حرکت قطعیه و توسطیه: بررسی تطبیقی دیدگاه ملاصدرا و علامه طباطبایی

The problem of motion and the explication of its meanings constitute one of the most fundamental issues in natural philosophy and ontology within Islamic philosophy. One of the central debates in this field concerns the distinction between cutting motion (ḥarakat al-qaṭʿiyya) and mediating motion (ḥarakat al-tawassuṭiyya), as well as the manner of their external or mental realization. Based on the primacy of existence and the fluidity of substance, Mullā Ṣadrā regards real motion as identical with cutting motion and considers mediating motion to be a merely mental construct. In contrast, Ṭabāṭabāʾī, adopting an analytical approach, maintains that both meanings of motion are two distinct considerations abstracted from a single external reality, and thus attributes an objective basis of abstraction to each.

Employing an analytical–comparative method and drawing upon the principal texts of Peripatetic philosophy and Transcendent Theosophy, this study examines and compares the views of Mullā Ṣadrā and Ṭabāṭabāʾī regarding cutting and mediating motion. The findings indicate that Mullā Ṣadrā’s rejection of mediating motion is grounded in a specific conception of stability and temporal correspondence. By contrast, Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s analytical interpretation allows motion to be understood as possessing two distinct aspects, both of which correspond to external reality. Accordingly, motion, as a mode of the existence of a fluid substance, admits abstraction into both cutting and mediating aspects without entailing the denial of the objectivity of either. This analysis offers a more precise account of the relationship between motion, time, and existence within the framework of Transcendent Theosophy.