نقد و بررسی آزمایش‌های لیبت

نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسنده
بهرام علیزاده
گروه آموزشی فلسفه دانشکده ادبیات دانشگاه خوارزمی
10.30470/phm.2020.38511
چکیده
آزمایش‌های لبیت –علی‌الادعا- نشان می‌دهند که فرآیندهای ناآگاهانه مغزی، قبل از آنکه از آنها باخبر شویم، تصمیم‌های ما را شکل می‌دهند. برخی بر اساس این مطالعات تجربی مدّعی شده‌اند که ما فاقد اراده آزاد هستیم. در این مقاله سه پاسخ به این مدّعا ارائه شده است: نخست، بسیار محل تردید است که افعال مورد مطالعه در آزمایش‌های لیبت نمونۀ کاملِ‌ افعالی باشند که آزاد شمرده می‌شوند. چنین افعالی در بهترین حالت نمونه‌های نازلی از افعال آزاد بشمار می‌آیند. دوم اینکه، لیبت مفاهیمی مثل "میل" و "قصد" را جابجا بکار می‌برد درحالی‌که تفسیری جایگزین از داده‌های لیبت می‌گوید آنچه شرکت‌کنندگان از خود گزارش می‌کنند تنها میل به حرکت است و نه قصد یا تصمیم به حرکت. و سوم اینکه، نتایج لیبت تهدیدی مستقل بر ضد ارادۀ آزاد بشمار نمی‌آیند بلکه صرفا تکرار این مدّعا هستند که تعیّن‌گرایی با آزادی جمع-شدنی نیست. از این جهت، این آزمایش‌ها نمی‌توانند دلیلی بر ضدّ همسازگرایی به شمار ‌آیند.
کلیدواژه‌ها
آزمایش‌های لیبت
اراده آزاد
پتانسیل آمادگی
تصمیم آگاهانه
همسازگرایی

عنوان مقاله English

A critical discussion of Libet’s Experiments

نویسنده English

Bahram Alizade
Department of Philosophy Kharazmi University
چکیده English

Abstract
Libet’s experiments, showing that we become aware of our intention to act only after we have unconsciously formed it. Based on these experimental studies, Some claim that we do not possess free will. This paper offers three responses to this claim; First, it is doubtful that actions studied in the Libet’s experiments are ideal exemplars of free will. They are at best ‘degenerate’ examples of free will. Second, Libet uses such terms as ‘urge’ and ‘intention’ interchangeably. An alternative interpretation of Libet’s results says, what the subjects were required to report was not a conscious intention or decision to act, but rather a perceived urge to move. Third, Libet’s results do not constitute a separate challenge to our freedom. It is merely rehearsing the claim that determinism is incompatible with free will. So, Libet’s experiments provide no evidence against compatibilist notion of free will.
Keywords: Libet’s experiments, Free will, Readiness potential, Conscious decision, Compatibilism.

کلیدواژه‌ها English

Libet’s experiments
Free will
Readiness potential
Conscious decision
Compatibilism
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