Kant's theory of hope focuses on the hope of the perfect good of man, which includes both his virtue and his happiness. According to Kant, individuals have a duty to strive for virtue and happiness, and they must achieve the highest good, in accordance with the morality and justice that lies within it. But is there any hope for highest good? In a theological approach, Kant promises that the human being will achieve highest good in another world with God's help. And in a secular approach he expresses the hope that mankind is moving towards highest good and will eventually achieve it in its gradual movement throughout history. The article claims that the secular approach was not proposed to compensate for the incompleteness of the theological approach - which some have stated - but rather it is in harmony with the theological approach and in accordance with Kant's philosophical system. However, it is criticized that in the secular approach, the human person has been neglected in favor of the human species. This critique can be described as the Gap of Justice.
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