Evaluation the relationship between Epistemic Autonomy and Testimony; A conciliatory proposal

Document Type : Original Article

Authors
1 Teacher
2 Doctoral student of moral philosophy
Abstract
Some contemporary epistemologists try to de-authenticate the "Testimony" based on some evidences and arguments and remove it from the scope of justified knowledge. The present article, which is a compilation in the library method, and an analytical method in the evaluation section, tries to examine and criticize one of the arguments raised for the invalidity of the Testimony. This argument, which has made the principle of "Autonomy" the basis of its criticism, does not consider relying on the words of others to be worthy of a mature and wise person. According to these forms, since relying on a Testimony means/requires worshiping and accepting the guardianship of another, it is fundamentally incompatible with the noble element and original human dignity, that is, rational Autonomy. Therefore, the Testimony cannot play a meaningful role in human cognition. Our contention is that not only is the aforementioned argument distorted and incapable of justifying its contention, but one of the essentials of Autonomy is to refer to the opinions of others in the realm of knowledge. Accordingly, this article tries to defend the authenticity of the Testimony while accepting Autonomy as a rational and fundamental principle.

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