Fodor's Causal Argument in Favor of Psychological Individualism; A Review of Owens's Reaction

Owens and Fodor agree that folk psychological explanatory states do not supervene on the physical. However, Fodor argues that this does not hold for theoretical psychology, which relies on causal explanations; these explanations must somehow supervene on the physical. Owens utilizes this agreement to critique Fodor, arguing that propositional attitude-based psychological explanations are not causal explanations, and therefore, the hybrid causal/representational model should be abandoned. Conversely, Saidel demonstrates that psychological explanations involving propositional attitudes can be causal, suggesting that the ambiguity in the application of “causal powers” (in their broad and narrow senses) is the source of this disagreement. Butler refutes the existence of broad causal powers, arguing that their acceptance necessitates that individuals with identical intrinsic properties could possess different causal powers, contradicting the supervenience of causal powers on intrinsic properties. Consequently, the tension between the individuation of propositional attitudes via broad content and their individuation via causal powers remains unresolved, and Saidel’s argument fails to address this tension. Finally, this paper critically examines the viewpoints of Owens, Butler, and Saidel, and offers a concluding synthesis.