A Critical Reappraisal of the Theory of “Ontological Correspondence of Knowledge and the Known” in the Thought of Ustād ʿUbūdiyyat

This article offers a critical reexamination and analysis of Ustād ʿUbūdiyyat’s articulation of the theory of the correspondence between knowledge and the known within the framework of Sadrian philosophy (ḥikmat-i mutaʿāliyah). It aims to demonstrate that his interpretation of “ontological correspondence” and the doctrine of “real and gradational predication” (ḥaml ḥaqīqah wa raqīqah) in acquired knowledge suffers from significant philosophical and explanatory deficiencies. Drawing on the theory of the gradation of existence (tashkīk al-wujūd), Ustād ʿUbūdiyyat holds that knowledge occupies a higher ontological level than the known, and on this basis, he seeks to justify the ontological correspondence of knowledge and the known. This study first reconstructs and logically analyzes his central argument, then identifies several critical problems, including the weakness of the causal basis for correspondence, the inadequacy of his account in explaining non-material objects of knowledge, conceptual ambiguities surrounding real and gradational predication, the inability to account for the representation of individuating features of the known, and the inconsistency between his account of the merely conceptual status of quiddity (māhiyyah) and its supposed genuine representation. Ultimately, the article concludes that, despite Ustād ʿUbūdiyyat’s innovative effort to integrate Sadrian metaphysics with epistemological theory, his account fails to provide a comprehensive and coherent explanation of the reality of correspondence in acquired knowledge, owing to its insufficient scope and ontological shortcomings.