The Crisis of Inference in Philosophical Hermeneutics: Rereading the Epistemological Capabilities of Theological Rationality

This research explores a central epistemological dilemma in contemporary philosophy of religion, namely the crisis of inference resulting from the application of philosophical hermeneutics in the field of theology. The main issue is how to infer stable doctrinal propositions from religious texts, while philosophical hermeneutics emphasizes the radical historicity of understanding and the fluidity of meaning. This article, using a critical analytical method, defines its goal not to refute hermeneutics but to reinterpret and explain the epistemological capacities of theological rationality in the face of this crisis. In this regard, first the foundations of philosophical hermeneutics and its consequences in the thought of some religious neo-thinkers were analyzed. Then, in a positive move, the theological model of ijtihad was reconstructed and explained as an original methodology. This model is based on the dialectic between fixed governing principles such as the rule of deterministic reason and variable elements and the domain of ijtihad. The effectiveness of this model in resolving apparent conflicts was demonstrated through a philosophical case study of the "Problem of Evil." The key finding of the research is that theological rationality itself has a dynamic and coherent framework for valid inference that can balance adherence to principles and responsiveness to the exigencies of the times.