The Divergence Between analytical philosophy from phenomenology in Their Approaches to the Foundational Claim of Embodied Cognition

Document Type : Original Article

Author
Assistant Professor, Faculty Member, Amirkabir University
10.30470/phm.2025.2052301.2644
Abstract
Classical or Cartesian cognitive science views cognition as a symbolic computation and something within the mind, a cognition that has no relation to the environment, the body, and human praxis, and revolves around the manipulation of representations. As some of the gaps and shortcomings of this approach became apparent, the body, the environment, and the stream of embodied cognition (EC) gradually became prominent in the second cognitive revolution. Although embodied cognition in its various forms has guided the mainstream of research in cognitive science for several decades and has overcome the Cartesian approach and cognitivism as a new paradigm, there is no consensus on its essential gravity, and the common ground of its different approaches is still a matter of dispute. This essay seeks to question the common ground of the various types of EC as the aggregator of its different approaches under one idea. What is it that characterizes an approach in cognitive science as embodied and distinguishes it from Cartesian approaches?

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Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript
Available Online from 02 September 2025