عنوان مقاله [English]
Libet’s experiments, showing that we become aware of our intention to act only after we have unconsciously formed it. Based on these experimental studies, Some claim that we do not possess free will. This paper offers three responses to this claim; First, it is doubtful that actions studied in the Libet’s experiments are ideal exemplars of free will. They are at best ‘degenerate’ examples of free will. Second, Libet uses such terms as ‘urge’ and ‘intention’ interchangeably. An alternative interpretation of Libet’s results says, what the subjects were required to report was not a conscious intention or decision to act, but rather a perceived urge to move. Third, Libet’s results do not constitute a separate challenge to our freedom. It is merely rehearsing the claim that determinism is incompatible with free will. So, Libet’s experiments provide no evidence against compatibilist notion of free will.
Keywords: Libet’s experiments, Free will, Readiness potential, Conscious decision, Compatibilism.