Larry Laudan and the Pessimistic Induction

Author
Javad Akbari Takhtameshlou
Assistant Professor at Sharif University of Technology
Abstract
Relying on the ‘no miracle argument’, the realists claim that the best explanation for the extraordinary success of scientific theories is that they are (approximately) true. But Larry Laudan in his 1981 paper presented an influential historical argument (known as the ‘pessimistic induction’) which challenged this claim. History of science, according to Laudan, offers many scientific theories that despite their previous success are rejected today. Then, unlike the realists’ claim, success cannot be considered as a mark of truth of the theories. In this paper first Laudan’s argument will be introduced in detail, and then the exact logical formulation of this argument will be reconstructed. Finally, we suggest a response to this argument.

Keywords

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Philosophical Meditations
Volume 6, Issue 17 - Serial Number 17
September 2016
Pages 103-134