نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

• سید مهدی کشمیری ¹
• محمدرضا امینی ²

¹ دانشجوی دکتری فلسفه دین دانشگاه تهران(پردیس فارابی)

² دانشجوی دکتری فلسفه اخلاق دانشگاه ادیان و مذاهب

چکیده

مقالة حاضر کوششی‌ است در راستای تبیین و تطبیق دو نظریة فرااخلاقی «خطا» و «ادراکات اعتباری» ازسوی جان مکی و علامه سیدمحمدحسین طباطبایی. این مقاله که از حیث روش تحقیق به روش کتابخانه­ای انجام شده، تلاشی است برای کشف، تحلیل، تبیین و صورت‌بندی پیش‌فرض‌های ضمنی و مصرَح دو نظریة مهم فرااخلاقی، تحت‌ عناوین «نظریۀ ­خطا» و «ادراکات اعتباری» که به‌ترتیب از سوی جان مکی و سیدمحمدحسین طباطبایی طرح شده‌اند. از آنجاکه زبان اخلاق، متافیزیک اخلاق، عقلانیت اخلاق و معرفت اخلاقی، برخی از مهم­ترین پیش‌فرض­های فرااخلاقی است، در تحقیق حاضر به تحلیل این مؤلفه­ها می­پردازیم. نتیجة مقایسه این است که اگرچه وجه افتراق مهم نظریة اعتباریات با نظریة خطا در یکی از مبانی انسان‌شناختیِ معرفت اخلاقی این دو نظریه است -که در یکی (نظریۀ اعتباریات) از وجود و اعتبارِ ادراکاتِ اعتباری ثابت که ریشه در طبیعت بشری دارد سخن می‌رود- با این­حال ناواقع‌گراییِ اخلاقی در متافیزیک اخلاق، شناخت‌گرایی در زبان اخلاق، واقع‌گروی اخلاقی در عقلانیت اخلاق و ناواقع­گرایی در معرفت اخلاقی از اشتراکات مهم این دو نظریه است.

کلیدواژه‌ها

• نظریة خطا
• نظریة اعتباریات
• وجودشناسی اخلاقی
• معرفت‌شناسی اخلاق
• عقلانیت اخلاق
• زبان‌شناسی اخلاق

موضوعات

• فلسفه اخلاق

عنوان مقاله [English]

A Comparative Study of John Mackie's Theory of Error and Allameh Tabatabaei's Theory of Artificial Conceptions

نویسندگان [English]

• seyed mahdi keshmiri ¹
• محمدرضا امینی ²

¹ Department of philosophy of religion, religions and mysticism, Faculty of Theology, Farabi Campus, University of Tehran

² Department of Moral philosophy, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Religions and Denominations

چکیده [English]

Abstract
The present article aims at explaining and applying the two theories of metaethical "error" and " artificial conceptions theory" put forward respectively by John Mackie and Allameh Seyyed Mohammad Hosein Tabatabaei. Since the language of ethics, the metaphysics of ethics, the rationality of ethics, and the perception of ethics are some of the most suggestive metaethical assumptions, we will analyze these components in the present research. The result of the comparison indicates that although the error and conceptions theories differ in anthropological foundations of moral knowledge so that in the conceptions theory, the existence and validity of fixed artificial conceptions are rooted in human nature,, there are significant commonalities in two therories in question with regard to unethical realism in ethical metaphysics, cognitivism in ethical language, ethical realism in ethical rationality and unrealism in ethical knowledge.
Keyword
Error theory, Artificial Conceptions Theory, ethical ontology, ethical epistemology, ethical rationality
Introduction
Among the important issues in the field of metaethics is the discussion of to be and not to be, and the quality of moral attributes and knowledge. These two issues in the specialized literature on metaethical issues are raised in the form of realism/unrealism and moral cognitivism/non-cognitivism dualities. Two of the philosophers in this field who had innovative an independent theorizing are Allameh Tabatabaei and J.L. Mackie, who presented two theories of " artificial conceptions " and "error". Referring to the authors, apart from some differences, the interesting similarities between the opinions of these two philosophers make the theoretical and practical capacities of these theories clearer and more understandable. Mackie is a philosopher who defends naturalism and thus does not mention supernatural matters in his philosophical states of mind about religion and ethics. Therefore, it seems comprehensible that having this basis, Mackie's position in ethics is a strong unrealism. But could one find commonalities between Mackie's point of view as a naturalist and the point of view of a supernaturalist and mystic like Tabatabaei?
Method
This study's research design is a library method and attempts to discover, analyze, and explain and form the implicit and explicit presuppositions of two significant metaethical theories named "error-theory" and "artificial conceptions " respectively proposed by Mackie and Tabatabaei.
Findings
In this article we attempted to describe the artificial conceptions  theory while paying close attention to some differences related to the common language in the philosophy of analytical ethics, so that firstly, regarding the principle of the possibility of comparing these two perspectives, the judgment about the "possibility" of comparing these two perspectives would be achieved. Secondly, the philosophical insights of the two theories should be more obvious.
We found that first, the mere differences in some foundations (even the important foundations of the intellectual system) do not mean that other calories of the intellectual world of these two philosophers do not overlap; Second, in the field of ethics, this comparative study is insightful to understand the point of views of both philosophers.
Conclusions and Discussions
In his theory of artificial conceptions, in order not to fall into the trap of relativity, Allameh Tabatabaei, points out fixed conceptions; conceptions that are permanent and eternal due to our status as human beings. For explaining ethical disagreements, in terms of motivating the language of ethics and so on, he comes close to moral unrealism.
By distinguishing between artificial and true conceptions in the discussion of conceptions, Allameh, has considered predicate ideas and ethical validation as the artificial conceptions. According to him, general true conceptions are permanent, valid, and undeniable, and have external and independent manifestation and deserve logic. On the other hand, artificial conceptions are relative, temporary, and unnecessary and do not have independent and external manifestation; Since it does not have the condition of necessity, generality, and certainty, it does not have logic; And since it does not have any external description and comparative, it is false, but it is useful lies. The usefulness of these conceptions is also because of their practical benefits. However, true perceptions are not dependent on agreements, and individual and social good and bad, both before society and after society, do not affect the existential status and epistemological status of these types of perceptions and affirmations.
Therefore, in the field of ethical language, unlike many who defend moral skepticism and accept agnosticism, Mackie is a cognitivist and believes that our metaethical intuitions in the field of ethical language are useful for their truth and falsity, and that "ability", rather than "receipt", entails confirmation and denial, for the language of ethics is enough to consider a cognitive position - only at the level of concepts. According to him, although the language of ethics has the "ability" to confirm and deny since there is no moral description in the outside world, they are all false and wrong. At the same time, Mackie believes that the assumption of the existence of these propositions and the projection of these internal values ​​to the outside world is due to practical solutions and to meet the need, and based on achieving expediency and avoiding corruption.
The comparison concludes that the theory of contingent and the theory of error in the language of ethics, metaphysics of ethics, knowledge of ethics, and ethical rationality have remarkable affinities, and of course, this affinity is more significant in metaphysics and the language of ethics than in other aspects of it.
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کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

• error theory»
• mackie»
• etebariat»
• «
• tabatabaei»