خداباوری و انگاره‌های ضدشهودی

نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسنده
احمد عبادی
دانشیار فلسفه، گروه معارف اهل‌البیت(ع)، دانشکده الهیات و معارف اهل‌البیت(ع)، دانشگاه اصفهان، اصفهان، ایران
10.30470/phm.2023.1974056.2324
چکیده
علم شناختیِ دین با رویکردی علمی به‌دنبال یافتنِ تبیین‌های علّی دربارۀ منشأ، رواج و انتقال باورهای دینی است. یکی از باورهای مرتبط با حوزۀ دین، باور به مفاهیم ضدشهودی است. مفاهیم ضدشهودی، مفاهیمی هستند که با شهودهای معمول انسانی همخوانی ندارند. این مفاهیم، اگر انسجام شناختی را از بین نبرند، موجب ماندگاری و انتقال باورهای دینی در مقایسه یا سایر باورها می‌شوند. لذا، ضدشهودی‌بودن نقش مهمی در فهم دین ایفا می‌کند. به‌رغم جایگاه مهم مفاهیم ضدشهودی در علم شناختیِ دین، معتقدیم در کاربست این مفاهیم ابهامات و اِشکالاتی وجود دارد که اگر به‌درستی تبیین و تصحیح نشوند در پذیرش و تثبیت باورهای خداباورانه خلل ایجاد می‌کند: ۱. ناتوانیِ فرابازنمایی در حل مشکل تمایز میان باورهای ضدشهودیِ دینی و سایر مفاهیم ضدشهودی، ۲. تأکید صرف بر ساختار شناختی و عدم توجه به نقش تربیت و فرهنگ در شناسایی مفاهیم ضدشهودی، ۳. ابهام در نقش تبیینیِ مفاهیم ضدشهودی، ۴. ناهمخوانیِ تحلیل برخی مفاهیم ضدشهودی مانند خدا با آموزه‌های رسمی ادیان. در پایان، دو انتقاد بر رویکرد شناختی به دین مطرح می‌کنیم: ۱. عدم توجه به شهودهای خودآگاه، ۲. به‌نظر با تبیین صرفاً طبیعیِ باورها در نظام شناختی، عوامل انسانی جای عوامل فراطبیعی را بگیرند، اما آمارها چیز دیگری نشان می‌دهند. هدف این نوشتار، تحلیل و نقد کاربست مفاهیم ضدشهودی در علم شناختیِ دین است.

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات

عنوان مقاله English

Theism and Counter-Intuitive Concepts

نویسنده English

Ahmad Ebadi
Associate professor of philosophy, University of Isfahan
چکیده English

The cognitive science of religion (CSR) seeks to find causal explanations for the origin, dissemination and transmission of theistic beliefs. One of the beliefs related to the field of religion is counterintuitive concepts: ideas and concepts that violate the automatic and non-reflective expectations of our mental tools. According to the researchers of CSR, counterintuitive concepts, if they are used in their minimal sense and do not weaken the conceptual coherence, cause the permanence and transmission of religious beliefs in comparison with other beliefs. Therefore, counterintuitiveness plays an important role in understanding religion. Despite the positive points of counterintuitive concepts, we believe that these concepts have ambiguities and problems that, if not properly explained and corrected, will cause problems in the acceptance and fixation of theistic beliefs: First, meta-representation's inability to solve the problem of distinguishing between counterintuitive religious beliefs and other counterintuitive concepts. Second, ambiguity in the explanatory role of counterintuitive concepts. Third, emphasis on cognitive architecture and not paying attention to the role of upbringing and culture in identifying counterintuitive concepts. Fourth, the inconsistency in the analysis of some counterintuitive concepts such as God with the official doctrine of religions. Fifth, not paying attention to conscious intuitions. Sixth, it seems that with the naturalization of beliefs in the cognitive system, human agents will take the place of supernatural agents, but the statistics show something else.

کلیدواژه‌ها English

Cognitive Science of Religion
Cognitive Tools
Reflective Beliefs
Unconscious Intuitions
Methodology of Religious Studies
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