Observational knowledge from the perspective of Robert Brandom

This article analyzes Robert Brandom’s view of observational knowledge by focusing on his fundamental concepts such as the space of reasons and the game of giving and asking for reasons. Drawing on Wilfrid Sellars’s ideas, Brandom explains observational knowledge as a two-tiered process involving reliable differential responsive dispositions and normative commitments embedded in linguistic practices. A feedback-oriented level of perceptual engagement is described as a capacity shared by humans and other intelligent beings. However, at a distinct level, it is rational and logical beings who participate in language games, thereby rendering the entirety of their perceptual uptake conceptual and thus normative. The article seeks to offer a more holistic perspective on intentionality by highlighting the entanglement of these two levels and explaining how they mutually inform one another. It emphasizes that linguistic interactions, as part of discursive practices, account for knowledge through reasoning and the social exchange of reasons. It argues that observational claims must not only reliably emerge from differential responsive tendencies but also be integrated into inferential relations with other beliefs and claims. Within this normative space, individuals monitor and assess their own and others’ sets of commitments and entitlements under the governance of inferential norms. As a result, this view regards knowledge as a normative and social status arising from participation in discursive interactions, and it explains it without direct reference to traditional epistemic notions such as truth, justification, or epistemic warrant.