Psychological resistance and its role in the weakness of will, with emphasis on cold acratic actions

When a person, despite their better judgment and consideration of all relevant factors, intentionally and freely performs (or does not perform) an action, this behavior is classified as weakness of will, or akrasia. This issue, which has a long history in philosophy and was also of interest to the Greeks, was revived in contemporary philosophy with Davidson's (1970) article on the subject. Davidson ignored the role of emotions in justifying weakness of will, but people after him have tried to attribute a role to emotions in Davidson's picture of weakness of will. To provide a framework for understanding such actions, Christine Tappolet argues that the causal and justificatory role of emotions should be regarded as part of the reasons (as part of the rational process, not in opposition to it) that we invoke for acting. However, there are cases, such as exceeding the speed limit or smoking, where emotions alone cannot sufficiently justify such actions. This article introduces psychological reactance as a complementary framework for understanding weakness of will. Psychological reactance refers to an individual’s response to restore their perceived freedom after it is threatened. This concept offers a compelling explanation for akratic actions, particularly those classified as immoral or as examples of so-called "cold" akrasia.