the study of animalism about personal identity

Document Type : Original Article

Author
Ahmad Lohrasbi
Assistant professor of the university of religions and denominations
10.30470/phm.2024.2014834.2465
Abstract
A theory of personal identity should explain how a person, despite all the changes that happen to her/him over time, remains the same and does not become another person or end. In other words, a theory of personal identity should provide us with a criterion for personal identity. Animalism is a theory of personal identity that offers the biological criterion for personal identity. The main claim of animalists is that we are animals. You, I, and any other who is similar to us is an animal, i.e., identical to an animal. According to this claim, they refuse to accept other criteria, especially the psychological criterion as the right criterion for the personal identity, and offer the biological criterion. As they say, we are living organisms and persist through time as long as our life persists, and we don't need anything other than biological systems to persist. In another word psychological criterion are neither necessary nor sufficient for our persistence through time. Their main argument is thinking animal argument which is rejected by arguments such as the thinking parts argument. Animalists, however, do not seem to have good arguments to defend their view, nor do they have good responses to the critics.
Keywords
personal identity
animalism
thinking animal argument
Eric Olson
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Philosophical Meditations
Volume 15, Issue 35 - Serial Number 35
September 2025
Pages 119-151