Analysis of the Possibility and Causes of Epistemic Akrasia Through the Rational Psychology of Mulla Sadra's Transcendent Wisdom

Document Type : Original Article

Author
Associate Professor of Philosophy, Payame Noor University, Tehran, Iran
Abstract
The present paper aims to discuss the possibility and main causes of epistemic akrasia based on Mullah Sadra's transcendental theosophy by descriptive-analytical method. Epistemic akrasia means "man's belief in things contrary to his beliefs", of which, some of researchers have studied the possibility and presented various formations, in line with "practical akrasia" (doing action contrary to a person's moral judgment). Mulla Sadra has two theories about the explanation of the multiplicity of actions of the self: 1- the theory of the powers of the self and 2- the theory of the levels [modalities] of the self. According to the theory of "powers of the self", the possibility of cognitive dissonance can be seen as the result of the independence of perceptual powers. Based on the theory of "levels of self", we can also talk about the possibility of developing cognitive dissonance in different levels [modalities] of self. Phenomena such as self-deception, embellishment of action, denial and obstinacy, stubbornness and bigotry, self-deceit, intellectual negligence and mental distress can be considered as examples of epistemic akrasia. Based on the theory of levels of the self, Mulla Sadra has explained the mechanism of creating cognitive dissonance by rational perceptions and beliefs, considering it to be the result of intellectual disorder or incompatibility in the activity of the powers of the self or the non-actuality of its superior levels. These factors lead a person to believe in things for which there is no reasonable rational reason and even to conflict with his rational beliefs.

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