Examining the opinion of Allameh Tabatabai and Sabzevari about the content of suspicion with an emphasis on Seyyed Jalaluddin Ashtiani's criticisms of them.

Essential doubt has been a challenging issue in Islamic philosophy. Avicenna rejected essential doubt and Sheikh Ishraq proved it. Although Mulla Sadra believed in the originality of existence, his words about essential doubt are initially inconsistent. Mulla Sadra's followers have also spoken differently on this issue. Although Sabzevari accepted the doubt in essence, he considered the abstract individual of essence to be an intrusive existence. Allama Tabataba'i considered the evidence to prove the doubt in essence insufficient and stated that this evidence only proves the stronger existence of the effect in relation to the cause. Ashtiani first says that Mulla Sadra's statements are not inconsistent and that he believed in doubt in essence in all cases. Secondly, this doubt in essence is a consequence of doubt in existence and Ashraf's argument of possibility proves without any problems the existence of abstract individuals for the specific essence. Thirdly, the abstract individual is the individual in essence for the essence, not an intrusive existence for it. In this article, we conclude through an analytical and descriptive method that the carrying of truth and subtlety is not specific to the superior existence of the effect in relation to the cause, and that the rational existence of a specific nature is both the specific existence of that nature and, since it possesses all the perfections of that nature in a supreme manner, it is an example of the carrying of truth and subtlety.