themselves. When moral principles become internal, they also gain emotional weight (for a different view, see Gleeson, 2007, p. 370). The fact that having determinations forms the agent’s experience and improves their sensitivities is a familiar phenomenon also in areas beyond morality. The fact that the agent can “see” that someone needs help does not make the principle of beneficence redundant, but shows the agent’s ability to implement this principle. b) The agent’s character depends on the fact that they conceive themselves to have identity and unity over time. Moral principles as extended internal determinations, (1) bring about psychological connections between the agent’s present intentions and future implementations of those intentions, and (2) help them build up and perceive themselves as a specific person (for a related discussion in moral psychology see Prinz, 2007: 306-307). Moral principles, as distinct from other kinds of principles, in virtue of their universal obligatoriness, help the individual build up and maintain a self above their diverse roles. Based on this section, moral judgement is not a strange capacity that should somehow be added to moral principles, but through the medium of moral character is basically based on moral principles. Therefore, moral principles are essentially required by moral judgement. Conclusions and discussions In opposition to what I call “sufficiency of moral judgement” (the view of many particularists), I said that moral principles are indeed required by the capacity of moral judgement itself. Moral judgement needs some sensitivities, and depends on the moral character of the individual. Moral principles as extended internal determinations play two important roles in the constitution of the individual’s moral character. First, they form their moral sensitivities. Second, they help them maintain his identity and unity over time. The individual by adopting a set of moral principles determines to live a certain life, and developing their moral sensitivities help them remain committed to their determinations. Moral principles help the individual construct and perceive themselves as a specific person. References Albertzart, M. (2014). Moral principles. London: Bloomsbury. Asghari, S.A. (1399 SH). Tabyeen-e Masʾale-ye Jaygah-e Aslha-ye Akhlaqi. Tarh-e Pazhooheshi. Tehran: Pazhooheshgah-e Olum-e Ensani va Motaleʿat-e Farhangi. [in Persian] Dancy, J. (1983). Ethical particularism and morally relevant properties. Mind, 92: 530–47. Gleeson, A. (2007). Moral particularism reconfigured. Philosophical Investigations, 30:363–80. Kant, I. (1996). Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. In M. J. Gregor (ed.), Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Larmore, C. E. (1987). Patterns of Moral Complexity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mill, J. S. (1998). Utilitarianism (Crisp, R., Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Prinz, J. (2007). The Emotional Construction of Morals. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Moral Responsibility in Disinformation: A Study in Moral Philosophy

Mahdi Shaghaghi

Volume 13, Issue 30 , August 2023, Pages 279-328

https://doi.org/10.30470/phm.2022.545866.2145

Abstract

Short abstract: In this study I have tried to contribute in some meta-ethical reflections on moral responsibility involving disinformation. Conceptual analysis and reflective equilibrium ... Read More Short abstract: In this study I have tried to contribute in some meta-ethical reflections on moral responsibility involving disinformation. Conceptual analysis and reflective equilibrium were two methods that have been used for achieving the goals of this article. In first step, I used some citations from philosophers and some examples to show dilemmatic view of moral problems is logically fallacious. Findings of the second step showed that ideal morality fails to explain actions in pressure conditions and implications of care ethics and doing best practices are the defendable way of action in such conditions, provided that the provisions of “helping to eliminate poverty and address the gap between poor and wealthy” are satisfied. In final step, by reviewing arguments of some philosophers, I introduced will and wish as a building blocks of the akrasia and weakness of will phenomenon. Then, 8 rules were predicted for determining moral responsibility in akratic and weakness of will conditions. Keywords: Disinformation, Moral Failure, Moral Responsibility, Akrasia, Moral Conflict. Introduction: Disinformation is a purposeful misguiding of people (Fallis 2009, 2014) by representing false or even true predicates. Mediatic, diplomatic, and performatic governmental institutions continually disinform people by misleading news or reports. Factitious organizational reports are prevalent in the administrative and managerial level. Some of these institutions assert on dilemmatic nature of situations or pressure condition and security issues or weakness of will to justify disinformation. In this case, three distinct questions arise: 1) is the moral dilemma and disinformation we must assign moral responsibility in this context logically possible? 2) does the disinformation result from a pressure condition and we should assign moral responsibility in this context? 3) does the disinformation result from akrasia or weakness of will and we should assign moral responsibility by considering this context? several philosophers have considered the moral dilemmas from distinct points of view. As a Platonic issue (known as platonic conflict), we can see that a couple of other philosophers such as Sartre have studies moral dilemmas (Sartre dilemma). But recent scholars such as Donagan (1984), McConnell (1978, 2018), Bagnoli (2013), Bennett & Chamberlin (2013), Marcus (1980), and Vessel (2020) have studied moral dilemmas from the possibility, dichotomic distinctions, moral residue, deontic logic, and other points of view. In the domain of moral responsibility in pressure condition, we have several scholars such as Frye (1983), Rawls (1999), Mills (2004), Sen (2006), and Tessman (2015), who have studied this issue from the Pluralism of reasonable, Rectificatory justice, idealization, and best practices points of view. And several other scholars such as Fischer and Ravizza (1998), Arpaly and Schroeder (1999), Davidson (2001), Holton (2012) and others have considered Akrasia and weakness of will from the deep self, whole self, irresistible desire, reasons responsiveness, and a couple of other points of view. By critical analysis of these literature, I tried to consider moral responsibility in the context of each of them. Methodology: In this article, I have used two related methods for text analysis and studying reasonability of arguments: conceptual analysis and reflective equilibrium. Using conceptual analysis, I have tried to find main themes of arguments to make comparisons with other reasonings. Standpoints of several important scholars and philosophers were considered to make comparisons and find new themes. And then, I tried to use reflective equilibrium by considering our moral intuitions as a reasonable and conventional human being. In this sense, intuitions were considered from the common sense point of view. I tried to use counterexamples and counter arguments to find a way for assigning moral responsibility. Findings: Initially, I tried to show that dilemmatic view of moral problems is logically fallacious and we cannot reject moral responsibility by referring to dilemmatic nature of the situation. Findings of the second step showed that ideal morality fails to explain actions in pressure conditions and implications of care ethics and doing best practical practices is the defendable way of action in such conditions, if the provision of “helping to elimination of poverty or deliberative marginalization, and bridging the gap between poor and wealthy” were satisfied. Third, by reviewing arguments of some philosophers, I introduced will and wish as a building blocks of the akrasia and weakness of will phenomenon. Then, 8 categories were predicted for determining moral responsibility in akratic and weakness of will conditions: A) a person has moral will and this is inconsistent with her/his judge value. In this case there is not moral responsibility in the irresistible desire conditions but there is moral responsibility in external force conditions. B) a person has moral will this is consistent with her/his judge value. In this case, there is moral responsibility in any conditions. C) a person has immoral will and this is inconsistent with her/his judge value. In this case, there is moral responsibility if the desire is resistible. Also, there is moral responsibility in the condition of external force if this condition is a result of her retrospective negligence and this negligence is not a reasonable result of an oppressive situation. Furthermore, there is moral responsibility in the case of irresistible will, if the will is a result of her/his retrospective negligence and this negligence is not a reasonable result of an oppressive or external compulsion. D) a person has immoral will and this is consistent with her/his judge value. In this case there is moral responsibility in any conditions. E) a person has immoral judge value and this is consistent with her/his will. In this case, there is moral responsibility if the judge value is not a reasonable result of oppressive force or isolated in-group nurture. F) a person has immoral judge value and this is inconsistent with her/his will. In this case, there is moral responsibility in any time when the moral will goes to adhere immoral judge value that is not a reasonable result of oppressive force or isolated in-group nurture. G) a person has moral judge value and this is consistent with her/his will. In this case there is moral responsibility in any condition. H) a person has moral judge value and this is inconsistent with her/his will. In this case there is moral responsibility in resistible desire condition. Also, there is moral responsibility if the will shaped in the external force condition is not reasonable result of her/his retrospective negligence and the mentioned negligence is not a reasonable result of oppressive context. Conclusions and discussions: As a concluding remark, it is worth to mention that disinformation is a deliberate misguide of others and is more consistent with rules that denotes immoral judge value (case of E and F). In these cases, disinforming consists of moral responsibility unless judge value of a person be a reasonable result of oppressive force or isolated in-group nurture. Also, for clarifying “irresistible will”, Fischer and Ravizza’s idea of “Moderate reasons responsiveness” is a reasonable conceptual measure. References Arpaly, N. & Schroeder, T. (1999). Blame and the Whole Self. Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 93 (2), 161-188. C. (2006). Breaking Ties: The Significance of Choice in Symmetrical Moral Dilemmas. Dialectica, 60 (2), 157-170. Bennett, L. & Chamberlin, S. M. E. (2013). Resisting Moral Residue. Pastoral psychology, 62 (2), 151-162. Collins, P. H. (2000) Gender, Black Feminism, and Black Political Economy. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 568 (1), 41-53. Coates, D. J. & Swenson, P. (2013). Reasons-responsiveness and degrees of responsibility. Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 165 (2), 629-645. Davidson, D. (2001). How is weakness of the will possible. In: Essays on actions and events, Second edition, pages 25-42. USA, New York: Oxford University Press. DePaul, M. (2006). Intuitions in moral inquiry. In: The Oxford handbook of ethical theory. Edited by David Copp. New York: Oxford University Press, 595-623. Fallis, D. (2009). A Conceptual Analysis of Disinformation. iConference Proceedings, retrieved April 20, 2020, from: http://hdl.handle. net/2142/15205. Fallis, D. (2014). A Functional Analysis of Disinformation. In iConference 2014 Proceedings (p. 621 - 627). doi:10.9776/14278. Retrieved April 20, 2020, from: https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/handle/2142/47258. Frye, M. (1983). The Politics of Reality. Trumansburg, New York: Crossing Press. Holton, R. (1999). Intention and weakness of will. The Journal of Philosophy, 96 (5), 241-262. Retrieved October 8, 2020, from: http://web.mit.edu/holton/www/pubs/Weakness.pdf Kittay, E. F. (2001). When Caring Is Just and Justice Is Caring: Justice and Mental Retardation. Public Culture, 13 (3), 557-579. Marcus, R. B. (1980). Moral Dilemmas and Consistency. The Journal of Philosophy, 77, 121–136. May, J. & Holton, R. (2012). What in the World is weakness of will? Philosophical Studies, 157 (3), 341-360. McConnell, Terrance C. Moral Dilemmas and Consistency in Ethics. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, VIII (2), 269-287. McConnell, T. (2018). Moral Dilemmas. In: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/moral-dilemmas/>. Mele, A. (1991). Akratic Action and the Practical Role of Better Judgment. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 72 (1), 33–47. Mele, A. (2012). Backsliding: Understanding Weakness of Will. New York: Oxford University Press. Mills, C. (2004). Ideal Theory as Ideology. In: Moral Psychology, edited by Peggy DesAutels and Margaret Urban Walker, 163–181. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield. Mills, C. (2009). Schwartzman vs. Okin: Some Comments on Challenging Liberalism. Hypatia, 24 (4), 164–177. Pateman, C. & Mills, C. (2013). Contract and Domination. Third print. Cambridge: Polity Press; Wiley. Rawls, J. (1971). A Theory of Justice. First edition, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. Rawls, J. (1993). Political Liberalism. First publication. New York: Columbia University Press. Rawls, J. (1999). The Law of Peoples; With “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. Sen, A. (2006). What Do We Want from a Theory of Justice? The Journal of Philosophy, 103 (5), 215-238. Stroud, S. and Svirsky, L. (2019). Weakness of Will. In: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Retrieved October 8, 2020, from: <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2019/entries/weakness-will/>. Talbert, M. (2019). Moral Responsibility. In: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). Retrieved October 20, 2020, from: <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/moral-responsibility/>. Tessman, L. (2015). Moral Failure: On the Impossible Demands of Morality. New York: Oxford University Press. Tessman, L. (2005). Burdened Virtues: Virtue Ethics for Liberatory Struggles. New York: Oxford University Press. Vessel, J. P. (2020). Moore’s Open Question Maneuvering: A Qualified Defense. The Journal of Ethics, 24 (1), 91-117. Walker, M. U. (2003). Moral Contexts. Lanham, Mariland: Rowman and Littlefield.

“Paternalism” and “Moralism”: Possibility of or Limiting Citizen’s Freedoms?

seyed mohammad hosseini; Mohammad Yousefzade; Hosein Dabbagh

Volume 13, Issue 30 , August 2023, Pages 335-376

https://doi.org/10.30470/phm.2022.553581.2214

Abstract

Abstract What does moral paternalism mean? What about moralism? How do moral paternalism and moralism differ? In paternalism, at least in its classical version, the aim is to prevent ... Read More Abstract What does moral paternalism mean? What about moralism? How do moral paternalism and moralism differ? In paternalism, at least in its classical version, the aim is to prevent people from inflicting harm on themselves, not necessarily on others. However, in moralism, the aim is to prevent people from committing what society regards as a wrongdoing to secure society’s understanding of morality. Some accounts of moralism argue that these wrongdoings ought to be criminalized. It is rather obvious to claim that applying moral paternalism and moralism shall restrict people’s liberty in one way or another. The question raised is that which one of these two approaches is plausible to be employed by states? In this paper, we argue that moralism restricts people’s liberty unjustifiably, hence implausible. We begin by accounting for and then we critically evaluate moralism. We conclude by arguing that moralism is not on the basis of a defendable approach. Keywords: Paternalism, Moralism, “Morals, Conventional Morality, Legal Moralism Introduction Moralism and Paternalism are two systems of thought that deem to be against each other. Although there are some restrictions on "Individual Freedom" in both systems, its intensity and weakness will vary depending on which approach we adopt to justify it. In this paper, we explore these two systems to determine their justifiability in the restriction of freedom. Our main intention is to reject Moralism’s justification. However, this does not indicate that by rejecting Moralism, we defend its alternative simultaneously, e.g., Moral Paternalism. What is essential in all forms of Paternalism, at least according to its classical approach, is not necessarily to harm others (the Harm Principle) - Paternalism should strive only to prevent someone from harming him/herself. But in Moralism, by interfering in citizens’ freedom, the aim is to avoid an "immoral" act; it is not about harm to self or others - what matters is that one commits an immoral act that society considers immoral. For Moralism, moral norms originate from society’s values, descriptively speaking. Findings In Paternalism, the restriction of individual freedom is justified only when one person’s action harms and endangers himself. So, an attempt should be made to prevent the person's risky action. But in the Moralism, as soon as an act occurs contrary to the common morals of society, whether this act causes harm to the person or others, individual freedom should be restricted and, according to some readings, we should even consider the act as a crime because of acting against the common moral codes. What are the justifications for restricting individual freedom? One reason for interfering in the individuals’ freedom in Paternalism is that the individual should not be harmed - harm that, for example, can lead to death in some situations. Whereas in Moralism, the justification for interfering in the "freedom of the individual" is only because the action weakens the moral foundations of society - the conventional moral foundations that most people conform to. Thus, harming oneself and others does not work as a justification for moralists to interfere with freedom. In Moral Paternalism, the main goal is to prevent one from putting him/herself in danger. This kind of Paternalism could be justifiable because the Paternalist, at least, has a prima facie reason to prevent moral harm to him/herself. In other forms of Paternalism, the Paternalist seeks to prevent the person from taking harmful action, not morally but in other practical respects. Moralism’s justification, however, seems not justified because it is based on the premise that one's moral harm is not necessarily the criterion for interfering in "individual liberty", but merely committing an act against the common conventional moral codes of society is wrong. This justification fails if one argues that these more codes are problematic and not normatively plausible. In all forms of Moral Paternalism, individual freedoms’ restrictions must be justified. Still, the justification for restricting liberty in Paternalistic actions is based only on the fact that it threatens to harm a person. In Paternalism, although violating individual freedoms is morally wrong, when individuals are in danger and need of help, at least in such cases, violating their "freedom" is morally justifiable. The justification for restricting individual freedom in Paternalism is that the interventionist- or paternal action- is in the personal interest and society’s interest. Another reason for Paternalist action, according to some thinkers, is that a person should be helped in a situation where he does not have the power to protect himself and prevent himself from harm. Protecting someone's interests, protecting those who are unable to protect themselves, intervening in tools and instruments that put one at risk, or preventing one from consuming narcotics - albeit intermittent happiness but in the long run, endangers their self-determination and free will - these are issues that justify Paternalism and to prevent harm to oneself and violate individual liberty. For example, a person who is mentally disabled, lacking in common sense, and engaging in risky action does not seem morally permissible to abandon. In Moralism, however, there is no valid reason to interfere with individual freedoms. Neither harming oneself is important to interfere with one's freedom, nor harming others - only that one has acted contrary to the customary morality of society deserves to be restricted in one person’s freedom. The Moralist philosophers are concerned with preserving the customs of society – customs maintained by moral codes, and any violation of these codes, even if private, is punishable. It is easy to imagine the extent to which individual freedoms are threatened and violated at any chance in this perception. Supposedly, to preserve the very existence of society, the government directs moral orders toward allegedly “immoral” actions and behavior’s that society finds immoral, such as homosexuals, different races, religious minorities, etc. Is it then possible to imagine security for such groups at all? The minimum virtue that will be lost to this group of people is "freedom". In Moralism, conventional morality is so important that it seems that the protection of the freedom of those who believe in these moral codes depends on the violation of the freedom of those who do not sympathize with this morality and do not obey its rules. Moralism is one of the strongest justifications for using criminal law to prohibit homosexual activities between satisfied adults in private. Conclusion Although both Paternalism and Moralism restrict the freedoms of individuals or citizens, as we have argued in this article, Moralists’ justification for citizens’ freedom is not plausible. The development of Moralism as a political theory can have counterintuitive consequences. Such theories will leave governments free to take what is intuitively morally unjustifiable as a means of maintaining power. For example, following Moralism, a government is justified in discriminating against a particular minority, e.g., the Uyghur Muslim minority in China- for the reason that their presence weakens the moral foundations of society. It is evident that such an argument is wrong and shows why Moralism is dubious. References de Marneffe, P. (2006). “Avoiding Paternalism”. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 34 (1). 68–94. Devlin, P. (1965). The Enforcement of Morals. Oxford University Press. Dworkin, G. (1972). “Paternalism”. Monist, 56 (1). 64-84. __________ (2020). “Paternalism”. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, URL=< https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/paternalism/> Dworkin, R. M. (1966). “Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of Morals”. The Yale Law Journal, 75 (5). 986-1005. Feinberg, J. (1984). The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. Vol. 1: Harm to Others. Oxford University Press. _________ (1986). The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. Vol. 3: Harm to Self. Oxford University Press. _________ (1988). The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. Vol. 4: Harmless Wrongdoing. Oxford University Press. Hart, H. L. A. (1963). Law, Liberty, and Morality. Oxford University Press. Häyry, H. (1992). “Legal Paternalism and Legal Moralism: Devlin, Hart and Ten”. Ratio Juris, 5 (2). 191-201. Raz, J. (1986). The Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Rose, D. J. (1966). “Devlin P: The Enforcement of Morals”. Federal Law Review 144, Vol. 2 (1). 144-159. Scoccia, D. (2000). “Moral Paternalism, Virtue, and Autonomy”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 78 (1). 53-71. _________ (2018). “The Concept of Paternalism”. in Kalle Grill & Jason Hanna (eds.) The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Paternalism. New York: Routledge. 11-23. Ten, C. L. (1971). “Paternalism and Morality”. Ratio (Misc.), 13 (1). 56-66.

A Philosophical Analysis of the Way through Which Usuli Evidence is Related to Epistemological Justification through Moral Philosophy Issues

mohammad hosein safaee

Volume 13, Issue 30 , August 2023, Pages 383-409

https://doi.org/10.30470/phm.2022.545400.2140

Abstract

Abstract The functionality of Fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) as the most respective knowledge among Islamic knowledges, directly relates to the degree of success of current religious ... Read More Abstract The functionality of Fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) as the most respective knowledge among Islamic knowledges, directly relates to the degree of success of current religious derivation logic and its implications. Accordingly, some contemporary Usuli scholars pointed to the necessity of proposing the philosophy of Usul and some initial works such as the frame of discussion done by them. Due to the usual importance of exploring the epistemological bases in philosophical thinking, epistemology of Usul Fiqh (Principles of Islamic jurisprudence) is considered as a part of philosophy of Usul Fiqh. According to the findings of this paper, it becomes evident, by description and analysis of content, that the relation between Usuli evidence and epistemological justification, is one of the ways of extending epistemological issues to the Usuli issues. If this claim can be proved, there will be a basis for applying various epistemological theories (such as epistemological internalism and externalism and justification mechanisms like Foundationalism and coherentism) to the Usuli evidence. Consequently, by applying the epistemological implications of each Usuli base, the system of evidence will be promoted and the logic of derivation in Islamic law (Sharia) become nearer to contemporary epistemology. However the mere intuitive relation between evidence and justification can not prove this correlation, especially due to numerous discussions in the epistemology on the separation of justified belief (theoretical rationality) from the very practice which is raised from it (practical rationality). This paper tries to prove the relation between Usuli evidence and epistemological justification through the discussions proposed in the moral philosophy. It also puts forward a vivid picture of its results in Usul Fiqh. Keywords: Evidence, ـustification, Moral Philosophy, Epistemology and Practical Rationality. Introduction Today, One of Fiqh’s claims is its capability for responding to all human life's aspects regardless of geography and plurality of cultures. For muslim thinkers, the modern lifestyle (without noticing to previous traditions) is not the only way of living, but also one can return to the sameFiqh, find prophet’s advice and live according to it. Truth of Fiqh which is amout to its soul, is discovering the practical precepts of Islam (Ahkam). In this respect, a Fiqh scholar is not a legislator but rather a discoverer. The derivation process which is done by Fiqh scholars ends up with a proposition denoting the Hokm (divine order). Derivation logic of Islamic law must have necessary rationality for various intellectual groups and should be in harmony with other knowledges, due to its universality. Shahid Motahhary speaks about the necessity of consistent relation between Fiqh and other current knowledges in the following quote: “There is no other way... if we claim that our Fiqh is one of real knowledges of the world, we must follow the same methods which is followed by other knowledges, otherwise, it means Fiqh is out of other knowledges circle” (Tabatabaei et al, 1341, pp. 64-65). It seems that the extension of contemporary epistemological issues to the Usul Fiqh will lead to the improvement of its logic and make a ground for the agreement of Islamic and western traditions; hence this paper tries to prove the relation between these two considerable factors: evidence in the Islamic tradition and justification in the western tradition. Methodology For establishing the relation between two considerable factors of evidence in the islamic tradition and justification in the western tradition, theses steps must be taken: First step. synonymity of Usuli evidence with practical rationality of moral philosophy second step. Metaphysical realism of divine orders realm for shia (this realm of realism called ontological realism). third step. Correlation between ontological realm (rational realism) and epistemological realm (epistemological realism). Due to the separability of ontological realism from epistemological realism, the extension of epistemological issues to Usuli issues require the establishment of epistemological realism of imami Usulis. fourth step. After establishing ontological realism and epistemological realism of immami Usulis, exploring the way of attributing practical rationality to the justified religious beliefs begins. fifth step. If the practical rationality is attributable to religious belief and Usuli propositions, moral philosophy can be a bridge between epistemology and Usul Fiqh. Findings with the extension of epistemological categories to Usuli theories, the following doctrines can be hold: Usulis’ metaphysical realism in the divine orders realm, due to their belief in the possibility of making mistakes and the existence of divine orders beyond the accessibility of the one who deduces; Indirect voluntarism due to volitional bases of obtaining certainty; Quasi-foundationalist mechanism due to reference of the conjectural validity of denotations (imārāt) to the essential validity of certainty; Evidentialism; Internalism due to the necessity of explaining the way of obtaining evidence. Conclusion and discussions According to the account made, practical rationality can be attributed to Usuli normative propositions (such as decency and obscenity) as a part of moral sentences in philosophical view, therefore every theory of moral philosophy implies a theory in Usuli evidence (Usuli evidence characterized by moral philosophy through practical rationality). In Islamic tradition the transition from epistemological realm to the ontological realm is usual and because of that rational (ontological) realism of Imami Usuls amounts to their epistemological realism; so the very Usuli moral sentences is considered as epistemic according to metaethical analysis (Usuli propositions can be explored epistemologically because they are epistemic). Some religious beliefs implies goal-mean rationality and by virtue of this, they have a kind of practical rationality, so the practical rationality as a bridge between justified religious belief and Usuli evidence, leads to a relation between these two concepts: justification in justified religious belief and evidence in Usuli propositions. Epistemic interpretation of Usuli theories can be a result of this relation. According to the findings of this paper, Imami Usuls hold these views: metaphysical realism, voluntarism, quasi- foundationalist, evidentialism, and internalism. References Ebn Babvey (Sadoogh) Mohammad Ben Ali. (1413 AH). Man layahdarohol Faghih, Ghom: Daftar Entesharat Eslami Vabaste be Jamea Modaresin, Chap Dovom. Esfahani Gheravi, Mohammad Hossein. (1414 AH). Nahaye al-Deraye fi Sharhe al-Kefaye, Ghom: Moasese al al-Beyt leehya al-Thorath alayhem al-salam, Chap Aval. Jaasas, Ahmad Ben Ali. (1414 AH), Al-Fosul fi al-Usul, Koveyt: Vezarat al-Oghaf, Chap Dovom. Jafari langrudi, Mohammad Jafar. (1382 SH), Maktabhaye Hoghughi Dar Jahane Eslam, Tehran: Ganje danesh, Chap Aval. Jannati, Mohammad Ebrahim. (1370 SH), Manabe Ejtehad az Didgah Mazaheb Eslami, Tehran: Keyhan, Chap Aval. Haeri, Abdalkarim. (1418 AH), Dorar Alfaraed, Ghom: Moasese Nashr al-Eslami, Chap Panjom. Khorasani, Mohamad Kazem ben Hossein. (1409 AH), Kefaye al-Osul, Ghom: Moasese al al-Beyt alayhesalam, Chap Aval. Khorasani, Mohammad Kazem ben Hossein. (1410 AH), Dorar al-Favaed, fi al-Hashie al-Jadide, Tehran: Moasese al-Tab va al-Nashr levezarat al-Saghafe va al-Ershad al-Eslami, Chap Aval. Khuee, Seyed Abulghasem. (1412 AH), Mesbah al-Usul, Ghom: Maktabe al-Davari, Chap Aval. Khosropanah, Abdalhossein. (1379 SH), Kalam Jaded, Ghom: Markaz Motaleat va Pazhuhesh haye Farhangi hozehaye elmie. Dekart, Rene (1376 SH), Ghavaed Hedayet Zehn, Translated By: Manoochehre Saneee Darebidi, Tehran: Entesharat Beyn al-Melali. Sobhani, Jafar. (1420 AH). Resale fi al-Tahsin va al-Taghbih al-Aghleen, Ghom, Moasese Emam Sadegh alayhesalam. Al-Sadr, Al-Seyed Mohammad Bagher. (1986). Dorus fi Elm al-Usul al-Halghe al-Ula, Beyrut: Daralkotob al-lobnani, al-Tabe Sanieh. Tabatabaee va Digaran, Bahsi Darbareye Matjaeeat va Rohaniat. (1341 SH) Tehran: Sherkat Sahami Enteshar, Chap Aval. Altusi, Nasir al-Din (1405 AH), Talkhis al-Mohasel, Beyrut: Daraldeva, Chap Dovom.

The Relation of Art to Life in Heidegger’s Thought: Art as a Way of Salvation

Mohsen Karami; Atefeh Vakili

Volume 13, Issue 30 , August 2023, Pages 419-447

https://doi.org/10.30470/phm.2022.546460.2162

Abstract

Abstract: The relation between art and life has always been a most important problem that philosophers have paid attention to. Martin Heidegger is one of the great philosophers for ... Read More Abstract: The relation between art and life has always been a most important problem that philosophers have paid attention to. Martin Heidegger is one of the great philosophers for whom art has a central role. So, in this study, we explored the relation between art and life in Heidegger’s thought, and by way of philosophical analysis, hermeneutics and discourse analysis, we attempted to find the relation between art and life in Heidegger’s thought. Now, Heidegger elevates art to a way of human salvation and believes that art can help us in the face of our existential problems. And, for him, of course, this salvation can only be achieved by great art so that it can fulfill its responsibilities to human life. The second objective of this study is to discover and enumerate such a relation from the heart of Heidegger's philosophy of art. The art seems to have the following duties towards human life: opening the world, making it holy, understanding how to live, creating a people, freedom, taking it out of everyday life, making ontological differences, and giving birth to a meaningful world out of a meaningless and mysterious context. The third objective we dealt with is how, in Heidegger's view, art could accomplish these tasks and, in a sense, save men. According to him, art can accomplish the tasks by thematizing, repeating, showing the other side of things, providing a passionate experience, paying attention to details, showing the simple and basic lines of the world, and distancing oneself from things. Finally, our fourth objective is to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of Heidegger's views on the relationship between art and life, and to show that his approach, despite its merits, has ambiguities and problems, including failure to provide a definition of art in its general sense versus great art; elitism in the art world; and the lack of a clear explanation of important concepts such as making the other aspect of beings visible, establishing the sacred, and understanding how to live. Keywords: Truth, Dwelling, World, Meaning of Life, Being, Beings, Great Art. Introduction Paying attention to the relationship between art and life has a long history, and its traces can be found in almost all theories of art from ancient times to the present day. But the exploration of this relationship has increased since the 19th century with the advent of existentialist philosophers, and many questions have been raised about how these two relate. By the diminishing of things in minds and souls that gave value and meaning to human life in the ancient world (such as religions, rituals, and even myths), and by changing the general view of men to the world and to themselves, thinkers more and more sought to find alternative ways of giving meaning to human life, and sought the connection of everything in human life in giving value and meaning to life. That is, they tried to look at everything in human life from the perspective of whether it is directly related to his existential problems or not, and, ultimately, makes his life more meaningful and valuable. As a result, they gradually explored this issue more deeply in art. It can be said that Heidegger has dealt more deeply than other existentialist philosophers in his philosophical texts with the problem of the relationship between art and life. In Heidegger's thought, the relationship between art and life is closely related to the exploration of the fundamental and important problems of human life. Existence has a complex nature and life has various and unknown dimensions in the heart of this existence. Its fundamental dimensions, such as the truth of existence and death, are aligned with this mysterious nature, and their recognition is difficult and complex. Heidegger believes that human life is existentially tied to problems such as the truth of existence, the sacred, choosing, meaning, death, and God, and that man may, due to the nature of the mind, feels confusion, anxiety, and disappointment. As a human being, human beings have cognitive limitations against fundamental problems such as truth, the existence of God, holiness, etc., and, on the other hand, in order to have an authentic, prosperous, and happy life, they must clarify their relation to these. Therefore, they need a means and a context through which to have a deep understanding of the basic problems and to give them appropriate answers. According to Heidegger, philosophy has always thought about the "the beings" from the time of Plato to the present day, and has been oblivious to "being" and "existential" problems; That is, in giving meaning to life, relying on the human mind and not considering the world as the main and all-encompassing thing, and paying attention to the existence of things instead of focusing on the horizon in which all these beings are possible have make humans away from the concept of being. Therefore, for Heidegger, as long as the origin and principle of the creation of phenomena are lost, it is not possible to find the right direction, find meaning and answer the basic problems of life. In addition, the paucity of the element of mystery and the non-recognition of the mysterious - which reflects the essence and nature of being and the world - in philosophy has made it difficult to find answers to the problems of human existence. Hence, he proposes another solution called "art", or more precisely "great art", whose nature and relation to life, or more precisely the existential problems of life, is the subject of the present paper. Methodology Heidegger does not have an independent treatise or book on the subject, and therefore discovering his view of the relation between art and life requires the use of hermeneutics, philosophical analysis, and discourse analysis. In addition, to deal with the great philosophers in philosophy, we use the works of commentators to understand and get closer to the content. Therefore, in this article, we use the interpretational works of one of the commentators on Heidegger’s philosophy of art, Julian Young, hoping that through this commentary we will be able to enter the mysterious world of Heidegger's philosophy of art and explore the relation of art to life in his thought. Julian Young, a philosopher and professor at Wake Forest University, has done important research on Heidegger's philosophy, including: Heidegger, Philosophy, Nazism, Heidegger's Later Philosophy, Heidegger: Off the Beaten Track, The Death of God and the Meaning of Life, and Heidegger's philosophy of art. The last book provides an accurate and scholarly description of Heidegger's philosophy of art and, unlike many writings on Heidegger's philosophy of art, does not confine itself to the treatise the origin of the work of art and a few other direct works, and explores all of Heidegger's works. He has dealt at length with all his thought. Accordingly, we have made this book a basis for research into the relationship between art and life in Heidegger's thought, although we have tried not to neglect the other related works. But it is clear to the reader familiar with Young's recent book that the answer to the problem of the "relationship between art and life in Heidegger's thought" is not the main subject of this book, and Young has dealt with the whole philosophy of art in the book. Therefore, using the analytical and interpretive approaches mentioned above, we will first try to find out exactly what Heidegger's conception of art is, then we will try to discover the tasks that art owes to life, and finally how art will accomplish these tasks. Findings and Conclusions As we have seen, for Heidegger, among all the solutions to the problems of human existence, art is the best option above philosophy, because it has two elements of mystery and creativity, which are inherent in the problems of human existence. According to Heidegger, Art also covers and pays attention to our existential problems well. For example, in the opening of the world, he recognizes the important points such as awareness of the world as a whole, its pre-existence, and the importance of the continuity of the world for the birth of meaning; Or in the matter of the sacred, he thinks the restriction and confinement of space for the rebirth of the sacred, the concept of its construction and the inhalation of its ethereal space are important. On the other hand, with his analyzes of the works of Cezanne and Klee, he presents a practical model to us and provides objective models for great art. In the next step, we saw how art fulfills its tasks in relation to our existential problems. That is, art deals with the subject of existential problems, with repetition and the use of repetitive novelty, by showing the other aspect of beings, by moving on the border of abstraction and realism, by providing a lively experience, by paying attention to details, by showing basic and fundamental lines of the world, and by taking some distance performs these tasks. In his description, Heidegger is the first philosopher in our time who, on the one hand, places art in such a lofty position and, on the other hand, puts such a heavy burden on art: Art is the way of human salvation in this agony days. But the art is not an art which can be reduced to the aesthetic, but an art which, in its Eastern sense, is an artless art (Starrs 1998; Watts 2011: 230-244) - by meditating and immersing in it, we get out of the control of ordinary subjectivity, open our eyes to the mysteries of life, and discover a more meaningful and valuable world. However, despite the strengths found in Heidegger's thought on the relationship between art and life, his approach also has ambiguities and problems, including the lack of a definition of art in its general sense versus great art, elitism in the art world, which in a way again distances art from the context of ordinary life and leads to a violation of Heidegger's main purpose, and the lack of a clear explanation of basic concepts such as making the other aspect of beings visible, establishing the sacred, and understanding how to live. References Denkerfahrungen 1910-1976 (Frankfurt-on-Main: Klostermann, 1983). Denken und Kunst in Japan und Heidegger – Gedenkschrift der Stadt Messkirch zum hundertstag Geburtstag Martin Heideggers (Sigmarinen: j. Thorbecke, 1989), pp. 211-15. Martin Heidegger: Gesamtausga, ed. F. W. von Hermann (Frankfurt-on-Main: Klostermann, 1977 and onwards). Holderlin and the Essence of Poetry in Existence and Being, ed. W. Brock (London: vision, 1949), pp. 291-315. Ister Holderlin’s Hymn ‘The Ister’, tr. W. McNeill and j. Davis (Bloomington Indiana University Press, 1996). Neitzsche, 4 volumes, tr. D. F. Krell (San Francisco: Harper- Collins, 1979-82). Pathmarks, ed. W. McNeill(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). Poetry, Language, Thought, tr. A. Hofstadter (New York: Harper and Row, 1971). The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, tr. W. Lovitt (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1977). Harries, K. (2009). Art Matters: A Critical Commentary on Heidegger’s “The Origin of the Work of Art”. Springer. Starrs, Roy. (1998). An Artless Art: The Zen Aesthetic of Shiga Noya. London and New Yourk: Routledge. Süner, Ahmet. (2017). A critical evaluation of Heidegger’s criticism of aesthetics in: ‘The Origin of the Work of Art,’ Journal of European Studies, 38.2: 11-26. Watts, Michael. (2010). The Philosophy of Heidegger. Cambridge. Young, Julian. (2001). Heidegger's Philosophy of Art. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Young, Julian. (1395SH). Heidegger's Philosophy of Art. Translated by Amir Maziar. Tehran: Gam-e Now. * assistant professor of IRIB university, mohsenkarami@iribu.ac.ir * MA in Soore university, ativ1366@gmail.com

A Critical Investigation into Marilyn McCord Adams’ Theodicy in the Mirror of a Critical Comparison with Practical Theodicy

Jaafar Fallahi

Volume 13, Issue 30 , August 2023, Pages 445-485

https://doi.org/10.30470/phm.2022.553662.2215

Abstract

Abstract: Theodicy of Marilyn McCord Adams, a contemporary analytic philosopher and theologian, argues that sufferers will experience an organic (not additive) unity after death and ... Read More Abstract: Theodicy of Marilyn McCord Adams, a contemporary analytic philosopher and theologian, argues that sufferers will experience an organic (not additive) unity after death and it will compensate their sufferings. She criticizes instrumental theodicy for their stress on moral values and suggests an aesthetic ground in which individual life of the sufferer will change in postmortem life. Adams’ theoretical theodicy in comparison with practical theodicy will show some deficiencies. Altogether it focus on evil rather than suffering. She considers Christ’s cross and sufferings as a sign for sympathy of God with human sufferings, but there are a far distance between meaningful suffering of Jesus and suffering of a child in Auschwitz. Adams’ emphasis on the intimate relationship between God and human in postmortem eternal life leads to consolation and attention to supernatural realm, leading to an apathy to concrete situation of persons and keeping out from objection to oppression and to sympathy and solidarity with sufferers. Keywords: theodicy, Marilyn McCord Adams, evil, practical theodicy, political theology Introduction Marilyn McCord Adams, an American analytical theologian and philosopher, has a critical view to some theodicies. In some of her works, she overviews these theodicies and at last she herself presents a theodicy. In this article at first McCord Adams’ theodicy is presented and then it is examined in the mirror of Johan Baptist Metz’s practical theodicy. Finally, it is shown that although McCord Adams theodicy has some advantages over the other theoretical ones, in comparison to Metz theology, her theodicy reveals some deficiency. There are some criticisms leveled against McCord Adams’ theodicy from Gleeson, Untea, Tallon, Chignell, and Earl. But all of these are from analytical point of view and hence basically different from critical view of practical theodicy that is presented here. Method The method of this article is critical comparison. Findings Marilyn McCord Adams argues that instrumental theodicy, a theodicy that reckons evil as a necessary instrument for realization of greater goods and thus justifies evil, is immoral (McCord Adams 2013, p. 12). Instrumental theodicy can play a cleansing role for ones that allow such evils. Adams believes that we should emphasize God as Platonic Good, including justice, beauty and truth, instead as moral good (McCord Adams, 1999: 139). By considering the human life’s track in this world, she stresses the relation between God and man through beautiful creation and Christ incarnation (McCord Adams, 2006: 187). Something that justifies the goodness of God in spite of evils is other-worldly life. Adams believes that an intimate unity between God and man will form in after-death life and through that the victims of horrendous evil will find their painful experiences a useful litter for connecting themselves to crucified God. So, sufferings will be advantages for them, and their omission would be wished (McCord Adams, 1999: 168). So she designate this an organic unity that is different from additive unity of instrumental theodicies. . Conclusions and Discussions Although Adams’ theodicy has precedence over instrumental theodicies, reviewing it in the mirror of Metz’s practical theodicy shows some deficiencies in it. Adams’ theoretical theodicy desensitizes sufferings of our world by justifying evils and by this it helps bourgeoising Christianity. Adams theodicy speaks on behalf of sufferers and do not refer to their experiences. In her theodicy, in justifying human’s suffering, the sufferings of Christ are pointed out, although there is no resemblance between meaningful and self-conscious suffering of Christ and hanging of a child at Auschwitz. This theodicy is so ambitious that it seems that it has a clear and high vision of God, but such a claim is close to idolatry because God is mysterious and unclear. Metz’s theodicy in coming across evil and suffering instances emphasizes praxis and listening to sufferers’ accounts, and knows the later an important element in fortifying the resistance and protest in opposition to evils. Maybe Adams’ pointing to figures like Gandhi and Tutu as evidence to her claims on goodness of God rather than on finding a way to reduce the suffering in this world. So there are some oversights in practical aspect in Adams theodicy. finally, Metz’s use of Bible stories and prayer language is concerned to praxis but Adams’ pursues justifying evil. References Chignell, A.. (1998). The problem of infant suffering. Religious Studies, 34 (2): 205–217. Earl, D.. (2011). Divine intimacy and the problem of horrendous evil. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion. 69 (1): 17–28. Fallahi, Jaafar. (1397 SH). Zarfiyyathaaye Elaahiyyat-e Siyaasi-e Johan Baptist Metz Baraaye Elaahiyyaat-e Revaai. Religions and Mysticism. 51 (1): 129-151. Gleeson, Andrew. (2015). On letting go of theodicy: Marilyn McCord Adams on God and Evil. Sophia. 54: 1-12. Katherine Pinnock, Sarah. (2002). Beyond theodicy. University of New York Press. McCord Addams, Marilyn. (1380 SH). Problem of Evil. Translated by: Nahid Hejazi. Name-ye Falsafe, 11(1): 136-148. ---------. (1397 SH). A Review on Some Answers to the Problem of Evil. Translated by: Mohammad Haghani Fazl. in Darbaareye Shar. Na’imeh Purmohammadi (ed.). Qom: TaHa Press. pp. 485-508. ---------. (1991). Sin as uncleanness. Philosophical Perspective. 5: 1-27 ---------. (1999). Horrendous evil and the goodness of God. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. ---------. (2006). Christ and horrors: The coherence of Christology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ---------. (2013). Ignorance, instrumentality, compensation and the problem of evil. Sophia 52 (1): 7-26. ---------. (2014). Eucharist drama: Rehearsal for a revolution. in Lugt and Hart (eds.). Theatrical theology: Exploration in performing the faith. Cambridge: The Lutterworth Press. (pp. 203-223). Metz, Johann Baptist. (1969). Theology of the World. Translated by William Glen-Doepel, New York: Herder and Herder. --------. (1980). Faith in History and Society. Translated by David Smith. New York: Seabury Press. --------. (1981). The Emergent Church: The Future of Christianity in a Postbourgeois World. New York: Crossroad. --------. (1998). Theology as Theodicy?. in A Passion for God: The Mystical-Political Dimension of Christianity. edited and translated by J. Matthew Ashley. New York: Paulist Press. Mohaddesi, Hasan. (1388 SH). Elaahiyyat-e Enteghadi: Ruykardi Badil Ammaa Naashenaakhte. Tehran: Yaadaavaraan. Philips, D. Z.. (2005). The problem of evil and the problem of God, Minneapolis: Fortress Press. Tallon, P.. (2012). The poetics of evil: Toward an aesthetic theodicy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Untea, Ionut. (2019). Where human and divine intimacy meet: an insight into the theodicy of Marilyn McCord Adams. Sophia 59(3): 525-547. Yazdi, Hosein; Atrak Hosein. (1397 SH). Mas’aleye Shar va Faa’eliyyat-e Khodaa dar Jahaan. Philosophical Meditations. 8 (21): 169-200.

Arguments for the Prima Matter According to Ibn Sina: A Critical Review

Hamideh Mokhtari

Volume 13, Issue 30 , August 2023, Pages 393-524

https://doi.org/10.30470/phm.2022.549255.2186

Abstract

Abstract Ibn Sina has put forward two arguments of "continuity and disconnection" and "potentiality and actuality" to prove the prime matter. Based on the arguments of continuity and ... Read More Abstract Ibn Sina has put forward two arguments of "continuity and disconnection" and "potentiality and actuality" to prove the prime matter. Based on the arguments of continuity and disconnection, a change is not possible unless there is the prime matter, , a common and constant component providing identity during variation and change. In this article, we argue that this argument does not support its claim to prove the prime matter, nor can it solve the continuity and disconnection. Another argument of the prime matter is called the potentiality and actuality. in this article, we have shown that, based on the argument of potentiality and actuality, it is not possible to prove the prime matter. It is concluded that the two main arguments of the prime matter cannot prove the prime matter of Ibn Sina. Keywords: Ibn Sina, Prime matter, Arguments, Continuity and Disconnection, Potentiality and Actuality Introduction "Hylomorphism" is a theory in which the structure of material objects is explained based on matter and form. Traditional Hylomorphism has a significant background. The center of Aristotle's metaphysics is the distinction between matter and form. Although this theory started with Aristotle and continued in the metaphysics of some different philosophers, some aspects of it is still needed to be analyzed. Ibn Sina is one of the proponents of Hylomorphism theory. In his opinion, the central idea of Hylomorphism is that, material objects are composed of the substances of matter and the form. The focus of this article is the analysis of two arguments to prove the Prime matter according to Ibn Sina. This analysis is based on the opinions of some analytical philosophers. The subject of the this article is to find out whether Ibn Sina has been able to adduce satisfactory arguments for proving the Prime matter? Methodology In this article, the research method is descriptive-analytical based on analytical and logical investigation. In this way, first, we collected information by studying different books and then analyzed the information by using logical analysis methods. Finding Ibn Sina has presented two arguments to prove the Prime matter: "Continuity and Disconnection” and "Potentiality and Actuality”. Examining the argument of Potentiality and Actuality shows that in every material object there are two characteristics of Potentiality and Actuality, and these two characteristics are separate from each other, but it is not enough to prove the Prime matter and as a result, it is not possible to present Hylomorphism interpretation about the structure of material objects. Also, based on an argument, we showed that the Continuity and Disconnection argument cannot prove the prime matter. Basically, the Prime matter is supposed to maintain the identity between objects during change. But we have shown that the monster cannot be a suitable answer to the problem of identity during change Because according to the Continuity and Disconnection argument, the Prime matter was not proved; we thus showed that the Prime matter cannot be a suitable answer to the problem of identity during change. To solve the problem of Continuity and Disconnection, we provided two solutions; the first solution is based on a three-dimensional analysis and the second solution, which does not require the assumption of the Prime matter, is based on a four-dimensional analysis. In short, in this article, we have shown that there are problems with both arguments to prove the Prime matter. In other words, two arguments cannot prove the Prime matter. Conclusion and discussion The claim of the proof of Continuity and Disconnection is that it is not possible to change the Continuity and Disconnection unless there is the prime matter. This component is a constant component during change and provides identity during change. we showed that, this argument cannot fulfill its claim, i.e. proving the Prime matter, as well as solving the problem of changing, that is, the assumption of the Prime matter cannot give a suitable answer to the problem of Continuity and Disconnection. To solve the problem of Continuity and Disconnection, we provided two solutions; The first solution is based on a three-dimensional analysis and the second solution, which does not require the assumption of the Prime matter, is based on a four-dimensional analysis. Another argument to prove the Prime matter is Potentiality and Actuality. This argument cannot prove the Prime matter. The claim of the argument is that the proof of the characteristic of the Potentiality comes to the proof of the Prime matter, but A) The attribution of this characteristic can also be explained in the framework of the Bundel theory, without the need Hylomorphism. The property of being potential, along with the property of being actual, assuming a Bundel theory, are two properties and two constituents of the material object that can be considered as form, so there is no place to prove Prime matter, while it was supposed to be an argument in favor of proving the Prime matter. b) Also, with modifications in the Bundel theory, the Prime matter will not be proven. c) Also, by insisting on the many problems of the Bundel theory, it cannot be used in favor of Hylomorphism, because it has some assumptions that are sometimes not accepted by Ibn Sina. One of the assumptions of accepting the objection is to believe in the realism, while according to many evidences, Ibn Sina believes in tropism. So, Potentiality and Actuality argument, under the standard Bundel theory and even its modified versions, cannot prove the Prime matter. d) The Potentiality and Actuality argument will not work even within the framework of the Substratum This argument under the Substratum theory has more flaws than its proposal under the Bundel theory. Because under this potential, they can neither prove the Prime matter nor can they be the form of the object. References: Ibn sina. (1404 AH). Al-shifā, Al-elahiyat. Tashih: Sāeed zayed. Al-Ab Qhānāvati. Qom: Mār’āshi Nājāfi ----------. (1404 AH). Al-tālighat. Qom: Al-māktābāh Al-ālam Al-eslami. ----------. (1404 AH) Al-shifā, Al-tābi’eyay. Tashih: sāeed zayed. Qom: Mārāshi Nājāfi. ----------. (1404 AH) Al-shifā, Al-māntegh. Qom: Mārāshi Nājāfi. ----------. (1363 SH). Al -mābādā vā Al-mā’ad. Be ehtemam: Abdolleh Norani. Tehran: mo’asseseh motale’at eslami ---------. (1375 SH). Al-esharat vā Al-tānbihat. Qom: nāshr Al-bālaghāh ---------. (1379 SH). Al -nājat men AL-ghārgh fi bāhr Al-dālalat. Tashih Muhammad taghi Danesh pazhuh. Tehran: Daneshgah Tehran. ----------. (1989). Al-hodūd. Ghahereh: Al-heyā’ah Al-mesri Al-ālemah Al-ketab. Sābzevari mulla hadi. (1379 SH). Shārh Al-mānzūmeh. Mohaghegh: MāSūd Talebi. Tehran: nashr nab. Sohrevārdi, shāhab Al-din. (1375 SH). Hekāmāt Al-eshrāgh. Mājmūeh mosānāfat sheykh Eshragh (jeld 2). Tashih Hanri Corbān. Tehran: pazhuheshgah olūm Ensani. Sādr Al-din shirazi, Muhammad ebn Ebrahim.1981. Al-hekmāh Al-motā’aliyāh Fi Al-āsfar Al-āghliyah Beyrut: dar ehya Al-torāth. (mājmū’eh asar jed 5) Tehran: nāshr sadrd. Michael J. Loux.2006. “Metaphysics: a contemporary introduction.” — 3rd ed. (Routledge contemporary introductions to philosophy Sellars, W. 1963, "perception and reality". Science. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

A Comparative Study of John Mackie's Theory of Error and Allameh Tabatabaei's Theory of Artificial Conceptions

seyed mahdi keshmiri; محمدرضا امینی

Volume 13, Issue 30 , August 2023, Pages 531-568

https://doi.org/10.30470/phm.2022.550034.2191

Abstract

Abstract The present article aims at explaining and applying the two theories of metaethical "error" and " artificial conceptions theory" put forward respectively by John Mackie and ... Read More Abstract The present article aims at explaining and applying the two theories of metaethical "error" and " artificial conceptions theory" put forward respectively by John Mackie and Allameh Seyyed Mohammad Hosein Tabatabaei. Since the language of ethics, the metaphysics of ethics, the rationality of ethics, and the perception of ethics are some of the most suggestive metaethical assumptions, we will analyze these components in the present research. The result of the comparison indicates that although the error and conceptions theories differ in anthropological foundations of moral knowledge so that in the conceptions theory, the existence and validity of fixed artificial conceptions are rooted in human nature,, there are significant commonalities in two therories in question with regard to unethical realism in ethical metaphysics, cognitivism in ethical language, ethical realism in ethical rationality and unrealism in ethical knowledge. Keyword Error theory, Artificial Conceptions Theory, ethical ontology, ethical epistemology, ethical rationality Introduction Among the important issues in the field of metaethics is the discussion of to be and not to be, and the quality of moral attributes and knowledge. These two issues in the specialized literature on metaethical issues are raised in the form of realism/unrealism and moral cognitivism/non-cognitivism dualities. Two of the philosophers in this field who had innovative an independent theorizing are Allameh Tabatabaei and J.L. Mackie, who presented two theories of " artificial conceptions " and "error". Referring to the authors, apart from some differences, the interesting similarities between the opinions of these two philosophers make the theoretical and practical capacities of these theories clearer and more understandable. Mackie is a philosopher who defends naturalism and thus does not mention supernatural matters in his philosophical states of mind about religion and ethics. Therefore, it seems comprehensible that having this basis, Mackie's position in ethics is a strong unrealism. But could one find commonalities between Mackie's point of view as a naturalist and the point of view of a supernaturalist and mystic like Tabatabaei? Method This study's research design is a library method and attempts to discover, analyze, and explain and form the implicit and explicit presuppositions of two significant metaethical theories named "error-theory" and "artificial conceptions " respectively proposed by Mackie and Tabatabaei. Findings In this article we attempted to describe the artificial conceptions theory while paying close attention to some differences related to the common language in the philosophy of analytical ethics, so that firstly, regarding the principle of the possibility of comparing these two perspectives, the judgment about the "possibility" of comparing these two perspectives would be achieved. Secondly, the philosophical insights of the two theories should be more obvious. We found that first, the mere differences in some foundations (even the important foundations of the intellectual system) do not mean that other calories of the intellectual world of these two philosophers do not overlap; Second, in the field of ethics, this comparative study is insightful to understand the point of views of both philosophers. Conclusions and Discussions In his theory of artificial conceptions, in order not to fall into the trap of relativity, Allameh Tabatabaei, points out fixed conceptions; conceptions that are permanent and eternal due to our status as human beings. For explaining ethical disagreements, in terms of motivating the language of ethics and so on, he comes close to moral unrealism. By distinguishing between artificial and true conceptions in the discussion of conceptions, Allameh, has considered predicate ideas and ethical validation as the artificial conceptions. According to him, general true conceptions are permanent, valid, and undeniable, and have external and independent manifestation and deserve logic. On the other hand, artificial conceptions are relative, temporary, and unnecessary and do not have independent and external manifestation; Since it does not have the condition of necessity, generality, and certainty, it does not have logic; And since it does not have any external description and comparative, it is false, but it is useful lies. The usefulness of these conceptions is also because of their practical benefits. However, true perceptions are not dependent on agreements, and individual and social good and bad, both before society and after society, do not affect the existential status and epistemological status of these types of perceptions and affirmations. Therefore, in the field of ethical language, unlike many who defend moral skepticism and accept agnosticism, Mackie is a cognitivist and believes that our metaethical intuitions in the field of ethical language are useful for their truth and falsity, and that "ability", rather than "receipt", entails confirmation and denial, for the language of ethics is enough to consider a cognitive position - only at the level of concepts. According to him, although the language of ethics has the "ability" to confirm and deny since there is no moral description in the outside world, they are all false and wrong. At the same time, Mackie believes that the assumption of the existence of these propositions and the projection of these internal values to the outside world is due to practical solutions and to meet the need, and based on achieving expediency and avoiding corruption. The comparison concludes that the theory of contingent and the theory of error in the language of ethics, metaphysics of ethics, knowledge of ethics, and ethical rationality have remarkable affinities, and of course, this affinity is more significant in metaphysics and the language of ethics than in other aspects of it. Akhavan, M.; et al. (1395 SH). Errors of John Mackie's error theory. Philosophical reflections. 6 (16): 145-171. Fanaei, A. (1384 SH). Religion in the balance of morality; A research on the relationship between religious ethics and secular ethics. Tehran: Sarat. Fanaei, A. (2003). The ethics of moral thinking: An Inquiry into the Problem Of Justification in Moral Epistemology. United Kingdom: University of Sheffield. Javadi, M. (1374 SH). The immortality of ethical principles and contingent theory. insight (15), 22-26. Keshmiri, M. (1394 SH). A comparative-analytical review of John Mackie's theory of error and Allameh Tabatabaei's theory of contingent perceptions, graduate thesis, Department of Moral Philosophy, University of Qom. Lossau, Tammo. (2022). Mackie and the Meaning of Moral Terms. JHAP: Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy. Volume 10, Number 1. Mackie, J. (1977). Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. London: Penguin Books. Mackie, J. (1982). The Miracle of Theism: Arguments for and against the existence of God. New York: Oxford University Press Inc. McCord, G. (2010). Routledge Companion to Epistemology. New York: Routledge. Miandari, H. (1390 SH). Refusals on the theory of error in the philosophy of ethics based on biological evolution. Wisdom and Philosophy, (1), 67-86. Miller, A. (2003). An introduction to contemporary Metaethics. United Kingdom: Blackwell. Olson, J. (2014). Moral Error Theory; History, critique, defence. United Kingdom: Oxford University press. Tabatabai, M. (1374 SH). Nahayeh al-Hikmah (second edition, first volume). (A. Shirvani, compilation) Tehran: Al-Zahra. Tabatabai, M. (1385 SH). The principles of philosophy and the method of realism (Volume 1). (M. Shariati Sabzevari, edited) Qom: Bostan Kitāb. Tabatabai, M. (1388 SH). Man from beginning to end. Qom: Bostan Kitāb .

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