An Analysis of the Philosophical Foundations of Aesthetic Judgment in Avicenna’s Philosophy

Aesthetic judgment is commonly treated as a central problem of modern aesthetics; nevertheless, its underlying conditions can also be examined within premodern philosophical traditions. This article investigates the philosophical foundations of aesthetic judgment in Avicenna’s thought. It argues that, although Avicenna does not offer a separate and systematically articulated theory under the name of “aesthetic judgment,” the conceptual resources for such a theory may be found in his ontology, psychology, account of perception, theory of perfection, and his discussions of pleasure, order, and proportion. The study is fundamental in nature and adopts a descriptive-analytical method. Its material has been gathered through library research and interpreted through philosophical analysis. The findings suggest that, for Avicenna, beauty is not restricted to sensible objects; rather, it appears across different levels of being and cognition, from the sensible and imaginal to the intellectual and divine. On this basis, aesthetic judgment may be reconstructed as a judgment concerning the beauty or ugliness of beings and human works, grounded in such criteria as order, composition, moderation, proportion, unity, perfection, technical mastery, and proper representation. The article further shows that beauty in Avicenna’s philosophy is closely related to the good, perfection, knowledge, pleasure, happiness, and moral value. Thus, aesthetic judgment, in an Avicennian framework, cannot be reduced to a merely sensory response or subjective taste; it is rooted in broader ontological and epistemological principles.