تکامل برزخیِ نفس؛ از حرکت اشتدادی تا انبساط ملکات

The concept of barzakhī perfection of the soul (post-mortem perfection) in Islamic philosophy—particularly within Transcendent Theosophy (al-ḥikma al-mutaʿāliyya)—has been subject to multiple interpretations by Mullā Ṣadrā and his followers. These interpretations can be classified under two major approaches. The first is the interpretation of barzakhī perfection based on substantial motion (al-ḥaraka al-jawhariyya). To resolve the internal tensions of this thesis, various strategies have been proposed, including: (1) positing countless human faculties; (2) asserting a longitudinal ontological relation between barzakh and the terrestrial world; (3) denying the dependence of motion on prime matter (hayūlā); (4) positing a specific kind of body for the soul; (5) positing a particular type of prime matter; and (6) interpreting motion as an analytical accident. Through an analytical–critical approach, this study demonstrates that each of these strategies faces fundamental problems such as equivocation, petitio principii (begging the question), internal inconsistency, and reductionism. The second approach interprets barzakhī perfection through the doctrine of tajaddud al-amthāl (renewal of similitudes), a mystical framework that this article critically examines and deems inadequate. Ultimately, the study proposes three alternative solutions: (1) the perpetual attachment of the soul to the body, based on a reconstruction of Madras Zunūzī’s view on bodily resurrection; (2) the expansion of latent malakāt (dispositional perfections) within the rational soul; and (3) a hybrid approach combining the soul’s continual attachment to the body with the expansion of malakāt. These three approaches offer a new framework for explaining the problem of barzakhī perfection within Islamic philosophical thought.